Thread by @yeacikgonul

1. I posted a chain of tweets yesterday about Eastern Mediterranean maritime delimitation. Many positive feedbacks suggested me to connect these tweets. It will be a repeat, but I will be posting the thread once again in order.

2. I see many people commenting on the maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. I wanted to take an adventurous step and draw my own map. Just to clarify, drawing a map is a dangerous move, takes a lot of considerations (courts generally take 3 years to reach a map :)

3- I have devoted my academic career on maritime delimitation. If I know one thing good in life, that is this field. I know the details of all given judgments by heart, have 2 LLM degrees, a PHD candidate, written book and many articles on peer-reviewed journals and given courses

4- Based on my experience, here is “my” ideal delimitation in Eastern Mediterranean based on int law. The map compares the “fair delimitation” against Turkish and Greek claims. @WashingtonPoint @NicholasDanfort @Metin4020
@AkdenizKibris @CErciyes @ahval_en @YanniKouts @USAmbPyatt

5. I am confident that a competent court will decide on a very similar settlement if the dispute goes to adjudication. I give a max %5-%10 margin of error. P.S.: I am not a map expert, nor I hire a graphic designer. Little inaccuracy in my drawing should be tolerated

6. While drawing each section, I have cross checked with the established case law on similar disputes and relevant references. I have explanation for every section of the map, if anyone is interested to know why. Full explanation requires a 100 pages memo, but the summary is here

7. Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes will have almost full effect on delimitation, though they are hundreds of miles apart from Greek mainland. They have significant population. However, their weight against Turkey needs to be trimmed with a 2/3 effect for two reasons:

8.Their projection towards Anatolia has a pronounced cut-off effect on Turkey's maritime opening and there is a big disparity in costal lengths (4 vs 1). Western Colombian Islands situated against Nicaraguan mainland could be the best precedent to compare with the situation here.

9. I calculated the relevant coastlines of Rhodes & Karpathos and Turkey based on 200 nm EEZ projection:
#Turkey: Roughly from Datca to Alanya
#Rhodes & #Karpathos: East and North coasts of these islands combined. (West and south facades, and Crete are irrelevant)

10- Based on its location, pop, size, Kastellorizo has no chance to gain anything beyond territorial sea. Ample examples suggests the same (Colombian Islands, Channel Islands, St Martin’s Island and many more). It is most probable that Kastellorizo will be enclaved in the south

11. Some may argue that Kastellorizo shall be granted a corridor connecting it to other parts of Greek waters, as in St Pierre and Miquelon. I argue otherwise. Here is not an ocean or high seas. Anything beyond territorial sea will block Turkish mainland’s projection to the south

12. Cyprus (rep GCA & TRNC) needs to be treated as a single continentl mainland, not like a dependent island, but be given slightly reduced weight (I suggest 2/3 effect) due to the “disparity” in relevant coastal lengths (3 vs 1) and mostly pronounced “cut-off effect” in the West

13. The most comparable case would be Libya v. Malta, where Malta was given a limited effect due to disparity in coastal lengths, and there was not a cut-off effect in place. Enclaving Cyprus is laughable, while giving full effect to Cyprus will be distorting and disproportionate

14. The cut-off effect between Cyprus and Turkey becomes dramatic to the disadvantage of Turkey when the coastal relationship becomes adjacent towards the Southwest. A Court will be more sympathetic to Turkey on this section, and less on Northern part of the Island

15. Calculated the relevant coastlines of Cyprus and Turkey based on 200 nm EEZ projection:
#Turkey: From Kas, Antalya to all the way to the most Eastern Turkey (Samandag, Hatay)
#Cyprus: Northern and Western coast of the Island (other parts irrelevant).

16. Turkey’s southern boundary will be a median line between Egypt. Parties relevant coastlines are comparable on this section and there is no interrupting geographical feature (other than Kastellorizo). There should not be much complexity on this part.

17. From the most Southwestern corner of the map, Greece-Egypt boundary starts. The recent Greece-Egypt delimitation sounds reasonable and fits to this map. Obviously Turkey-Libya boundary does not exist. Cyprus-Egypt border will merge with this proposed line on Southeastern part

18. I genuinely believe that this is a fair delimitation. But of course, neither Turkey nor Greece will leave their positions, which make sense. You ask for the maximum and compromise in between. But the problem is ever growing political hostility due to the parties’ bad policies

19. In resolving the Mediterranean dispute, the primary question would be "whether Islands have the same maritime area of mainlands". Turkey wants to ignore Greek islands from an EEZ delimitation, whereas Greece would like to give full weight to these Islands, inc Kastellorizo

20. First of all, there is no clear answer to these questions. The effect to be accorded to islands has been one of the most controversial issues in the history of the law of maritime boundary delimitation. Lots of fight and discussion on this topic.

21. While the entitlement of islands to generate zones of maritime jurisdiction was fully respected under article 121 of the UNCLOS, their capacity to do so on an equal basis with ‘mainland’ coasts in the context of the delimitation was not.

22. The fact that islands have the right to generate maritime jurisdiction like other land features does not necessarily mean that islands will be given the same effect as that given to continental coasts.

23. In considering the weight to be accorded to insular features, the case law indicates that factors of size, status, location and the distance from the mainland, together with the extent of spatial distortion of the equidistance line, are decisive elements.

24. The main concern is the potential distorting and disproportionate effect of islands on the general geographical balance. Logic is simple: an insignificant feature in a delimitation area should not produce exaggerated and excessive adverse effects to the detriment of one party

25. There are ample cases where courts gave limited effect to distorting islands. Some examples coming to mind: English Channel Islands, St Martin's, Kerkennah Islands, St Pierre & Miquelon, Serpent’s Island, Quitasueño, Serrana, other Colombian Islands, Talpatty/New Moore Island

26. Kastellorizo, a small island located on the “wrong side” of the boundary falls within the definition of "distorting feature". Claiming this island to have full EEZ will not receive credit or respect from int law. No court will treat it equal against Turkish mainland.

27. Crete, Cyprus and Rhodes are completely different stories, they should be given significant weight in delimitation based on their location, pop, status etc, almost like mainland. Mapping out these islands from EEZ delimitation is non-sense, reducing their weight is equitable