#2dayIn1948
Less than 24hrs ago, enemy had heavily bombarded a single picquet of Skardu garrison, followed by a determined assault on it by a strength of two companies. Their first rush carried them almost on to the bunkers, and savage hand to hand fighting took place.
Less than 24hrs ago, enemy had heavily bombarded a single picquet of Skardu garrison, followed by a determined assault on it by a strength of two companies. Their first rush carried them almost on to the bunkers, and savage hand to hand fighting took place.
#2dayIn1948
Grenades and bayonets were put to liberal use, and the battle continued for four hrs. It ended with the repulse of the attackers once again, with many of their dead left behind.
Grenades and bayonets were put to liberal use, and the battle continued for four hrs. It ended with the repulse of the attackers once again, with many of their dead left behind.
#2dayIn1948
During the intense fighting, the picquet ran short of rifle ammo, and a fresh box of it had to be rushed there from the fort.
During the intense fighting, the picquet ran short of rifle ammo, and a fresh box of it had to be rushed there from the fort.
#2dayIn1948
This was the last box of ammo left in reserve. After the battle, it was found that there remained only 10 cartridges with each rifleman.
It was not enough even to fight one more battle.
This was the last box of ammo left in reserve. After the battle, it was found that there remained only 10 cartridges with each rifleman.
It was not enough even to fight one more battle.
#2dayIn1948
The long anticipated end for Skardu Garrison had come.
The long anticipated end for Skardu Garrison had come.
#2dayIn1948
As on 13 Aug 1948, the siege had lasted over six months. The civilian refugees - men, women & children, had cheerfully endured all the dangers and privations of the long siege, and knew what was in store for them.
As on 13 Aug 1948, the siege had lasted over six months. The civilian refugees - men, women & children, had cheerfully endured all the dangers and privations of the long siege, and knew what was in store for them.
#2dayIn1948
The men had fought like heroes, and now the time had come to meet their fate with calm resignation.
Their commander still exhorted them to fight on, but even he could hold out no hope of final success.
The men had fought like heroes, and now the time had come to meet their fate with calm resignation.
Their commander still exhorted them to fight on, but even he could hold out no hope of final success.
#2dayIn1948
When night came, these staunch men of the Skardu Garrison who had withstood so many stormy attacks, quietly slipped out of the fort in twos and threes, preferring to gamble their lives outside rather than wait patiently for the inevitable at the ..
When night came, these staunch men of the Skardu Garrison who had withstood so many stormy attacks, quietly slipped out of the fort in twos and threes, preferring to gamble their lives outside rather than wait patiently for the inevitable at the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. hands of an enemy whose treatment of his captives would even put the present day ISIS to shame.
.. hands of an enemy whose treatment of his captives would even put the present day ISIS to shame.
#2dayIn1948
Skardu capitulated this day.
Skardu capitulated this day.
#2dayIn1948
As a gloomy, grey sky welcomed the 365th day of independence of the Union of India, Skardu fort was held only by Lt Col Thapa alongwith four of his officers, one JCO and 35 other ranks.
The refugees lay huddled in their corner.
As a gloomy, grey sky welcomed the 365th day of independence of the Union of India, Skardu fort was held only by Lt Col Thapa alongwith four of his officers, one JCO and 35 other ranks.
The refugees lay huddled in their corner.
#2dayIn1948
Thapa sent off his last signal to Gen Thimayya at 0800Hr.
Thapa sent off his last signal to Gen Thimayya at 0800Hr.
#2dayIn1948
When the raiders took charge of the fort, all Muslim prisoners were led away, and the remaining murdered.
Fate of womenfolk was much worse, similar to that in Baramula in Oct 1947.
Capt Ganga Singh, Adjutant, was tied to the ground and shot dead.
When the raiders took charge of the fort, all Muslim prisoners were led away, and the remaining murdered.
Fate of womenfolk was much worse, similar to that in Baramula in Oct 1947.
Capt Ganga Singh, Adjutant, was tied to the ground and shot dead.
#2dayIn1948
The only prisoners allowed to live were Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, the garrison commander who'd held on despite terrific odds, thereby earning the grudging respect of an enemy not known much for his chivalry on battlefield, and his orderly, Sepoy Kalyan Singh.
The only prisoners allowed to live were Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, the garrison commander who'd held on despite terrific odds, thereby earning the grudging respect of an enemy not known much for his chivalry on battlefield, and his orderly, Sepoy Kalyan Singh.
#2dayIn1948
They would be repatriated a few weeks after the ceasefire in Jan 1949, to a warm welcome.
Thapa was awarded by the Govt with a well deserved Maha Vir Chakra & subsequently promoted to Brigadier, retiring in 1961.
Photo: Brig Thapa
They would be repatriated a few weeks after the ceasefire in Jan 1949, to a warm welcome.
Thapa was awarded by the Govt with a well deserved Maha Vir Chakra & subsequently promoted to Brigadier, retiring in 1961.
Photo: Brig Thapa
#2dayIn1948
Photo: Skardu Fort, held for more than 8 months by a handful of men, facing a much superior enemy.
Photo: Skardu Fort, held for more than 8 months by a handful of men, facing a much superior enemy.
#2dayIn1948
Brig Sher Jung Thapa passed away in Aug 1999 at the ripe old age of 92, unsung and unwept either by the Army or by the Govt.
Brig Sher Jung Thapa passed away in Aug 1999 at the ripe old age of 92, unsung and unwept either by the Army or by the Govt.
#2dayIn1948
No obituaries were written. Nor any memorial constructed to acknowledge his service rendered. Our history books remain silent on the battle of Skardu, which has a lot to teach despite the outcome, importantly about the character of the man who held on.
No obituaries were written. Nor any memorial constructed to acknowledge his service rendered. Our history books remain silent on the battle of Skardu, which has a lot to teach despite the outcome, importantly about the character of the man who held on.
#2dayIn1948
Still, his dogged defence of Skardu will remain an abject lesson for what you can achieve if you have it in you.
He had it in him in abundance.
May this thread be a lasting tribute to his memory.
God bless the souls of those who fell in and around Skardu.
Still, his dogged defence of Skardu will remain an abject lesson for what you can achieve if you have it in you.
He had it in him in abundance.
May this thread be a lasting tribute to his memory.
God bless the souls of those who fell in and around Skardu.
#2dayIn1948
There's another school of thought on the reason why Lt Col Thapa was not executed like others post surrender. This can only be explained by the way of a conjecture; one that just might stand the test of deep scrutiny.
Pak army during 1947-48 war was ..
There's another school of thought on the reason why Lt Col Thapa was not executed like others post surrender. This can only be explained by the way of a conjecture; one that just might stand the test of deep scrutiny.
Pak army during 1947-48 war was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. commanded by Gen Sir Douglas Gracey and he was, as would be expected, keeping a keen eye on progress of ops. When he learnt of the defiant stand of Skardu Garrison, he would have learnt that the man responsible for it was his old hockey colleague ..
.. commanded by Gen Sir Douglas Gracey and he was, as would be expected, keeping a keen eye on progress of ops. When he learnt of the defiant stand of Skardu Garrison, he would have learnt that the man responsible for it was his old hockey colleague ..
#2dayIn1948
.. at Dharamshala, whom he, as Adjutant of 1st Gorkha Rifles Regimental Centre, had motivated to join the Army, Lt Col Thapa.
.. at Dharamshala, whom he, as Adjutant of 1st Gorkha Rifles Regimental Centre, had motivated to join the Army, Lt Col Thapa.
#2dayIn1948
It may be fair to assume that he might have passed orders for no harm to be brought upon the person of Lt Col Thapa after his surrender. Of course, this may also be interpreted to mean that he gave a silent nod to the slaughter of balance of the prisoners.
It may be fair to assume that he might have passed orders for no harm to be brought upon the person of Lt Col Thapa after his surrender. Of course, this may also be interpreted to mean that he gave a silent nod to the slaughter of balance of the prisoners.
#2dayIn1948
But as I said before, this is just a conjecture, though food for thought nonetheless.
But as I said before, this is just a conjecture, though food for thought nonetheless.
#2dayIn1948
After the loss of Skardu, tempo of ops in Aug slowed down as both sides re-assessed their future course of action.
I will take this time to update the happenings in the UN / diplomatic front in this duration.
After the loss of Skardu, tempo of ops in Aug slowed down as both sides re-assessed their future course of action.
I will take this time to update the happenings in the UN / diplomatic front in this duration.
#2dayIn1948
In Jul 1948, Noel-Baker argued that Britain should turn a blind eye to the Pakistani presence in Kashmir & that the 'Stand Down' instructions should only be interpreted as barring the physical presence in Kashmir of British military personnel in the opposing armies.
In Jul 1948, Noel-Baker argued that Britain should turn a blind eye to the Pakistani presence in Kashmir & that the 'Stand Down' instructions should only be interpreted as barring the physical presence in Kashmir of British military personnel in the opposing armies.
#2dayIn1948
The UK Defence Minister fell in with this plea.
The assumption here was that no British officer had been sent into Kashmir with Pakistani forces. However, it turned out that the assumption was wrong.
Grafftey-Smith reported in July that a few British technical ..
The UK Defence Minister fell in with this plea.
The assumption here was that no British officer had been sent into Kashmir with Pakistani forces. However, it turned out that the assumption was wrong.
Grafftey-Smith reported in July that a few British technical ..
#2dayIn1948
.. officers were serving in Kashmir owing to the serious shortage of trained Pakistani personnel. A few days later, he reported that one of these officers, Maj Sloan of Royal Engineers, had been killed while clearing mines in Kashmir.
.. officers were serving in Kashmir owing to the serious shortage of trained Pakistani personnel. A few days later, he reported that one of these officers, Maj Sloan of Royal Engineers, had been killed while clearing mines in Kashmir.
#2dayIn1948
Even under the restricted interpretation of the 'Stand Down' policy, this called for a British response. Grafftey-Smith was therefore instructed to approach Zafrulla Khan at once and demand immediate withdrawal of all British officers from Kashmir.
Even under the restricted interpretation of the 'Stand Down' policy, this called for a British response. Grafftey-Smith was therefore instructed to approach Zafrulla Khan at once and demand immediate withdrawal of all British officers from Kashmir.
#2dayIn1948
He was to make it clear that London would not tolerate use of British officers 'in conditions in which they may be involved in hostilities with forces of another Dominion.' Pakistan promptly complied with the demand.
