Apropos of nothing, here's an order from Paris to the commander of French forces in Chad not to intervene to stop a coup d'état against François/N'Garta Tombalbaye in April 1975. There has long been speculation about the French role in the coup. 
From what I have gathered from French records, first-hand accounts, and American sources, the French may have known something was brewing in the day or two preceding the coup, but were not involved. Tombalbaye had threatened to purge the security services and that was enough.
To some extent though, the French certainly welcomed the change in regime, as Tombalbaye's methods of governance and frequently testy relations with Paris often got on French nerves. They wasted little time in recognizing the military regime that replaced him.
There was a belief at the time among French policymakers that military regimes were more efficient, less corrupt, and more publicly-minded than their civilian counterparts in Africa. This would backfire in Chad-- within a few months, the French army was expelled from the country.
This came about because the new regime, led by General Félix Malloum, faced the same constraints that many of France's clients felt--dependence on France eroded domestic legitimacy, but the resources it procured were necessary for security, political consolidation, and patronage.
However, the embarrassment caused by the public violation of Chadian sovereignty by French ransom payments and arms deliveries to rebels led by Hissène Habré as part of failed efforts to secure the release of French hostages forced the new government to take drastic action.
Denuded of French army protection however, Malloum's government was extremely vulnerable to the expansion of rebel forces, backed by Libyan money and weapons. By early 1978, it had lost control of the northern half of Chad, forcing Malloum to beg France to intervene.
After initial successes, the French army was unable (and partly unwilling) to prevent the collapse of the Chadian state the following year. Nearly all of Chad's dozen or so armed factions--including those France had fought against--sought French aid in the subsequent fighting.
Without drawing too close a parallel to current events in Mali (much has changed since the 70s) it's important to grasp that the relationship between France and a number of African countries has historically been deeply linked to the political interests of African ruling elites.
Hence, any analysis of the historical political trajectories of most of France's former colonies (and a few others), needs to be attentive to the role of France--not as a puppeteer--but as an element that weighs on the political calculus of African leaders.
As the most powerful "armed group" in the Sahel, the French army is a huge part of the regional political equation that can't be abstracted away, particularly in its second-order effects that are hard to measure.
How does it affect civil-military relations, the survival strategies of political elites, local political-economies, statebuilding, economic development, etc? These are important questions which should be part of current research agendas.
Historians have, unfortunately, only begun to scratch the surface of these questions (eg. see forthcoming by me 😁), but they clearly have deep relevance for the economic, political, and cultural histories of many African states as well. cambridge.org/core/books/fra…
