Here's what she does: "I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked" by a "virtue/duty" preference.
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Being a decision theorist, she does decision theory on this.
In particular, she asks how we can identify the agent's notion of duty (or whatever other virtue he feels constrained by) if we know his true preference.
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She also shows that choice behavior substantially restricts both the true preference and justifications when neither is known, and gives a mathematical characterization of how.
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What I like about this is that it takes seriously the conflict that can arise between duty and preference. It doesn't insist on some dogmatic conflation of the two (as in my first tweet) but creates a formalism giving them both space to be real things.
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A wonderful example of decision theory being helpful by giving us good, clear ways to talk about (and "be economists about") things that we should talk about, but didn't yet have good language for.
7/7
PS/ I think this is a piece of decision theory that Bernard Williams (who unfortunately is not on Twitter) would have liked.
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I'm delighted that this short survey, a labor of love, is forthcoming in Notices of the AMS later this month.
I'll post a few threads over the next few weeks.
Today: why do eigenvectors keep showing up in models of networks and influence?!
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In models that show up in networks, typically some matrix M carries the structure: who affects whom, and by how much.
This appears in settings ranging from opinion dynamics to spillovers in organizations to marketplace regulation, with links meaning different things.
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Once M has encoded the economic structure, spectral theory helps us answer the question:
which patterns persist, amplify, or determine the eventual outcome?
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If you do applied math (broadly - CS, stats, physics, . . .) - a request/freebie:
Refine is a tool that reads papers and finds technical issues, like a referee.
We want researchers in diverse areas to try it.
If you're willing to, read on.
1/
We'll give you free reviews, useful to stress-test a paper before submission or circulation.
(Users say it's similar to at least 4h of expert reading.)
In exchange, all we ask is you write a brief, fully honest reaction on X, LinkedIn, or any similar platform.
2/
Then we'll give you more free reviews, which you can keep or give as a gift to others.
If you're interested, please DM me. We'll do about 10 researchers for this first trial.
Conditions: PhD student or later, not in economics/finance/game theory.
3/
This terribly misguided paper is making the rounds.
This thread is to make it common knowledge what is wrong with it.
The basic thing: all modern economic theory allows for a gap between individual maximization and efficiency, whatever you mean exactly by each of these.
The first welfare theorem (individual optimization implies social efficiency) breaks down in the presence of frictions -
e.g., incomplete markets, asymmetric information, externalities, and market power.
Most economics today is about these frictions.
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Now, the paper has some halfhearted recognition of this, but says, effectively
"Well, you know, there is some meta-stage in which institutions are chosen, and economics assumes that this choice will be made to kill all frictions except the efficient ones."
3/