When the CRO instructed Shone ..
He was to make it clear that London would not tolerate use of British officers 'in conditions in which they may be involved in hostilities with forces of another Dominion.' Pakistan promptly complied with the demand.
When the CRO instructed Shone ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to seek a similar assurance from the Indian Govt, the High Commissioner counselled restraint. He sent his deputy, Symon, to consult Bucher unofficially. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed that no British personnel were serving in ..
.. to seek a similar assurance from the Indian Govt, the High Commissioner counselled restraint. He sent his deputy, Symon, to consult Bucher unofficially. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed that no British personnel were serving in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Kashmir & there was no intention of employing them in the state. But he urged that the matter should not be taken up formally with New Delhi. Bucher knew that the Indian Govt viewed this as an act of self-restraint rather than compliance with a British demand.
.. Kashmir & there was no intention of employing them in the state. But he urged that the matter should not be taken up formally with New Delhi. Bucher knew that the Indian Govt viewed this as an act of self-restraint rather than compliance with a British demand.
#2dayIn1948
Doubtless with the case of Junagadh in mind, he told Symon that a formal demarche would almost certainly lead the Indian Govt to re-examine the need for further retention of British Officers, including the question of his own replacement by an Indian officer.
Doubtless with the case of Junagadh in mind, he told Symon that a formal demarche would almost certainly lead the Indian Govt to re-examine the need for further retention of British Officers, including the question of his own replacement by an Indian officer.
#2dayIn1948
He claimed 'there had been an agitation for some time by a group of senior Indian officers led by Gen Cariappa against further retention of British officers even in an advisory capacity on the ground that they can't be employed where they are most needed, i.e Kashmir'
He claimed 'there had been an agitation for some time by a group of senior Indian officers led by Gen Cariappa against further retention of British officers even in an advisory capacity on the ground that they can't be employed where they are most needed, i.e Kashmir'
#2dayIn1948
The High Commissioner pointed that 'if Bucher is replaced .. we shall lose one of the most stabilizing and restraining influences in India.'
London reluctantly agreed to defer the question.
The High Commissioner pointed that 'if Bucher is replaced .. we shall lose one of the most stabilizing and restraining influences in India.'
London reluctantly agreed to defer the question.
#2dayIn1948
Thus, one element of the 'Stand Down' policy as it came to be interpreted in 1948 was that the British officers would stay out of Kashmir state territory The requirement was never communicated to New Delhi, though ..
Thus, one element of the 'Stand Down' policy as it came to be interpreted in 1948 was that the British officers would stay out of Kashmir state territory The requirement was never communicated to New Delhi, though ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Mountbatten had applied it earlier in Gen Russell's case - lest it precipitate a decision to terminate the services of all its personnel.
Another element of the policy was that a 'Stand Down', if ordered, would apply to both Dominions simultaneously.
.. Mountbatten had applied it earlier in Gen Russell's case - lest it precipitate a decision to terminate the services of all its personnel.
Another element of the policy was that a 'Stand Down', if ordered, would apply to both Dominions simultaneously.
#2dayIn1948
This came to be clarified in correspondence between Attlee & Liaquat, but once again, India was not informed.
The Attlee-Liaquat correspondence arose from an Indian charge that Pakistan was planning to use its air force to attack the RIAF in Kashmir.
This came to be clarified in correspondence between Attlee & Liaquat, but once again, India was not informed.
The Attlee-Liaquat correspondence arose from an Indian charge that Pakistan was planning to use its air force to attack the RIAF in Kashmir.
#2dayIn1948
Info available in London did not bear out the charge.
Indeed, it would have been foolhardy for Pakistan to employ her fledgling air force in this manner since it would inevitably have led to Indian retaliation against the bases ..
Info available in London did not bear out the charge.
Indeed, it would have been foolhardy for Pakistan to employ her fledgling air force in this manner since it would inevitably have led to Indian retaliation against the bases ..
#2dayIn1948
.. from which the attacks were launched. The possibility of the war spilling across the borders of J&K worried Britain.
Attlee therefore sought an assurance from Liaquat that the RPAF would not be launched in Kashmir. Liaquat provided the anticipated assurance.
.. from which the attacks were launched. The possibility of the war spilling across the borders of J&K worried Britain.
Attlee therefore sought an assurance from Liaquat that the RPAF would not be launched in Kashmir. Liaquat provided the anticipated assurance.
#2dayIn1948
In thanking Liaquat, Attlee spelt out his reason for taking up the question. 'My object in recalling you that, in the event of war, we should have to withdraw all British officers serving with the forces of India & Pakistan, was simply to ..
In thanking Liaquat, Attlee spelt out his reason for taking up the question. 'My object in recalling you that, in the event of war, we should have to withdraw all British officers serving with the forces of India & Pakistan, was simply to ..
#2dayIn1948
..remind you of this factor in the situation, 'he cabled. 'Such a step (which we should only take with the greatest reluctance) would be dictated not by any consideration of the rights and wrongs of the dispute, or of the resulting advantages or ..
..remind you of this factor in the situation, 'he cabled. 'Such a step (which we should only take with the greatest reluctance) would be dictated not by any consideration of the rights and wrongs of the dispute, or of the resulting advantages or ..
#2dayIn1948
.. disadvantages to one side or the other, but simply to prevent a situation in which British officers would be fighting one another. This we could never contemplate.'
Unquote
.. disadvantages to one side or the other, but simply to prevent a situation in which British officers would be fighting one another. This we could never contemplate.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
The same message was transmitted to Nehru.
This drew a protest from Liaquat. The logical implication of Attlee's position was that British officers would be withdrawn from both armies in the event of an Indian counter attack across Pakistani border.
The same message was transmitted to Nehru.
This drew a protest from Liaquat. The logical implication of Attlee's position was that British officers would be withdrawn from both armies in the event of an Indian counter attack across Pakistani border.
#2dayIn1948
He wrote, 'I am surprised at your view that the withdrawal of British officers wouldn't be dictated by any consideration of the rights or wrongs of he dispute. Surely if you withdraw British officers from the aggressor State, the question of British ..
He wrote, 'I am surprised at your view that the withdrawal of British officers wouldn't be dictated by any consideration of the rights or wrongs of he dispute. Surely if you withdraw British officers from the aggressor State, the question of British ..
#2dayIn1948
.. officers fighting one another cannot arise ... The disadvantages to India resulting from the loss of British officers are small compared with corresponding disadvantages to Pakistan. By the decision to withdraw British officers from both sides and ..
.. officers fighting one another cannot arise ... The disadvantages to India resulting from the loss of British officers are small compared with corresponding disadvantages to Pakistan. By the decision to withdraw British officers from both sides and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. by informing India of your intentions to do so, you are encouraging India in her career of aggression.'
Unquote.
.. by informing India of your intentions to do so, you are encouraging India in her career of aggression.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Atllee replied that 'the position is that the withdrawal of British officers from India alone or Pakistan alone on the ground that one or the other was the aggressor State is a step which we could not contemplate unless it were in pursuance of some ..
Atllee replied that 'the position is that the withdrawal of British officers from India alone or Pakistan alone on the ground that one or the other was the aggressor State is a step which we could not contemplate unless it were in pursuance of some ..
#2dayIn1948
This message - which was deliberately not communicated to Nehru - added a further twist to the Stand Down policy.
At first sight it seemed to be a reiteration of position taken in Attlee's previous telegram.
This message - which was deliberately not communicated to Nehru - added a further twist to the Stand Down policy.
At first sight it seemed to be a reiteration of position taken in Attlee's previous telegram.
#2dayIn1948
But the question of a Security Council decision opened up a new possibility.
But the question of a Security Council decision opened up a new possibility.
#2dayIn1948
Later in the year, it encouraged expectations in Pakistan which would produce a major change of military posture.
Pakistan didn't publicly acknowledge its military presence in Kashmir till 01 Aug 1948.
Later in the year, it encouraged expectations in Pakistan which would produce a major change of military posture.
Pakistan didn't publicly acknowledge its military presence in Kashmir till 01 Aug 1948.
#2dayIn1948
However, by the end of July India had definite info about Zafrulla's admission to the UN Commission for India & Pakistan concerning this presence.
Thus on 28 July, High Commissioner Krishna Menon called on Attlee to draw ..
However, by the end of July India had definite info about Zafrulla's admission to the UN Commission for India & Pakistan concerning this presence.
Thus on 28 July, High Commissioner Krishna Menon called on Attlee to draw ..
#2dayIn1948
.. his attention to the Pakistani admission & to express India's concern over the role of British officers in the Kashmir ops. He argued that the British govt could not possibly approve of the participation, direct or indirect, of British officers in ..
.. his attention to the Pakistani admission & to express India's concern over the role of British officers in the Kashmir ops. He argued that the British govt could not possibly approve of the participation, direct or indirect, of British officers in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. this illegal act of intervention.
On 05 Aug, after Pakistan had publicly acknowledged her military involvement, Krishna Menon met Addison, Lord President of the Council (in Attlee's absence), and Noel-Baker to urge that British should convey a strong ..
.. this illegal act of intervention.
On 05 Aug, after Pakistan had publicly acknowledged her military involvement, Krishna Menon met Addison, Lord President of the Council (in Attlee's absence), and Noel-Baker to urge that British should convey a strong ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and urgent message to Pakistan regarding use of seconded British officers for illegal purposes in Kashmir. Menon added that a 'Stand Down' should apply only to Pakistan since it was the guilty party.
Noel-Baker countered the Indian demarche in a ..
.. and urgent message to Pakistan regarding use of seconded British officers for illegal purposes in Kashmir. Menon added that a 'Stand Down' should apply only to Pakistan since it was the guilty party.
Noel-Baker countered the Indian demarche in a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. nine page minute to Attlee.
Side-stepping the legal point raised by Krishna Menon, he argued that 'it would only be open to His Majesty's Govt in the UK to accept this proposal for a unilateral "Stand Down" against Pakistan if they reversed the ..
.. nine page minute to Attlee.
Side-stepping the legal point raised by Krishna Menon, he argued that 'it would only be open to His Majesty's Govt in the UK to accept this proposal for a unilateral "Stand Down" against Pakistan if they reversed the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. policy in respect of the 'Stand Down' which they have followed and made it known to the Govts of India & Pakistan from the beginning.'
.. policy in respect of the 'Stand Down' which they have followed and made it known to the Govts of India & Pakistan from the beginning.'
