The old “colonial taxes” trope is making the rounds again regarding the CFA franc and Franco-African relations. It’s a misguided, and perhaps even counterproductive way to understand France’s peculiar role in postcolonial Africa. 1/
First, since 1960 the Franco-African relationship has been the most clearly neocolonial of all postcolonial relations b/t former African colonies and colonizers. French preferences for authoritarian regimes and single-party states has had destructive long-term effects. 2/
French military interventions in particular have consistently bolstered authoritarian regimes, and generally bought short-term stability at the cost of longer term instability. 3/
In many ways, the security logic governing French Africa policy remains the same today, and France continues to coddle dictators or look askance at democratic slippages in the name of stability. 4/
This needs to be understood though as a joint Franco-African project, as it always was. African leaders had and continue to have important stakes in keeping French security guarantees, economic aid, and currency rents. France can’t exercise influence without these allies. 5/
What this has meant is that even in the heavy days of French neocolonialism, African leaders had a huge influence over French policy—though more so in some countries (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon) than others. 6/
However, generally speaking, France has not consistently benefited economically from its postcolonial African relationship—indeed, the lack of profitability was a consistent problem for France in Africa from the colonial period. 7/
It’s true that for the first two post-independence decades, most of France’s former colonies were dependent on Paris for exports and imports, and had signed exclusive agreements regarding French access to raw materials. These clauses were largely dropped in the 1970s though. 8/
Today, the French market share in its former West and Central African colonies is somewhere between 11-15 percent (I’ve read different figures). French economic dominance has largely dissipated. 9/
In this regard, the CFA franc was not a “colonial tax” imposed on former colonies--it is a source of rent for African elites. Since independence African leaders desperately wanted access to hard currency and easy repatriation of their assets. The CFA regime provides this. 10/
The CFA regime also provides some macroeconomic stability by keeping prices steady and facilitating the imports of needed capital goods. That stability, in addition to the free capital flows linking it to Europe also means—in theory—better access to foreign investment. 11/
Since the 1980s at least, the vast majority of that foreign investment has not been French, even though clearly French companies have benefited from it. There is little evidence that the French economy or state have derived substantial benefits from the CFA.12/
Of course, critics are right to point out that the CFA limits African economic growth by restricting the money supply, impedes exports, encourages corruption through asset repatriation, and limits how states can regulate or tax profits from foreign investment. 13/
The new ECO currency changes none of this though and maintains elite access to hard currencies (an element which I think is underestimated in analyses of the persistence of the CFA regime). 14/
Broadly speaking, France’s postcolonial interest in Africa was originally driven by a) prestige linked to France’s status as a global power b) guaranteed diplomatic support at the UN and elsewhere c) “strategic depth” in case of war with Soviets, and d) yes, raw materials. 15/
Today, the most important lens through which French policymakers view its former colonies is security. This is perceived in terms of terrorism, migration, and generalized destabilization of a “traditional zone of influence.” 16/
This ideologically constructed conception of “strategic interest,” embedded within domestic political concerns related to terrorism and immigration, are the main drivers of continued French engagement (just look at French funding priorities) 17/
In other words, French neocolonialism no longer has the material reality it did 50 years ago. African elites are far more autonomous vis-à-vis France than they were in the past. But the “tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare” on the relationship to this day.
