Commission announced: 1) EU fiscal rules remain suspended in 2021; 2) focus of reviewing the rules is on reducing reliance on output gap estimates. A thread on why changing these output gap estimates is essential to promote recovery from 2022 onwards: /1
The European Commission’s potential output model is the core technical backbone of EU fiscal surveillance. Model-based estimates are used for evaluating and supervising member states’ fiscal performance and underlie recommendations related to medium-term budgetary objectives. /2
Given the importance of model-based estimates in the EU’s fiscal rules – avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal tightening in the near future will require that policymakers’ hands are not tied by overly pessimistic views on the development of potential output. /3
Past research provides in-depth analysis on revisions in potential output estimates in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Countries most affected by the crisis suffered the largest downward revisions in potential output – and vice versa. /4
Via the institutionalization of structural balances in the EU’s fiscal regulation framework, downward revisions in potential output increased fiscal consolidation pressures especially in the countries with the largest downward revisions. /5
I use the example of Italy for illustration. Before the COVID-19 shock hit, the Commission estimated that the Italian fiscal deficit would come in at 2.2% of GDP in 2019. Given small official estimates of the output gap, the ‘structural’ deficit was estimated to be large. /6
However, alternative estimates of the output gap pointing to a higher degree of resource underutilization would have reduced the fiscal consolidation pressure on the Italian government. Recommendations for lower government expenditures would have been obsolete. /7
Especially in the period 2010 to 2014, the reliance on pessimistic views of potential output triggered pro-cyclical adjustments in fiscal policy with negative economic growth effects: intereconomics.eu/contents/year/… /8
Fiscal consolidation caused hysteresis effects, leading to successive rounds of downward revisions in potential output that partly validated the original pessimistic potential output forecasts and, in turn, caused further fiscal consolidation requirements. /9
How will the COVID-19 shock affect the European Commission’s potential output estimates ? In its recent forecast, the Commission systematically reduced its PO forecast to a larger extent in countries that are also predicted to suffer from a larger drop in actual output. /10
One additional percentage point in predicted losses of actual output is associated with a loss in potential output of about 0.6 percentage points, suggesting that the revisions in PO-model estimates are strongly related to changes in economic activity. /11
The problem with immediate downward revisions in potential output is that pessimistic initial views have proven to be self-reinforcing during the Euro Crisis as they reduce fiscal space exactly in those times when it is most needed. /12
Downward revisions in potential output translate into higher ‘structural’ deficits, which will again become important once the temporary suspension of the EU’s fiscal rules is lifted. Commission has announced that rules will not apply in 2021. But problems will not disappear. /13
Once the suspension is lifted, model-based assessments of excessive ‘structural’ deficits will force the EU countries concerned to implement fiscal consolidation measures that may hinder economic recovery. Essential that we avoid a repeat of "output gap nonsense"! /14
Importantly, the PO-model would need to better consider the presence of hysteresis effects. Properly accounting for hysteresis should make economic policies more aggressive, especially during large negative cyclical events – and COVID-19 certainly falls into this category. /15
There are several approaches that have tried to come up with better estimates of potential output to improve policy-making. Here are a couple of links:
So let's continue the technical discussion - but never forget that all of the technical stuff is politically important, and we should therefore have a thorough public debate concerning the implications for policymaking: researchgate.net/publication/33…
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I have a new paper on fiscal consolidation and its growth effects. I review how large the fiscal consolidations in €zone countries were in the past, what the research record shows about growth effects, and what that implies for the austerity outlook for the next years. Thread 🧵
Pressure to implement fiscal consolidation during the early 1990s coincided with the introduction of the Maastricht provisions. On average, the €zone countries had a cumulative fiscal adjustment of 5.3% of GDP over the 1992-1998 period, with the largest consolidation in Italy.
The 1999-2007 period (i.e. from the establishment of the common monetary union until the outbreak of the financial crisis) was marked by some sizeable fiscal adjustments motivated by deficit-reduction desires, but these were concentrated in only a handful of countries.
How far from full employment? Our paper in European Economic Review: based on unemployment-vacancy data, we find full employment episodes in EU countries during the 1970s. Labour markets became tighter when recovering from COVID-19, but few countries hit full employment. Thread:
Based on contributions by Michaillat/Saez, we apply a full employment concept derived from the unemployment-vacancies relationship to European countries. We use the Beveridge (full employment-consistent) rate of unemployment (BECRU) to study labour markets over 1970-2022.
We find full employment episodes in EU countries in the 1970s. The European unemployment problem emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Slack in labour markets initially increased during the pandemic. Labour markets became tighter recovering from COVID-19; few countries hit full employment.
Do higher public debt levels reduce economic growth? My meta-analysis is out in the September issue of Journal of Economic Surveys. By analysing 816 estimates, I find
- publication bias in favour of negative growth effects
- no uniform public-debt-to-GDP threshold
Summary 🧵
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence tell us about growth effects of higher public debt? /2
Several papers argue that there is indeed evidence for a negative causal effect of higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, and for a (close to) 90% threshold in the public-debt-to-GDP-ratio beyond which growth falls significantly. /3
How did Italy become the Eurozone's Achilles heel, the monetary union's most vulnerable spot? In a new working paper, we answer this question by reassessing Italy's long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation 🧵
Italy is the Eurozone's Achilles heel; its large economy has fallen behind other Eurozone peers; given the Eurozone's institutions and rules, there are constantly questions on how to manage Italy's high public debt under constraints on monetary, fiscal, industrial and wage policy
We use a new structuralist framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline.
We need to promote public debate on fiscal policy and EU fiscal rules. Yesterday, I did a presentation in Vienna on climate investment in the context of public investment needs and EU fiscal rules reform. I stressed three main points (short thread):
1. If policymakers are serious about meeting the climate goals, they will need to significantly increase public investment for climate and energy. We are talking about *additional* public investment of at least 1% of EU GDP per year.
2. The European Commission has published EU fiscal rules reform orientations that were welcomed by EU finance ministers. Tough political negotiations ahead, but what's on the table will not sufficiently increase the scope for public climate investment.
The European Parliament requested me to write a study assessing the European Commission's orientations on reforming EU fiscal rules, with a focus on Debt Sustainability Analysis as an anchor for bilateral negotiations and surveillance.
Here is a summary of my main results 🧵
The Commission’s (COM) orientations (published in November 2022) were welcomed by the conclusions of the Council of the EU on March 14th 2023. COM proposes an enhanced role for debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in assessing fiscal risks. Focus: bringing down public debt ratios.
Reform orientations:
- COM conducts a DSA for each member state projecting the public-debt-to-GDP ratio over >10 years.
- DSA inputs used to derive reference fiscal adjustment path consistent with falling debt ratio
-Negotiations COM/governments on multi-annual expenditure plans