#2dayIn1948
British policy was that:
1. The purpose of the 'Stand Down' is to prevent British Officers & men fighting each other and its enforcement would have nothing to do with the rights or wrong of the disputes between India & Pakistan;
British policy was that:
1. The purpose of the 'Stand Down' is to prevent British Officers & men fighting each other and its enforcement would have nothing to do with the rights or wrong of the disputes between India & Pakistan;
#2dayIn1948
2. If the 'Stand Down' has to be enforced, it would apply simultaneously to all British personnel in all the armed forces of both Dominions.
Noel-Baker argued that there was no immediate danger of British personnel fighting each other since neither ..
2. If the 'Stand Down' has to be enforced, it would apply simultaneously to all British personnel in all the armed forces of both Dominions.
Noel-Baker argued that there was no immediate danger of British personnel fighting each other since neither ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistan nor India employed these personnel in Kashmir. Nor was there an imminent danger of 'formal hostilities' between the two dominions. It would be particularly difficult for Britain to order a 'Stand Down' at a moment when UNCIP had put ..
.. Pakistan nor India employed these personnel in Kashmir. Nor was there an imminent danger of 'formal hostilities' between the two dominions. It would be particularly difficult for Britain to order a 'Stand Down' at a moment when UNCIP had put ..
#2dayIn1948
.. forward a ceasefire proposal to India and Pakistan. Finally, he pointed to the political results which might flow from a 'Stand Down', particularly if applied only to Pakistan. He maintained that 'Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth'; 'the hostility ..
.. forward a ceasefire proposal to India and Pakistan. Finally, he pointed to the political results which might flow from a 'Stand Down', particularly if applied only to Pakistan. He maintained that 'Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth'; 'the hostility ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might be in creased'; and even that 'it might bring about an internal collapse in Pakistan from the chaos of which the Communists would profit.'
The minute thus reflected the political ..
.. of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might be in creased'; and even that 'it might bring about an internal collapse in Pakistan from the chaos of which the Communists would profit.'
The minute thus reflected the political ..
#2dayIn1948
.. calculations underlying the British policy on Kashmir.
Pakistan, unlike India, had declared her intention of remaining in the Commonwealth and seeking close military ties with the West. Britain was reluctant to take any step which might deflect ..
.. calculations underlying the British policy on Kashmir.
Pakistan, unlike India, had declared her intention of remaining in the Commonwealth and seeking close military ties with the West. Britain was reluctant to take any step which might deflect ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistan from the course she intended to follow. Second, the supposed impact on Muslim opinion in the Middle East weighed heavily in British deliberations. Britain's abandonment of the Palestine mandate and the emergence of the State of Israel had ..
.. Pakistan from the course she intended to follow. Second, the supposed impact on Muslim opinion in the Middle East weighed heavily in British deliberations. Britain's abandonment of the Palestine mandate and the emergence of the State of Israel had ..
#2dayIn1948
.. inflamed Arab nationalist sentiments. As a result, British strategic interests in the region had been put in jeopardy.
.. inflamed Arab nationalist sentiments. As a result, British strategic interests in the region had been put in jeopardy.
#2dayIn1948
Prone to confuse national with religious sentiment in Asia, British policy-makers drew the conclusion that their Middle East policy demanded a pro-Pakistan stance.
Finally, the weakness of Pakistan's domestic structures paradoxically became a source ..
Prone to confuse national with religious sentiment in Asia, British policy-makers drew the conclusion that their Middle East policy demanded a pro-Pakistan stance.
Finally, the weakness of Pakistan's domestic structures paradoxically became a source ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of strength in her foreign policy. Any proposal for taking a firm line against Pakistani misconduct could be easily derailed by a threat of internal collapse & spread of communism.
.. of strength in her foreign policy. Any proposal for taking a firm line against Pakistani misconduct could be easily derailed by a threat of internal collapse & spread of communism.
#2dayIn1948
On 23rd Aug, Attlee would respond to Nehru's demarche.
In a cable to Nehru, he said that 'the question of the presence of Pakistani troops is within the scope of the UN Commission's work and ..
On 23rd Aug, Attlee would respond to Nehru's demarche.
In a cable to Nehru, he said that 'the question of the presence of Pakistani troops is within the scope of the UN Commission's work and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. I am sure that we must leave any initiative in the matter to the Commission.'
.. I am sure that we must leave any initiative in the matter to the Commission.'
#2dayIn1948
As regards the 'Stand Down' arrangement, its purpose was to prevent British personnel from actually taking the field against each other. There was no immediate prospect of 'British personnel getting involved in the fighting.
As regards the 'Stand Down' arrangement, its purpose was to prevent British personnel from actually taking the field against each other. There was no immediate prospect of 'British personnel getting involved in the fighting.
#2dayIn1948
It would, I think, in these circumstances, be a mistake, particularly while arrangements for a ceasefire are being negotiated, for us to take any precipitate unilateral action.'
Unquote
It would, I think, in these circumstances, be a mistake, particularly while arrangements for a ceasefire are being negotiated, for us to take any precipitate unilateral action.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
Will tweet about the UN Commission & its workings tomorrow.
Will tweet about the UN Commission & its workings tomorrow.
#2dayIn1948
Ops by Pakistan in Northern part of Kashmir valley upto Jul-Aug 1948 represented the high tide of Pakistan's success.
Within a period of about eight months and with only about two battalions of troops, the invaders had occupied a vast & strategic region, from ..
Ops by Pakistan in Northern part of Kashmir valley upto Jul-Aug 1948 represented the high tide of Pakistan's success.
Within a period of about eight months and with only about two battalions of troops, the invaders had occupied a vast & strategic region, from ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Gilgit to Nubra, and from the Karakoram to the Zoji La & Gurez. As a result of these successes, the line of communication to Leh was cut, and the Kashmir Valley itself was surrounded from the North & East also. From the West and South-West, the ..
.. Gilgit to Nubra, and from the Karakoram to the Zoji La & Gurez. As a result of these successes, the line of communication to Leh was cut, and the Kashmir Valley itself was surrounded from the North & East also. From the West and South-West, the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. raiders were already threatening the Valley.
In evaluating the lessons of these ops, the foremost place must be given to the importance of good leadership.
Skardu commanded by an able and staunch leader, held out for six months against overwhelming ..
.. raiders were already threatening the Valley.
In evaluating the lessons of these ops, the foremost place must be given to the importance of good leadership.
Skardu commanded by an able and staunch leader, held out for six months against overwhelming ..
#2dayIn1948
.. odds, and defied all assaults till the end. The boldness of conception and skill in execution of the invaders' right hook against Dras & Kargil also compel admiration.
On the other hand, the unsound tactical dispositions of the Indian officers ..
.. odds, and defied all assaults till the end. The boldness of conception and skill in execution of the invaders' right hook against Dras & Kargil also compel admiration.
On the other hand, the unsound tactical dispositions of the Indian officers ..
#2dayIn1948
.. must be held primarily responsible for the destruction of their strong forces & the fall of Skardu.
HQ 163 Brigade repeatedly told the column commanders to picquet the heights along the route, to advance on either bank of the river and patrol vigorously, but ..
.. must be held primarily responsible for the destruction of their strong forces & the fall of Skardu.
HQ 163 Brigade repeatedly told the column commanders to picquet the heights along the route, to advance on either bank of the river and patrol vigorously, but ..
#2dayIn1948
.. detailed instructions given over the wireless could not obviate lack of tactical skill on ground.
These ops emphasized once again, the crucial importance of selecting bold & skillful officers for isolated & distant ops where neither effective ..
.. detailed instructions given over the wireless could not obviate lack of tactical skill on ground.
These ops emphasized once again, the crucial importance of selecting bold & skillful officers for isolated & distant ops where neither effective ..
#2dayIn1948
.. control from the superior formation nor replacement by another officer is practicable.
These ops also proved that the Indian troops, whether the State Forces men at Skardu or regular troops at Machhoi, were immensely superior to the enemy in stamina, ..
.. control from the superior formation nor replacement by another officer is practicable.
These ops also proved that the Indian troops, whether the State Forces men at Skardu or regular troops at Machhoi, were immensely superior to the enemy in stamina, ..
#2dayIn1948
.. scientific training and fire discipline. The garrison at Skardu & men of 1 Patiala at Gumri & Machhoi smashed every attack & held on. The siting of their MMGs proved excellent & their 3-inch mortars were the most effective & dreaded weapons.
.. scientific training and fire discipline. The garrison at Skardu & men of 1 Patiala at Gumri & Machhoi smashed every attack & held on. The siting of their MMGs proved excellent & their 3-inch mortars were the most effective & dreaded weapons.
#2dayIn1948
The invaders, on the other hand, were excellent in open manoeuvring & in laying ambushes. The destruction of the Indian columns in ambushes near Parkutta, & the manner in which they outflanked & neutralised the carefully sited picquets at Gumri and ..
The invaders, on the other hand, were excellent in open manoeuvring & in laying ambushes. The destruction of the Indian columns in ambushes near Parkutta, & the manner in which they outflanked & neutralised the carefully sited picquets at Gumri and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Machhoi showed that the invaders had immense tactical sense & and eye for the ground. Surprise attack was their forte, but they were incapable of carrying home a prepared attack against determined opposition.
It is remarkable that, with all their ..
.. Machhoi showed that the invaders had immense tactical sense & and eye for the ground. Surprise attack was their forte, but they were incapable of carrying home a prepared attack against determined opposition.
It is remarkable that, with all their ..
#2dayIn1948
.. superiority in numbers & firepower, they never succeeded in taking even one picquet by assault. Even the tiny garrison of Dras defied them for almost a month, and they entered the place only after the defenders had evacuated it.
.. superiority in numbers & firepower, they never succeeded in taking even one picquet by assault. Even the tiny garrison of Dras defied them for almost a month, and they entered the place only after the defenders had evacuated it.
#2dayIn1948
Finally, these ops brought out once again the vital importance of air support in modern war. In morale alone, strafing and rocket attacks gave dividends out of all proportions to the effort.
The RIAF gave valuable support to the gallant defenders of Skardu. But it..
Finally, these ops brought out once again the vital importance of air support in modern war. In morale alone, strafing and rocket attacks gave dividends out of all proportions to the effort.
The RIAF gave valuable support to the gallant defenders of Skardu. But it..
