Here's what she does: "I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked" by a "virtue/duty" preference.
3/
Being a decision theorist, she does decision theory on this.
In particular, she asks how we can identify the agent's notion of duty (or whatever other virtue he feels constrained by) if we know his true preference.
4/
She also shows that choice behavior substantially restricts both the true preference and justifications when neither is known, and gives a mathematical characterization of how.
5/
What I like about this is that it takes seriously the conflict that can arise between duty and preference. It doesn't insist on some dogmatic conflation of the two (as in my first tweet) but creates a formalism giving them both space to be real things.
6/
A wonderful example of decision theory being helpful by giving us good, clear ways to talk about (and "be economists about") things that we should talk about, but didn't yet have good language for.
7/7
PS/ I think this is a piece of decision theory that Bernard Williams (who unfortunately is not on Twitter) would have liked.
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This terribly misguided paper is making the rounds.
This thread is to make it common knowledge what is wrong with it.
The basic thing: all modern economic theory allows for a gap between individual maximization and efficiency, whatever you mean exactly by each of these.
The first welfare theorem (individual optimization implies social efficiency) breaks down in the presence of frictions -
e.g., incomplete markets, asymmetric information, externalities, and market power.
Most economics today is about these frictions.
2/
Now, the paper has some halfhearted recognition of this, but says, effectively
"Well, you know, there is some meta-stage in which institutions are chosen, and economics assumes that this choice will be made to kill all frictions except the efficient ones."
3/
a few notes on it from an economist studying network theory
The striking thing about César's hit 2009 paper on economic complexity is that it doesn't mention eigen-anything and seems surprisingly disengaged from network theory.
The economic complexity index that Hidalgo and Hausman propose in "The building blocks of economic complexity" is a very close variant of Kleinberg's very famous 1999 HITS algorithm.
It's not clear whether they're aware of this connection, but in any case
2/
economists writing about networks in 2009, such as Jackson, Acemoglu, myself, and many others would have probably written the paper differently --
with a clearer consciousness to our big debt to the prior study of eigenthings as centrality measures!
I don't care at all about homework being done with AI since most of the grade is exams, so this takes out the "cheating" concern.
Students seem motivated to learn and understand, which makes the class very similar to before despite availability of an answer oracle.
2/
It's possible that (A) all the skills I'm trying to teach will be automated, not just the problem sets AND (B) nobody will need to know them and (C) nobody will want to know them.
Notice: A doesn't imply B and B doesn't imply C.
3/
A survey of what standard models of production and trade are missing, and how network theory can illuminate fragilities like the ones unfolding right now, where market expectations seem to fall off a cliff.