1. So, this book. It's a major reference for French mil and nat sec types, and with reason. I'm not done with it yet, but already I've learned an exceptional amount. I did find a contradiction, however, that's relevant for @#Barkhane and FR STABOPS in general. 
2. Coutau-Bégarie (HCB) stresses the relevance of FR's colonial experience, saying FR Army exceptionally good at using local auxiliaries and establishing contacts with the population. "This heritage is not lost," he says (p. 476). I've heard this from many Fr senior officers.
3. Then, in a section on "the loss of efficacy of regular strategies," (sec. 275), he talks about how "post-modern armies" are increasingly incapable of dealing with irregular or assymetric threats. They rely increasingly on fire power...
4. ...are more reluctant to engage with enemy, because of risk of casualties, and are more and more cut off from the population (p. 529). Meanwhile, the enemy is perfectly integrated with the people and doesn't fear death.
5. Also, contemporary STABOPs differ from colonial ones in that two prerequisites are missing, a clear policy that's easy to understand, and real empathy with the population. (p. 530)
6. So here's the thing: HCB doesn't take the simple logical step of including the FR Army in that generalization, even though it is obvious.
7. I think that when it comes to dealing with locals and working with them, the FR Army is convinced it has a "savoir faire" that makes it an exception to the rule. I'm not so sure that's true any more. They might still do it better than the US, but not enough.
8. By the way, HCB also says a reason for the failure of contemporary efforts has to do with the obligation to rely on the local government, which often is ineffective "whebn it is not altogether corrupt." Should sound familiar.
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