#2dayIn1948
.. couldn't supply them even with their modest requirements in full. Judged by modern standards of major powers, RIAF was a pitifully small force and admittedly, it had to distribute its efforts between the various sectors of the front, from Poonch to Leh.
.. couldn't supply them even with their modest requirements in full. Judged by modern standards of major powers, RIAF was a pitifully small force and admittedly, it had to distribute its efforts between the various sectors of the front, from Poonch to Leh.
#2dayIn1948
By its wonderful exploits at Poonch & Leh, the RIAF had set itself a standard of performance which, unfortunately, it could not maintain at Skardu.
By its wonderful exploits at Poonch & Leh, the RIAF had set itself a standard of performance which, unfortunately, it could not maintain at Skardu.
#2dayIn1948
The fall of Skardu revealed vividly the dangers of the situation at Leh. It was also clear that the hostile forces released from the siege of Skardu would be rushing to Leh to complete the capture of this vital centre.
It became, therefore, all ..
The fall of Skardu revealed vividly the dangers of the situation at Leh. It was also clear that the hostile forces released from the siege of Skardu would be rushing to Leh to complete the capture of this vital centre.
It became, therefore, all ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the more important to send reinforcements & supplies to Leh as early as possible.
Accordingly, a Dakota flew to Leh on 15 Aug, carrying a medical officer, ammo & some stores. In addition, orders had already been issued to 2/8 Gorkha Rifles to move to Leh.
.. the more important to send reinforcements & supplies to Leh as early as possible.
Accordingly, a Dakota flew to Leh on 15 Aug, carrying a medical officer, ammo & some stores. In addition, orders had already been issued to 2/8 Gorkha Rifles to move to Leh.
#2dayIn1948
The unit was at Ferozepur when it received orders for the move. Its 'D' Company was already at Leh; the rest left Ferozepur by train on 17 Aug & reached Pathankot in the morning of this day in 1948.
The unit was at Ferozepur when it received orders for the move. Its 'D' Company was already at Leh; the rest left Ferozepur by train on 17 Aug & reached Pathankot in the morning of this day in 1948.
#2dayIn1948
In another Dakota flight to Leh, carrying more supplies, ammo & stores, the General Staff Officer Grade 1 of HQ Sri Div too flew to Leh, alongwith Commander Jammu & Kashmir Militia. The purpose of their visit was to study the situation on the spot ..
In another Dakota flight to Leh, carrying more supplies, ammo & stores, the General Staff Officer Grade 1 of HQ Sri Div too flew to Leh, alongwith Commander Jammu & Kashmir Militia. The purpose of their visit was to study the situation on the spot ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and inform the local officers of the plans for sending them massive reinforcements.
Accordingly, 2/8 GR was already enroute, Tactical HQ & No 8 Platoon of 'A' Company of the unit having moved from Pathankot to Srinagar this morning, alongwith a ..
.. and inform the local officers of the plans for sending them massive reinforcements.
Accordingly, 2/8 GR was already enroute, Tactical HQ & No 8 Platoon of 'A' Company of the unit having moved from Pathankot to Srinagar this morning, alongwith a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. section of 3-inch mortars & a signal detachment. The party consisted of 3 officers, 3 JCOs & 58 other ranks, and was led by Lt Col H.S.Parab, Commanding Officer 2/8 GR.
.. section of 3-inch mortars & a signal detachment. The party consisted of 3 officers, 3 JCOs & 58 other ranks, and was led by Lt Col H.S.Parab, Commanding Officer 2/8 GR.
#2dayIn1948
Regarding the UN Commission for India & Pakistan.
As we've seen before, the British Govt had failed to persuade the Commission to sacrifice its planned halt in Geneva, where it unhurriedly prepared its rules of procedure and waded through a sea of ..
Regarding the UN Commission for India & Pakistan.
As we've seen before, the British Govt had failed to persuade the Commission to sacrifice its planned halt in Geneva, where it unhurriedly prepared its rules of procedure and waded through a sea of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. documents. Members sought protection against the hazards of tropical travel through a comprehensive course of inoculations against typhus, cholera, small-pox, diphtheria, plague & yellow fever.
After exhausting these preliminaries, the Commission ..
.. documents. Members sought protection against the hazards of tropical travel through a comprehensive course of inoculations against typhus, cholera, small-pox, diphtheria, plague & yellow fever.
After exhausting these preliminaries, the Commission ..
#2dayIn1948
..finally left Geneva for Pakistan on 05 July, 11 weeks after adoption of the Security Council resolution.
In Karachi, the Commission was lodged in the Governor-General's residence but Jinnah himself, terminally ill, was secluded in the distant hill station of Ziarat.
..finally left Geneva for Pakistan on 05 July, 11 weeks after adoption of the Security Council resolution.
In Karachi, the Commission was lodged in the Governor-General's residence but Jinnah himself, terminally ill, was secluded in the distant hill station of Ziarat.
#2dayIn1948
A meeting with the PM, Liaquat Ali Khan, amounted to no more than an exchange of courtesies, with no more than an exchange of courtesies, with no mention of Kashmir. But when the Commission called on Zafrulla Khan, it ..
A meeting with the PM, Liaquat Ali Khan, amounted to no more than an exchange of courtesies, with no more than an exchange of courtesies, with no mention of Kashmir. But when the Commission called on Zafrulla Khan, it ..
#2dayIn1948
.. received, in the words of one of its members, a 'bombshell'.
The Foreign Minister informed the Commission on 09 July that three brigades of Pakistan Army had been operating in Kashmir since May. When asked why the Security Council had not been ..
.. received, in the words of one of its members, a 'bombshell'.
The Foreign Minister informed the Commission on 09 July that three brigades of Pakistan Army had been operating in Kashmir since May. When asked why the Security Council had not been ..
#2dayIn1948
.. informed earlier, Zafrulla Khan said that the Commission was daily expected to arrive in Karachi & he had seized the first opportunity to inform them of the development!
To one member of the Commission, this disclosure would have caused little surprise, however.
.. informed earlier, Zafrulla Khan said that the Commission was daily expected to arrive in Karachi & he had seized the first opportunity to inform them of the development!
To one member of the Commission, this disclosure would have caused little surprise, however.
#2dayIn1948
The US had been aware of the development since May and the American member of the Commission, Ambassador Huddle, had presumably been informed about the move, as well as his Govt's decision to underplay it at the behest of the UK.
The US had been aware of the development since May and the American member of the Commission, Ambassador Huddle, had presumably been informed about the move, as well as his Govt's decision to underplay it at the behest of the UK.
#2dayIn1948
The Commission decided to refrain from any public reference to the deployment, though members acknowledged to one another that it was a grave and disturbing development.
When the Commission arrived in New Delhi, it received and incisive briefing from ..
The Commission decided to refrain from any public reference to the deployment, though members acknowledged to one another that it was a grave and disturbing development.
When the Commission arrived in New Delhi, it received and incisive briefing from ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Mr Bajpai, the Secretary General in the MEA. Bajpai highlighted the fact that a great change had occurred in the situation since the adoption of the Security Council resolution - The Indian Army was now fighting against the regular armed forces of Pakistan in J&K.
.. Mr Bajpai, the Secretary General in the MEA. Bajpai highlighted the fact that a great change had occurred in the situation since the adoption of the Security Council resolution - The Indian Army was now fighting against the regular armed forces of Pakistan in J&K.
#2dayIn1948
An undeclared war was in progress between both countries. India attached the 'highest importance to the declaration of Pakistan's guilt and .. to Pakistan being directed to do what, seven months ago, we had asked the Council that it be asked to do.
An undeclared war was in progress between both countries. India attached the 'highest importance to the declaration of Pakistan's guilt and .. to Pakistan being directed to do what, seven months ago, we had asked the Council that it be asked to do.
#2dayIn1948
Until this matter was settled, there could be no question of discussing the details of a plebiscite.'
Until this matter was settled, there could be no question of discussing the details of a plebiscite.'
#2dayIn1948
In addition to above, Bajpai pointed out that - 'If the future of J&K was to be determined by the arbitrament of the sword, then, without in anyway wishing to utter a threat, or use the language of menace, I should like the Commission, as realists, to recognize ..
In addition to above, Bajpai pointed out that - 'If the future of J&K was to be determined by the arbitrament of the sword, then, without in anyway wishing to utter a threat, or use the language of menace, I should like the Commission, as realists, to recognize ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that the offer of plebiscite couldn't remain open. If Pakistan wanted a decision by force and that decision went against Pakistan, it could not invoke the machinery of the UN to obtain what it had failed to secure by its chosen weapon of force.'
.. that the offer of plebiscite couldn't remain open. If Pakistan wanted a decision by force and that decision went against Pakistan, it could not invoke the machinery of the UN to obtain what it had failed to secure by its chosen weapon of force.'
#2dayIn1948
Bajpai thus, left the Commission in no doubt that India wouldn't accept a ceasefire unless it included a condemnation of Pakistan and acknowledged the fact that Pakistan, unlike India, had no legal status in Kashmir.
The demand ..
Bajpai thus, left the Commission in no doubt that India wouldn't accept a ceasefire unless it included a condemnation of Pakistan and acknowledged the fact that Pakistan, unlike India, had no legal status in Kashmir.
The demand ..
#2dayIn1948
.. for condemnation was being pressed with increased vigour in view of the Pakistani Army's entry into the State. India was not prepared to discuss plebiscite arrangements until these concerns had been suitably addressed.
The Commission received an ..
.. for condemnation was being pressed with increased vigour in view of the Pakistani Army's entry into the State. India was not prepared to discuss plebiscite arrangements until these concerns had been suitably addressed.
The Commission received an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. identical message in conversations with Nehru & Ayyangar.
India also pointed out that a plebiscite was not the only means for ascertaining the will of the people. A door should also be left open for other methods.
Nehru had come to the conclusion ..
.. identical message in conversations with Nehru & Ayyangar.
India also pointed out that a plebiscite was not the only means for ascertaining the will of the people. A door should also be left open for other methods.
Nehru had come to the conclusion ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that the conditions necessary for a plebiscite were unlikely to be attained. He therefore favoured a broader reference to the means of ascertaining the views of the people than one confined to plebiscite alone.
Pakistan, likewise, conveyed that ..
.. that the conditions necessary for a plebiscite were unlikely to be attained. He therefore favoured a broader reference to the means of ascertaining the views of the people than one confined to plebiscite alone.
Pakistan, likewise, conveyed that ..
