Is the TTP resurging? Some angles on the trajectory and internal politics of the TTP. 1/n
Formed in 2007, TTP remains one of the most lethal center-seeking insurgent movements in Pakistan. It functioned as al-Qaida's paramilitary in Af-Pak; it hosted al-Qaida central & supported its int'l terror campaign from Pakistan; it is also allied with the Afghan Taliban.
From 2010 to 2016, TTP steadily declined in organizational capital, manpower, & territory. It also struggled politically, experiencing fratricide & splintering. This was due to US drone strikes, Pakistan military operations, and the rise of ISIS. mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116…
By 2016, TTP and its splinters had moved to various parts of eastern Afghanistan. There the group experienced more infighting. By 2017, and even in early 2018, it appeared the TTP was in terminal decline. thediplomat.com/2018/02/flaggi…
But that changed in 2018 with Mufti Noor Wali becoming chief of the TTP. A former JUI-F activist & senior leader of the Mehsud "halqa", Wali from the outset focused on the TTP's cohesion. As @pstanpolitics shows, cohesion is key to insurgent trajectories: books.google.com/books/about/Ne…
In 2018, from the little I knew about Noor Wali, my sense was that he was positioned to revive the TTP: arabnews.com/node/1322976/w…
Theories on outbidding suggest that one path to consolidation for militants is to engage in more violence (mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116…). But Noor Wali cut down on violence & focused on reducing factionalization with "unity" messaging.
I have been hearing about TTP's political activity for a year but publicly observable activity has only picked up in recent months. For instance, in July, TTP announced the rejoining of the Hakimullah Mehsud/Shehryar faction, which had separated in 2014. thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-re…
Recently, it announced alliances with units of al-Qaida and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami. Today, TTP announced a merger with a key splinter, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. I suspect Hizb-ul-Ahrar & Mangal Bagh will also end up joining/allying with the TTP.
The logic of these alliances & mergers is captured in @tricbacon's work. For those joining, TTP is a key node of a militant network; on the other side, TTP sees new allies filling org deficits, like presence in geographies where the Mehsud units are weak. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Beyond alliances/mergers, there are reports of TTP moving fighters to Waziristan: arabnews.pk/node/1714011). Violence appears low but this recent suicide bombing was noteworthy: dawn.com/news/1573981. Also, there are reports of substantial extortion by TTP in South Waziristan.
I don't have a firm explanation for the TTP's resurgence but a number of factors seem important. In Afg: the decline of ISIS & control of territories TTP is in by Afghan Taliban; in Pak, reduced forces in Waziristan & fall-out of over-reliance on flipped former TTP fighters.
Research on pol violence (I am familiar with) doesn't see leadership to be a key variable but in this case, Noor Wali’s leadership seems important, who is more effective than the last two chiefs, Hakimullah and Fazlullah. Both lacked a political strategy for the insurgency.
For eg: Hakimullah's involvement in the bombing of CIA base in Khost in 2009 & 2010 Times square plot put TTP in the crosshair of a powerful US CT campaign, aka the drone war. Also, Hakimullah’s dispute with Wali-ur-Rehman added to the TTP’s problems. google.com/books/edition/…
After Hakimullah's killing in a drone strike, Fazlullah failed to politically manage the TTP. Most consequential was his inability to rein in the “Mehsud Halqa” – which remains TTP's most powerful faction. He also couldn't respond to ISIS's rise & the splintering it engendered.
In contrast, Noor Wali appears to be treading politically and carefully. To be sure, TTP has vulnerabilities. I see no evidence of major popular support; it can also be self-destructive. Yet its trajectory is ascendant and with the rise of the Afghan Taliban it has opportunities.
The TTP remains a major CT challenge. I believe its political consolidation and resurgence has implications for Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban -- with which TTP is still allied -- and the future of al-Qaida in Afghanistan & Pakistan. n/n
n+1/n: Related to TTP is a nice working paper by @EoSpangler and @dustywhite7, which uses machine learning prediction to impute unclaimed/unattributed TTP attacks in GTD dataset. The figure shows their main result, imo; thresholds are predicted prob of an attack being by TTP. 
There are many interesting insights on the nature of TTP's violence, the type of violence it claims, and claimed/unclaimed attacks in the full paper: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Also, this 2018 report by @AmiraJadoon and Sara Mahmood, which looked at the TTP's code of conduct released in Sept of the year to assess how the group was trying to reconstitute itself: ctc.usma.edu/fixing-cracks-…
