Thread by @bill_hayton

How does China see Vietnam’s South China Sea policy? Very clearly, according to this April 2020 article by Zhao Weihua of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies in 文化纵横 / Wénhuà zònghéng / ‘Cultural aspect’. Thanks to @khacgiang for alerting me to it. mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LAsrVIVVcFGw…

Caveat - I’m working off Google Translate so there may be errors…

The author is a Southeast Asia ‘watcher’ and on the 'Research Team' of @SCS_PI scspi.org/en/gywm

Professor Zhao analyses statements by Vietnamese generals and concludes they believe that "the US is only using Vietnam and will not fundamentally abandon its subversive policy towards Vietnam"

And, according to Prof Zhao, Vietnam’s leaders believe that "If Vietnam completely falls to the United States, Vietnam may eventually become a victim of the game between China and the United States."

Professor Zhao appears to believe that before 1975, "Vietnam fully recognized China’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands and surrounding waters”. He doesn’t offer any evidence but if this is the starting point for Chinese analyses, then we can see a problem

He ascribes the start of a new phase in the South China Sea after 2009 to, "the rapid growth of [China’s] national power, especially the smooth implementation of China's maritime power strategy after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”

Refreshing to hear a Chinese scholar admitting that “our side started it” back in 2009…!

Prof Zhao argues that since 2011, "Vietnam has shifted its main goal in the South China Sea to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf” rather than the question of who controls which islands.

Zhao seems impressed with Vietnam’s use of "international academic seminars to promote Vietnam’s views and achieve political goals in the name of academics.” He notes that "the 'East Sea Research Fund' ...has become increasingly noticeable."

Zhao notes a change in Vietnam’s attitude to the former ‘Republic of Vietnam’ - no longer calling it the 'Saigon Puppet Regime’ - because of the need to use its actions before 1975 in support of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s current territorial claims.

Zhao claims that China’s island-building in the Spratlys "broke [Vietnam’s] last hope of seizing the Xisha [Paracel] islands and reefs and the surrounding waters, but also shaken the foundation of its vested interests in the Nansha [Spratly] area."

Zhao suggests a deal exists in Vietnamese leaders’ minds: If China promises not to use force to seize islands in the Spratlys controlled by Vietnam, then Vietnam will not mention the sovereignty of the Paracels or use the United States to intervene in the Vietnam-China dispute.

Zhao believes Vietnam has two motivations for its South China Sea policy: 1. to increase its strategic depth and extend its early-warning range and 2. to exploit fish and energy resources.

Strange that Zhao doesn’t recognise the importance of Vietnam’s territorial beliefs to its South China Sea policy. Zhao copies the same mistake of many who look at China’s policy but leave out its nationalistic agenda of grabbing territory purely for its own sake.

I’ve learnt a new term. Zhao refers to Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf claim as the ‘fan’ claim, presumably because of its shape...

Zhao describes Vietnam’s new South China Sea 'systematic strategic adjustment' as:
1. assert that islands have no EEZ entitlement
2. narrow the scope of its claim area
3. reach agreements with other Southeast Asian claimants
4. blur its views on military transits through the sea

Zhao repeats the old BS that "the "South China Sea Arbitration" was mainly provoked by the support of the United States and Japan for the Philippines”. But that’s standard boilerplate propaganda.

Zhao thinks Vietnam’s strategy has worked because "it has greatly reduced the choice space for China's rights protection in the South China Sea and worsened China's international public opinion environment on the South China Sea."

BUT, crucially, Zhao thinks "it is very unlikely that Vietnam will resort to international judicial or arbitration procedures.”

Zhao says "Vietnam often uses this topic [legal action] to threaten China, it is basically just a tool to play games with China or put pressure on it, and there is almost no possibility of putting it into practice."

If that’s what Chinese decision-makers believe then there’s no point Vietnamese representatives dropping hints about taking legal action. It will have no effect on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea.

Zhao also asserts that "Mainstream scholars close to Vietnam’s decision-making tier believe that China’s rise is unstoppable” and that "the United States is likely to reach a compromise with China at the expense of Vietnam’s interests"

Zhao claims that Vietnamese leaders believe "the United States is likely to exchange interests with China after China meets its core requirements for "freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea, betray Vietnam, and recognize China's sovereignty requirements in the SCS."

The conclusion for China is that "The longer time delays, the more passive Vietnam will be”. In effect China wins by refusing to negotiate on anything.

Zhao believes VN decision-makers think Vietnam can make concessions to China in order to reach agreement:
1. abandon VN’s claim in Paracels to consolidate position in Spratlys
2. make limited concessions in the Spratlys up to the line of its EEZ claim from its coastline

Zhao then concludes that "it is in the fundamental interests of both China and Vietnam to focus on the short-term management of differences and maintain stability” followed by more boilerplate language...

"seeking truth from facts, complying with international commitments, objectively invoking international law, act in the same direction, abandon outdated practice of suppressing external forces, pursue a win-win situation through peaceful consultations, so both parties can agree."

My thoughts…
1. It’s a single academic at a provincial university writing in an open journal - it’s not a Politburo briefing paper
2. But, this seems to be mainstream thinking among China’s South China Sea watchers
3. There are hints that a territorial compromise could be found

4. Chinese decision-makers believe time is firmly on their side in the South China Sea - delay is good.
5. They don’t think Vietnam will initiate a legal case
6. They think Vietnam has no faith in the United States.
END!