#2dayIn1948
.. it was not prepared to accept an unconditional ceasefire. The conditions it attached to a ceasefire were that India should withdraw her troops simultaneously with Pakistan and that the views of the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' should be taken into account.
.. it was not prepared to accept an unconditional ceasefire. The conditions it attached to a ceasefire were that India should withdraw her troops simultaneously with Pakistan and that the views of the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' should be taken into account.
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan moreover expected the Commission to also take up the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The Commission, however, formed the impression that Pakistan was keener on a ceasefire than her words suggested. The impression was reinforced by a ..
Pakistan moreover expected the Commission to also take up the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The Commission, however, formed the impression that Pakistan was keener on a ceasefire than her words suggested. The impression was reinforced by a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. letter from Zafrulla Khan, expressing regret that the Commission had not actually made a ceasefire proposal.
The Commission saw a connection between this sentiment and developments on the battlefield, where the Indian army had achieved definite progress.
.. letter from Zafrulla Khan, expressing regret that the Commission had not actually made a ceasefire proposal.
The Commission saw a connection between this sentiment and developments on the battlefield, where the Indian army had achieved definite progress.
#2dayIn1948
'Now that the Indian army was advancing closer and closer to her border, Pakistan might find it very much in her interest to stop fighting, particularly if by the establishment of a ceasefire this advance could be terminated', observed one of its members.
'Now that the Indian army was advancing closer and closer to her border, Pakistan might find it very much in her interest to stop fighting, particularly if by the establishment of a ceasefire this advance could be terminated', observed one of its members.
#2dayIn1948
The Commission informed Pakistan in unambiguous terms that the uninvited movement of her troops into foreign territory was a violation of international law & that it had seriously aggravated the problem. India had valid ..
The Commission informed Pakistan in unambiguous terms that the uninvited movement of her troops into foreign territory was a violation of international law & that it had seriously aggravated the problem. India had valid ..
#2dayIn1948
.. ground for complaint and the Commission could not but give some expression to this fact in its report.
Having thus prepared the ground, UNCIP presented a finetuned resolution on 13 Aug . This called for a ceasefire; outlined truce terms; and ..
.. ground for complaint and the Commission could not but give some expression to this fact in its report.
Having thus prepared the ground, UNCIP presented a finetuned resolution on 13 Aug . This called for a ceasefire; outlined truce terms; and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. re-stated the position accepted by both sides that the 'future status of the State of J&K shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.'
The truce terms required Pakistan to withdraw her forces from the state 'as the presence of ..
.. re-stated the position accepted by both sides that the 'future status of the State of J&K shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.'
The truce terms required Pakistan to withdraw her forces from the state 'as the presence of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. troops of Pakistan in the territory of State of J&K constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Govt of Pakistan before the Security Council.'
India would begin to withdraw the bulk of her forces from the State ..
.. troops of Pakistan in the territory of State of J&K constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Govt of Pakistan before the Security Council.'
India would begin to withdraw the bulk of her forces from the State ..
#2dayIn1948
.. after the raiders (the tribesmen & other Pakistani nationals) had withdrawn & the Pakistani troops had commenced their withdrawal. Pending acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would maintain, on her side of the line ..
.. after the raiders (the tribesmen & other Pakistani nationals) had withdrawn & the Pakistani troops had commenced their withdrawal. Pending acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would maintain, on her side of the line ..
#2dayIn1948
.. existing at the time of ceasefire, a minimum force to assist in maintenance of law & order.
The question of conditions for a 'reference to the will of the people' was left for later consultations between the Commission and the two govts 'upon acceptance of the ..
.. existing at the time of ceasefire, a minimum force to assist in maintenance of law & order.
The question of conditions for a 'reference to the will of the people' was left for later consultations between the Commission and the two govts 'upon acceptance of the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. truce agreement.'
Britain had no representative in the Commission and her ability to influence its work was limited during the period it functioned in the subcontinent. Unlike the Security Council proposals of 21 April, the ..
.. truce agreement.'
Britain had no representative in the Commission and her ability to influence its work was limited during the period it functioned in the subcontinent. Unlike the Security Council proposals of 21 April, the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. UNCIP proposals did not reflect a deliberate pro-Pakistan tilt.
Instead, they were an attempt to balance the interests of India and Pakistan while taking into account the fact that entry of Pakistani army into J&K was a violation of the 17 Jan resolution.
.. UNCIP proposals did not reflect a deliberate pro-Pakistan tilt.
Instead, they were an attempt to balance the interests of India and Pakistan while taking into account the fact that entry of Pakistani army into J&K was a violation of the 17 Jan resolution.
#2dayIn1948
Ayyangar had complained of the 21 April resolution that it 'put the cart before the horse' by failing to issue a clear call to Pakistan to withdraw the raiders before going into the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The UNCIP resolution conceded ..
Ayyangar had complained of the 21 April resolution that it 'put the cart before the horse' by failing to issue a clear call to Pakistan to withdraw the raiders before going into the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The UNCIP resolution conceded ..
#2dayIn1948
.. primacy to a ceasefire based on withdrawal of the raiders.
The question of arrangements for a reference to the will of the people was was to be taken up later, after both sides had accepted the truce arrangements. Moreover, there was implied ..
.. primacy to a ceasefire based on withdrawal of the raiders.
The question of arrangements for a reference to the will of the people was was to be taken up later, after both sides had accepted the truce arrangements. Moreover, there was implied ..
#2dayIn1948
.. criticism of Pakistan in the demand that she withdraw her forces from J&K since their presence constituted a 'material change in the situation.'
This was, of course, no more than a slap on the wrist. The Commission refrained from publicly ..
.. criticism of Pakistan in the demand that she withdraw her forces from J&K since their presence constituted a 'material change in the situation.'
This was, of course, no more than a slap on the wrist. The Commission refrained from publicly ..
#2dayIn1948
.. condemning Pakistan for having violated international law because it realized that open condemnation would result in Pakistan's rejecting the proposals.
India asked for clarification of certain aspects of the resolution, seeking confirmation ..
.. condemning Pakistan for having violated international law because it realized that open condemnation would result in Pakistan's rejecting the proposals.
India asked for clarification of certain aspects of the resolution, seeking confirmation ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that it recognised that recurrence of aggression in Kashmir must be prevented & that India would have to maintain sufficient forces in the state to meet the threat of external aggression as well as internal disorder; that the sovereignty of the State ..
.. that it recognised that recurrence of aggression in Kashmir must be prevented & that India would have to maintain sufficient forces in the state to meet the threat of external aggression as well as internal disorder; that the sovereignty of the State ..
#2dayIn1948
.. extended to its entire territory & that there could be no recognition of the so called 'Azad Kashmir Govt'; and that the Commission did not recognize Pakistan's claim to have any part in a plebiscite, 'should it be decided to seek a solution of ..
.. extended to its entire territory & that there could be no recognition of the so called 'Azad Kashmir Govt'; and that the Commission did not recognize Pakistan's claim to have any part in a plebiscite, 'should it be decided to seek a solution of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the future of the State by means of a plebiscite.'
On receiving satisfactory clarifications on these points, India accepted the resolution on 25 August.
Pakistan wanted the Commission to deal with the question of plebiscite arrangements in the resolution.
.. the future of the State by means of a plebiscite.'
On receiving satisfactory clarifications on these points, India accepted the resolution on 25 August.
Pakistan wanted the Commission to deal with the question of plebiscite arrangements in the resolution.
#2dayIn1948
The Commission, it maintained, should be guided by terms of the 21 Apr resolution, which should be interpreted taking into account the explanations offered by its sponsors. It insisted on India's prior acceptance of the plebiscite ..
The Commission, it maintained, should be guided by terms of the 21 Apr resolution, which should be interpreted taking into account the explanations offered by its sponsors. It insisted on India's prior acceptance of the plebiscite ..
#2dayIn1948
.. provisions of the 21 Apr resolution. It wanted the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' to be treated as a separate party to any settlement and to be left in control of the territory it had occupied.
It insisted that the 'Azad Kashmir' forces shouldn't be disarmed ..
.. provisions of the 21 Apr resolution. It wanted the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' to be treated as a separate party to any settlement and to be left in control of the territory it had occupied.
It insisted that the 'Azad Kashmir' forces shouldn't be disarmed ..
#2dayIn1948
.. or disbanded. Pakistan wanted to be placed on a footing of absolute equality with India in connection with the plebiscite and indicated that she would continue to press for the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the State on the grounds that even ..
.. or disbanded. Pakistan wanted to be placed on a footing of absolute equality with India in connection with the plebiscite and indicated that she would continue to press for the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the State on the grounds that even ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a minimal Indian presence would be prejudicial to a fair plebiscite.
These were among the formidable list of objections raised by Pakistan.
.. a minimal Indian presence would be prejudicial to a fair plebiscite.
These were among the formidable list of objections raised by Pakistan.
#2dayIn1948
The Commission was prepared to accommodate some of Pakistan's concerns - most notably, by leaving the 'Azad' forces intact, but it could not accept the rest.
The Commission was prepared to accommodate some of Pakistan's concerns - most notably, by leaving the 'Azad' forces intact, but it could not accept the rest.
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan's formal reply, sent on 06 Sep, would contain such far reaching reservations and qualifications that the Commission interpreted it as tantamount to rejection.
Pakistan's formal reply, sent on 06 Sep, would contain such far reaching reservations and qualifications that the Commission interpreted it as tantamount to rejection.
#2dayIn1948
While regretting that this response made an immediate ceasefire impossible, the Commission expressed the hope that Pakistan would reconsider its position.
The door would thus be left open for follow up action on the 13 Aug resolution.
While regretting that this response made an immediate ceasefire impossible, the Commission expressed the hope that Pakistan would reconsider its position.
The door would thus be left open for follow up action on the 13 Aug resolution.
#2dayIn1948
On 18 Aug, Thimayya had sent to HQ Western Command his plan for 'Operation Duck'. It involved the use of four battalions, of which three were available & the fourth was to be obtained by thinning out the Uri sector. Moreover, Sri Div would have no ..
On 18 Aug, Thimayya had sent to HQ Western Command his plan for 'Operation Duck'. It involved the use of four battalions, of which three were available & the fourth was to be obtained by thinning out the Uri sector. Moreover, Sri Div would have no ..
#2dayIn1948
.. reserves left while the op was going on, and thus, Cariappa's approval was sought to mounting the attack under these conditions, and was obtained without delay.
In essence, the plan was to turn the Zoji La position from the right & thus ..
.. reserves left while the op was going on, and thus, Cariappa's approval was sought to mounting the attack under these conditions, and was obtained without delay.
In essence, the plan was to turn the Zoji La position from the right & thus ..
#2dayIn1948
.. compel the enemy to leave his strong defences at Gumri & Machhoi. The whole 77 Para Brigade was to march North-East from the road-head at Khanabal, cross the main Himalayan range by the Bobang or Lonvilad Pass & then march down the Suru Valley.
.. compel the enemy to leave his strong defences at Gumri & Machhoi. The whole 77 Para Brigade was to march North-East from the road-head at Khanabal, cross the main Himalayan range by the Bobang or Lonvilad Pass & then march down the Suru Valley.
#2dayIn1948
One battalion was then to cross the Lasar La & attack Dras, whereupon 1 Patiala was to advance quickly from Zoji La & link up with the outflanking column at Dras. The remaining two battalions were to continue down the Suru Valley & capture Kargil.
One battalion was then to cross the Lasar La & attack Dras, whereupon 1 Patiala was to advance quickly from Zoji La & link up with the outflanking column at Dras. The remaining two battalions were to continue down the Suru Valley & capture Kargil.
#2dayIn1948
Apart from 1 Patiala holding position at Zoji La, the troops who were to take part in the attack were 3 Jat, 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles (FF) & 5 Maratha, supported by one platoon MMG, the J&K Mountain Battery, detachment 433 Royal Indian Engineers & 83 Field Ambulance.
Apart from 1 Patiala holding position at Zoji La, the troops who were to take part in the attack were 3 Jat, 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles (FF) & 5 Maratha, supported by one platoon MMG, the J&K Mountain Battery, detachment 433 Royal Indian Engineers & 83 Field Ambulance.
#2dayIn1948
3 Jat reached Khanabal in preparation for 'Operation Duck' this day in 1948. Other troops too were on their way.
3 Jat reached Khanabal in preparation for 'Operation Duck' this day in 1948. Other troops too were on their way.
#2dayIn1948
Col HS Parab was made the Military Governor of Leh and given extraordinary powers in order to enable him to muster all available resources for defence of Leh. He landed in Leh this day, and found the civil situation very unsatisfactory.
Col HS Parab was made the Military Governor of Leh and given extraordinary powers in order to enable him to muster all available resources for defence of Leh. He landed in Leh this day, and found the civil situation very unsatisfactory.
#2dayIn1948
Due to the departure of the British Resident & the absence of the Wazir e Wazarat, administration had virtually come to a standstill. In spite of the efforts of the Tehsildar, people had started hoarding foodgrains.
Due to the departure of the British Resident & the absence of the Wazir e Wazarat, administration had virtually come to a standstill. In spite of the efforts of the Tehsildar, people had started hoarding foodgrains.
#2dayIn1948
Refugees had arrived in large numbers & panic prevailed in the city.
Refugees had arrived in large numbers & panic prevailed in the city.
#2dayIn1948
Col Parab's orders from Maj Gen KS Thimayya, DSO, were clear and concise - "You will defend Leh at any cost."
To enable him to do so, he had been appointed the Military Governor of Leh & given extraordinary powers. His charter, signed by Bakhshi ..
Col Parab's orders from Maj Gen KS Thimayya, DSO, were clear and concise - "You will defend Leh at any cost."
To enable him to do so, he had been appointed the Military Governor of Leh & given extraordinary powers. His charter, signed by Bakhshi ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Ghulam Mohammad, the Deputy PM, read as follows: "In the interest of Public Security and to ensure coordination between the civil and military authorities, Col Parab, Second Battalion The Eighth Gorkha Rifles, is appointed Administrator for the district of ..
.. Ghulam Mohammad, the Deputy PM, read as follows: "In the interest of Public Security and to ensure coordination between the civil and military authorities, Col Parab, Second Battalion The Eighth Gorkha Rifles, is appointed Administrator for the district of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Ladakh until further orders. He shall have complete control over the civil administration, both Executive & Judicial, in the district. He shall execute all civil, revenue & criminal powers which the Wazir-i-Wazarat of Ladakh has heretofore been exercising."
.. Ladakh until further orders. He shall have complete control over the civil administration, both Executive & Judicial, in the district. He shall execute all civil, revenue & criminal powers which the Wazir-i-Wazarat of Ladakh has heretofore been exercising."
#2dayIn1948
"It is further ordered that no appeal shall lie to the High Court from or against any order, sentence or decree passed by him under any law for the time being in force."
"He shall further exercise all the powers vested in the ..
"It is further ordered that no appeal shall lie to the High Court from or against any order, sentence or decree passed by him under any law for the time being in force."
"He shall further exercise all the powers vested in the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Govt under the Public Safety Act or the Jammu & Kashmir Defence Rules (Continuance) Ordinance or re-enacted under the Emergency Provisions (Re-enactment) Ordinance."
Unquote.
The Military Governor held a public meeting soon after assuming ..
.. Govt under the Public Safety Act or the Jammu & Kashmir Defence Rules (Continuance) Ordinance or re-enacted under the Emergency Provisions (Re-enactment) Ordinance."
Unquote.
The Military Governor held a public meeting soon after assuming ..
#2dayIn1948
.. charge & exhorted the people not to panic or indulge in anti-social activities. He also set up a full-fledged Cabinet including a PM, a Health Minister, a Defence Minister (who also looked after Home Affairs), a Finance Minister and a Food Minister.
.. charge & exhorted the people not to panic or indulge in anti-social activities. He also set up a full-fledged Cabinet including a PM, a Health Minister, a Defence Minister (who also looked after Home Affairs), a Finance Minister and a Food Minister.
#2dayIn1948
The local public men & petty officials nominated to these posts worked efficiently as a team & relieved the Military Governor of much of the work of civil administration.
Col Parab found the forward positions extending in an arc. Far in the North ..
The local public men & petty officials nominated to these posts worked efficiently as a team & relieved the Military Governor of much of the work of civil administration.
Col Parab found the forward positions extending in an arc. Far in the North ..
#2dayIn1948
.. across the Shyok, fighting was going on around Kharu. The main threat to Leh was from raiders concentrated at Nimu, about 30km away. The defenders were holding their positions around Tharu, blocking the entire route to Leh.
South of Indus, the ..
.. across the Shyok, fighting was going on around Kharu. The main threat to Leh was from raiders concentrated at Nimu, about 30km away. The defenders were holding their positions around Tharu, blocking the entire route to Leh.
South of Indus, the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. raiders were trying to advance down the track from Sumdah, and were located on the West bank of the Zanskar River. Due to the Ladakh Range & the turbulent Indus, there was no lateral communication between these three sectors. The defenders could ..
.. raiders were trying to advance down the track from Sumdah, and were located on the West bank of the Zanskar River. Due to the Ladakh Range & the turbulent Indus, there was no lateral communication between these three sectors. The defenders could ..
#2dayIn1948
.. switch forces from one sector to another only through Leh, and the raiders similarly had to go round via Saspul Gompa and the Alchi Bridge if they wanted to reach Sumdah or Chilling from Nimu. Between the raiders in Shyok Valley and in Indus ..
.. switch forces from one sector to another only through Leh, and the raiders similarly had to go round via Saspul Gompa and the Alchi Bridge if they wanted to reach Sumdah or Chilling from Nimu. Between the raiders in Shyok Valley and in Indus ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Valley, communications were even more difficult, and only small parties could cross the towering mountain range through difficult passes.
All in all, the difficult days for Leh had passed. With the sortie that brought in Col Parab to Leh on ..
.. Valley, communications were even more difficult, and only small parties could cross the towering mountain range through difficult passes.
All in all, the difficult days for Leh had passed. With the sortie that brought in Col Parab to Leh on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 23 Aug, regular Dakota sorties had commenced, ferrying troops and supplies regularly, except when weather was bad.
The remaining personnel of 2/8 GR, moving by foot, had left Manali for Rohtang Pass on 25 Aug.
They were named the Arjun Column ..
.. 23 Aug, regular Dakota sorties had commenced, ferrying troops and supplies regularly, except when weather was bad.
The remaining personnel of 2/8 GR, moving by foot, had left Manali for Rohtang Pass on 25 Aug.
They were named the Arjun Column ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and comprised 'B' and 'C' Companies of the battalion.
.. and comprised 'B' and 'C' Companies of the battalion.
#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles arrived at Khanabal post-haste from Delhi for participation in 'Operation Duck' for recapture of Dras.
Meanwhile, 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles arrived at Khanabal post-haste from Delhi for participation in 'Operation Duck' for recapture of Dras.
#2dayIn1948
'Op Duck' was suddenly called off. A serious enemy infiltration had been reported in Tithwal sector. 3 Jat was, therefore, rushed to Sopore and 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles & other units ordered to move to Sonamarg area.
The projected turning ..
'Op Duck' was suddenly called off. A serious enemy infiltration had been reported in Tithwal sector. 3 Jat was, therefore, rushed to Sopore and 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles & other units ordered to move to Sonamarg area.
The projected turning ..
#2dayIn1948
.. movement from the right had come to nothing.
It seems doubtful if the advance along the Suru Valley could have been accomplished as planned. For that difficult, sparsely populated region, a brigade was a massive force & it would have been ..
.. movement from the right had come to nothing.
It seems doubtful if the advance along the Suru Valley could have been accomplished as planned. For that difficult, sparsely populated region, a brigade was a massive force & it would have been ..
#2dayIn1948
.. very difficult to transport its rations & ammo over the long mule tracks. The advance would have been necessarily slow and cumbersome, and all surprise would have been lost, giving the enemy time to concentrate all his forces to oppose it from ..
.. very difficult to transport its rations & ammo over the long mule tracks. The advance would have been necessarily slow and cumbersome, and all surprise would have been lost, giving the enemy time to concentrate all his forces to oppose it from ..
#2dayIn1948
.. excellent natural defensive positions. It must have been a realization of these considerations which led Gen Thimayya not to attempt it again, but to change the plan basically. But, perhaps, the advance down the Suru would have enjoyed greater ..
.. excellent natural defensive positions. It must have been a realization of these considerations which led Gen Thimayya not to attempt it again, but to change the plan basically. But, perhaps, the advance down the Suru would have enjoyed greater ..
#2dayIn1948
.. probability of success if only a single, lightly-equipped, quick-marching battalion had been employed in it.
Since only 100 men of the Gilgit Scouts were reliably estimated to be at Suru Village and one platoon of Chitral Scouts at Sanko, an ..
.. probability of success if only a single, lightly-equipped, quick-marching battalion had been employed in it.
Since only 100 men of the Gilgit Scouts were reliably estimated to be at Suru Village and one platoon of Chitral Scouts at Sanko, an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Indian Army battalion should have been quite capable of overcoming all resistance & taking even the enemy occupying Dras by surprise.
Such had been the raiders' plan which gave them possession of Kargil & Dras; but perhaps irregular troops & their ..
.. Indian Army battalion should have been quite capable of overcoming all resistance & taking even the enemy occupying Dras by surprise.
Such had been the raiders' plan which gave them possession of Kargil & Dras; but perhaps irregular troops & their ..
#2dayIn1948
.. commanders can take risky gambles on which professional soldiers would hardly care to stake their reputation.
.. commanders can take risky gambles on which professional soldiers would hardly care to stake their reputation.
#2dayIn1948
The Arjun Column, comprising 'B' and 'C' Companies of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles, approx 350 men in total, was resting at Kyelang. It had marched daily for seven days from Manali & the men and beasts were into the second day of a well earned, two day rest.
The Arjun Column, comprising 'B' and 'C' Companies of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles, approx 350 men in total, was resting at Kyelang. It had marched daily for seven days from Manali & the men and beasts were into the second day of a well earned, two day rest.
#2dayIn1948
Desultory & indecisive fighting continued in all three sectors in Leh as August came to a close. The same continued over the first week of September as well.
Occasional sniping & heavier exchanges of rifle fire too took place at times, without any noticeable damage.
Desultory & indecisive fighting continued in all three sectors in Leh as August came to a close. The same continued over the first week of September as well.
Occasional sniping & heavier exchanges of rifle fire too took place at times, without any noticeable damage.
#2dayIn1948
In Shyok Valley, an enemy attempt at crossing the river from Mandori Village was beaten back in this duration, though at one point defenders were worried on account of their ammo stocks.
In the Chilling sector, the raiders ..
In Shyok Valley, an enemy attempt at crossing the river from Mandori Village was beaten back in this duration, though at one point defenders were worried on account of their ammo stocks.
In the Chilling sector, the raiders ..
#2dayIn1948
.. tried to cross the Zanskar River at Choksi. They were reported to be having one 3-inch mortar, one 2-inch mortar, one MMG and two LMGs, forcing the defenders to ask for an additional platoon & an MMG as reinforcements. However, the enemy launched ..
.. tried to cross the Zanskar River at Choksi. They were reported to be having one 3-inch mortar, one 2-inch mortar, one MMG and two LMGs, forcing the defenders to ask for an additional platoon & an MMG as reinforcements. However, the enemy launched ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the attack before reinforcements could reach. The defenders hung on for three days, frustrating every attempt to cross.
Reinforcements finally arrived four days later, putting paid to this attempt also.
In the main sector between Nimu & Tharu, fighting was ..
.. the attack before reinforcements could reach. The defenders hung on for three days, frustrating every attempt to cross.
Reinforcements finally arrived four days later, putting paid to this attempt also.
In the main sector between Nimu & Tharu, fighting was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. confined for many weeks to patrolling & desultory rifle fire. With the gradual concentration of 2/8 GR at Leh, the Military Governor systematically prepared the defences & completed his preparations for driving away the raiders from Ladakh.
.. confined for many weeks to patrolling & desultory rifle fire. With the gradual concentration of 2/8 GR at Leh, the Military Governor systematically prepared the defences & completed his preparations for driving away the raiders from Ladakh.
#2dayIn1948
The 'Defence Minister' enrolled volunteers and set them to improving the various hill tracks for use by loaded mules. A rough but serviceable intelligence organisation was created which kept Leh Brigade informed of enemy's moves & intentions.
A rope bridge ..
The 'Defence Minister' enrolled volunteers and set them to improving the various hill tracks for use by loaded mules. A rough but serviceable intelligence organisation was created which kept Leh Brigade informed of enemy's moves & intentions.
A rope bridge ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was thrown across the Indus near Tharu to connect the positions at Chilling with the main front. Performed entirely by manual labour, this was no small feat.
A rationing system for the civil population was also established. Plentiful stocks ..
.. was thrown across the Indus near Tharu to connect the positions at Chilling with the main front. Performed entirely by manual labour, this was no small feat.
A rationing system for the civil population was also established. Plentiful stocks ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of rations, ammo & stores were collected. A party was sent to Gya, which enrolled 50 local villagers in the militia and dug out defensive positions for the Leh garrison to fall back upon in case of a major defeat.
The frontline positions near ..
.. of rations, ammo & stores were collected. A party was sent to Gya, which enrolled 50 local villagers in the militia and dug out defensive positions for the Leh garrison to fall back upon in case of a major defeat.
The frontline positions near ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Tharu were strengthened and the tactical position stabilized.
At the same time, it was decided to form a band of guerillas under Maj Hari Chand for operating behind enemy lines. Guerilla tactics offered tremendous possibilities in the sparsely ..
.. Tharu were strengthened and the tactical position stabilized.
At the same time, it was decided to form a band of guerillas under Maj Hari Chand for operating behind enemy lines. Guerilla tactics offered tremendous possibilities in the sparsely ..
#2dayIn1948
.. populated, mountainous, thinly-held areas of Ladakh. The local population was also sympathetic to Indian troops, and since the raiders were in very small numbers compared to the area occupied by them, deep penetrations behind their lines was ..
.. populated, mountainous, thinly-held areas of Ladakh. The local population was also sympathetic to Indian troops, and since the raiders were in very small numbers compared to the area occupied by them, deep penetrations behind their lines was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. expected to be relatively safe as well as profitable.
.. expected to be relatively safe as well as profitable.
#2dayIn1948
In Dras sector, the plan for turning movement from the right having proved abortive, a turning movement from the left was attempted. It was decided that two battalions with mule transport should climb up from Sonamarg to the Bot Kulan Gali, push ..
In Dras sector, the plan for turning movement from the right having proved abortive, a turning movement from the left was attempted. It was decided that two battalions with mule transport should climb up from Sonamarg to the Bot Kulan Gali, push ..
#2dayIn1948
.. down the Muski Nala & take Dras by surprise.
At the same time, the other two battalions of 77 Para Brigade were to advance on the main Zoji La track & link up with Dras. A company of 5/11 GR was also to cross over from the Khanabal area to the ..
.. down the Muski Nala & take Dras by surprise.
At the same time, the other two battalions of 77 Para Brigade were to advance on the main Zoji La track & link up with Dras. A company of 5/11 GR was also to cross over from the Khanabal area to the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Suru Valley to create a diversion there & tie up as many hostiles as possible.
The hostile penetration in Tithwal having proved to be a false alarm, orders were immediately issued for the first attack in the Zoji La sector. 3 Jat & 1/5 GR reached ..
.. Suru Valley to create a diversion there & tie up as many hostiles as possible.
The hostile penetration in Tithwal having proved to be a false alarm, orders were immediately issued for the first attack in the Zoji La sector. 3 Jat & 1/5 GR reached ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Sonamarg from Sopore & Khanabal respectively. These two battalions were to form the column for the advance via Bot Kulan Gali under command of Lt Col AS Pathania, MC, of 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles.
Of the other two battalions, namely, 5 Maratha LI and ..
.. Sonamarg from Sopore & Khanabal respectively. These two battalions were to form the column for the advance via Bot Kulan Gali under command of Lt Col AS Pathania, MC, of 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles.
Of the other two battalions, namely, 5 Maratha LI and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 1 Patiala, the former was to force the Zoji La positions by capturing the Mukand Hill on the right, thus allowing the latter to push on to Gumri & Beyond. 5 Maratha was ready at Baltal, and 1 Patiala was already holding picquets at Zoji La.
.. 1 Patiala, the former was to force the Zoji La positions by capturing the Mukand Hill on the right, thus allowing the latter to push on to Gumri & Beyond. 5 Maratha was ready at Baltal, and 1 Patiala was already holding picquets at Zoji La.
#2dayIn1948
The attack was originally scheduled to go in on 02 Sep, but was later postponed to 03 Sep.
In the end, however, even this proved to be too ambitious and 1/5 GR only reached the vicinity of its objective on 04 Sep, to find itself held up by an enemy ..
The attack was originally scheduled to go in on 02 Sep, but was later postponed to 03 Sep.
In the end, however, even this proved to be too ambitious and 1/5 GR only reached the vicinity of its objective on 04 Sep, to find itself held up by an enemy ..
#2dayIn1948
.. post manned by a platoon. As there was not enough daylight to mount an attack that day, nor was any flanking movement possible, Lt Col Pathania had to halt his troops for the night. Their camping ground was about 3km short of Bot Kulan Gali.
.. post manned by a platoon. As there was not enough daylight to mount an attack that day, nor was any flanking movement possible, Lt Col Pathania had to halt his troops for the night. Their camping ground was about 3km short of Bot Kulan Gali.
#2dayIn1948
After reconnoitering the ground, 1/5 RGR launched an attack this evening.
The going was difficult, to say the least.
After reconnoitering the ground, 1/5 RGR launched an attack this evening.
The going was difficult, to say the least.
#2dayIn1948
Despite terrible ground and enemy opposition, the attack was pressed home by two companies under Lieutenant Ichhe Gurung, MC and the Pass was captured by morning. 3 Jat then immediately pushed through the Pass & occupied the ridge by 0900Hr.
Despite terrible ground and enemy opposition, the attack was pressed home by two companies under Lieutenant Ichhe Gurung, MC and the Pass was captured by morning. 3 Jat then immediately pushed through the Pass & occupied the ridge by 0900Hr.
#2dayIn1948
Picquets were posted on the high hills o neither side & a fair amount of equipment & ammo left behind by the raiders in their hurried withdrawal was collected.
However, the operation had to be abandoned at this stage.
All surprise had been lost and the ..
Picquets were posted on the high hills o neither side & a fair amount of equipment & ammo left behind by the raiders in their hurried withdrawal was collected.
However, the operation had to be abandoned at this stage.
All surprise had been lost and the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. fleeing raiders from Bot Kulan Gali had warned their comrades up ahead. The route ahead was too difficult to be forced against prepared and well manned positions. To add to it, the mule track was found to be completely buried in snow and there ..
.. fleeing raiders from Bot Kulan Gali had warned their comrades up ahead. The route ahead was too difficult to be forced against prepared and well manned positions. To add to it, the mule track was found to be completely buried in snow and there ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was no way mules could have carried on ahead of here.
The Marathas at Zoji La too had been unsuccessful. Having reached the top of Mukand Hill, they assumed the enemy had fled the entire area and didn't dig in, resulting in the raiders pressing home ..
.. was no way mules could have carried on ahead of here.
The Marathas at Zoji La too had been unsuccessful. Having reached the top of Mukand Hill, they assumed the enemy had fled the entire area and didn't dig in, resulting in the raiders pressing home ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a successful counter attack to recapture the position.
The diversionary operation in Suru Valley was also fruitless.
By 1900Hr this day, the company of 5/11 GR had crossed the main Himalayan range & was established near Suru Village.
.. a successful counter attack to recapture the position.
The diversionary operation in Suru Valley was also fruitless.
By 1900Hr this day, the company of 5/11 GR had crossed the main Himalayan range & was established near Suru Village.
#2dayIn1948
No hostiles had been engaged by them so far.
No hostiles had been engaged by them so far.
#2dayIn1948
In Leh, a guerilla platoon had been successfully organised, to exploit the battlefield by operating behind enemy lines. It comprised of select Gorkha & State Force troops, prime criteria being ability to survive out in the open at near glacial altitudes.
In Leh, a guerilla platoon had been successfully organised, to exploit the battlefield by operating behind enemy lines. It comprised of select Gorkha & State Force troops, prime criteria being ability to survive out in the open at near glacial altitudes.
#2dayIn1948
35 such men, led by Maj Hari Chand, alongwith a local villager as guide, moved out at 0955Hr. They carried three Bren Guns & grenades, 150 rounds of .303 rifles, a blanket / greatcoat & two days' emergency scale rations.
As the track on ..
35 such men, led by Maj Hari Chand, alongwith a local villager as guide, moved out at 0955Hr. They carried three Bren Guns & grenades, 150 rounds of .303 rifles, a blanket / greatcoat & two days' emergency scale rations.
As the track on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. which they moved, gradually disappeared, the horses on which they were moving were left behind & the party continued on foot.
By nightfall, the men were on the upper slopes of the range, only 3Km from the Pass. There, they spent the night, huddled ..
.. which they moved, gradually disappeared, the horses on which they were moving were left behind & the party continued on foot.
By nightfall, the men were on the upper slopes of the range, only 3Km from the Pass. There, they spent the night, huddled ..
#2dayIn1948
.. together for warmth, sheltering behind some rocks to escape the piercing wind.
.. together for warmth, sheltering behind some rocks to escape the piercing wind.
#2dayIn1948
On the diplomatic front, this was the day that Pakistan formally rejected the 13 Aug resolution presented by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The resolution had called for a ceasefire; outlined truce terms; and re-stated ..
On the diplomatic front, this was the day that Pakistan formally rejected the 13 Aug resolution presented by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The resolution had called for a ceasefire; outlined truce terms; and re-stated ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the position accepted by both sides that the 'future status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.'
The truce terms required Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the State 'as the ..
.. the position accepted by both sides that the 'future status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.'
The truce terms required Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the State 'as the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of J&K constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Govt of Pakistan before the Security Council.'
India would begin to withdraw the bulk of her forces ..
.. presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of J&K constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Govt of Pakistan before the Security Council.'
India would begin to withdraw the bulk of her forces ..
#2dayIn1948
.. from the State after the raiders (tribesmen & other Pakistani nationals) had withdrawn & the Pakistani troops had commenced their withdrawal. Pending acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would maintain, on its side ..
.. from the State after the raiders (tribesmen & other Pakistani nationals) had withdrawn & the Pakistani troops had commenced their withdrawal. Pending acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would maintain, on its side ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of the line existing at the time of ceasefire, a minimum force to assist in maintenance of law and order.
The question of conditions or a 'reference to the will of the people' was left for later consultations between the Commission & the two govts ..
.. of the line existing at the time of ceasefire, a minimum force to assist in maintenance of law and order.
The question of conditions or a 'reference to the will of the people' was left for later consultations between the Commission & the two govts ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 'upon acceptance of the truce agreement.'
Britain had no representative in the Commission & its ability to influence its work was limited during the period it functioned in the subcontinent.
Unlike the UNSC proposals of 21 Apr, the UNCIP ..
.. 'upon acceptance of the truce agreement.'
Britain had no representative in the Commission & its ability to influence its work was limited during the period it functioned in the subcontinent.
Unlike the UNSC proposals of 21 Apr, the UNCIP ..
#2dayIn1948
.. proposals didn't reflect a deliberate pro Pakistan tilt. They were an attempt to balance the interests of India & Pakistan while taking into account the fact that the entry of Pakistani army into J&K was a violation of the 17 Jan resolution.
.. proposals didn't reflect a deliberate pro Pakistan tilt. They were an attempt to balance the interests of India & Pakistan while taking into account the fact that the entry of Pakistani army into J&K was a violation of the 17 Jan resolution.
#2dayIn1948
Ayyangar had complained of the 21 April resolution that it 'put the cart before the horse' by failing to issue a clear call to Pakistan to withdraw the raiders before going into the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The UNCIP resolution conceded ..
Ayyangar had complained of the 21 April resolution that it 'put the cart before the horse' by failing to issue a clear call to Pakistan to withdraw the raiders before going into the question of plebiscite arrangements.
The UNCIP resolution conceded ..
#2dayIn1948
.. primacy to a ceasefire based on withdrawal of the invaders. The question of arrangements for a reference to the will of the people was to be taken up later, after both sides had accepted the truce arrangements.
Moreover, there was implied ..
.. primacy to a ceasefire based on withdrawal of the invaders. The question of arrangements for a reference to the will of the people was to be taken up later, after both sides had accepted the truce arrangements.
Moreover, there was implied ..
#2dayIn1948
.. criticism of Pakistan in the demand that it withdraw its forces from J&K since their presence constituted a 'material change in the situation.'
This was, of course, no more than a slap on the wrist. The Commission refrained from publicly ..
.. criticism of Pakistan in the demand that it withdraw its forces from J&K since their presence constituted a 'material change in the situation.'
This was, of course, no more than a slap on the wrist. The Commission refrained from publicly ..
#2dayIn1948
.. condemning Pakistan for having violated international law (thought it did so in private) because it realised that open condemnation would result in Pakistan's rejecting the proposals.
India had asked for clarification of certain aspects of ..
.. condemning Pakistan for having violated international law (thought it did so in private) because it realised that open condemnation would result in Pakistan's rejecting the proposals.
India had asked for clarification of certain aspects of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the resolution. She sought confirmation that it recognized that recurrence of aggression in Kashmir must be prevented and that India would have to maintain sufficient forces in the state to meet the threat of external aggression as well as of ..
.. the resolution. She sought confirmation that it recognized that recurrence of aggression in Kashmir must be prevented and that India would have to maintain sufficient forces in the state to meet the threat of external aggression as well as of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. internal disorder; that the sovereignty of the State extended to its entire territory and that there could be no recognition of the so called 'Azad Kashmir Govt'; and that the Commission didn't recognize Pakistan's claim to have any part in a ..
.. internal disorder; that the sovereignty of the State extended to its entire territory and that there could be no recognition of the so called 'Azad Kashmir Govt'; and that the Commission didn't recognize Pakistan's claim to have any part in a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. plebiscite, 'should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the State by means of a plebiscite.'
On receiving satisfactory clarifications on these points, India accepted the resolution on 25 Aug.
Pakistan, however, wanted the ..
.. plebiscite, 'should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the State by means of a plebiscite.'
On receiving satisfactory clarifications on these points, India accepted the resolution on 25 Aug.
Pakistan, however, wanted the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Commission to deal with the question of plebiscite arrangements in the resolution. The Commission, it maintained, should be guided by the terms of the 21 Apr resolution, which should be interpreted taking into account the explanations offered by its sponsors.
.. Commission to deal with the question of plebiscite arrangements in the resolution. The Commission, it maintained, should be guided by the terms of the 21 Apr resolution, which should be interpreted taking into account the explanations offered by its sponsors.
#2dayIn1948
It insisted on India's prior acceptance of the plebiscite provisions of the 21 Apr resolution. It wanted the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' to be treated as a separate party to any settlement and to be left in control of the territory it had occupied.
It insisted on India's prior acceptance of the plebiscite provisions of the 21 Apr resolution. It wanted the 'Azad Kashmir Govt' to be treated as a separate party to any settlement and to be left in control of the territory it had occupied.
#2dayIn1948
It insisted that the 'Azad Kashmir' forces should not be disarmed or disbanded. Pakistan wanted to be placed on a footing of absolute equality with India in connection with the plebiscite & indicated that she would continue to press for ..
It insisted that the 'Azad Kashmir' forces should not be disarmed or disbanded. Pakistan wanted to be placed on a footing of absolute equality with India in connection with the plebiscite & indicated that she would continue to press for ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the State on the grounds that even a minimal Indian presence would be prejudicial to a fair plebiscite.
These were among the formidable list of objections raised by Pakistan.
The Commission was prepared to ..
.. the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the State on the grounds that even a minimal Indian presence would be prejudicial to a fair plebiscite.
These were among the formidable list of objections raised by Pakistan.
The Commission was prepared to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. accommodate some of Pakistan's concerns - most notably, by leaving the 'Azad' forces intact - but it couldn't accept the rest.
Pakistan's formal reply, sent this day in 1948, contained such far-reaching reservations & qualifications that the ..
.. accommodate some of Pakistan's concerns - most notably, by leaving the 'Azad' forces intact - but it couldn't accept the rest.
Pakistan's formal reply, sent this day in 1948, contained such far-reaching reservations & qualifications that the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Commission interpreted it as tantamount to rejection.
While regretting that this response made an immediate ceasefire impossible, the Commission expressed the hope that Pakistan would reconsider her position.
.. Commission interpreted it as tantamount to rejection.
While regretting that this response made an immediate ceasefire impossible, the Commission expressed the hope that Pakistan would reconsider her position.
#2dayIn1948
A door was thus left open for follow-up action on the 13 Aug resolution.
A door was thus left open for follow-up action on the 13 Aug resolution.
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