Very weird to see a WSSIC temporary designator show up in the DoD PRC military power report. AFAIK, this is the first time we’ve seen this for the HQ-19.
Decoding:
CH - China
AB - Anti-ballistic
X - Experimental (pre-IOC)
02 - Second type
Decoding:
CH - China
AB - Anti-ballistic
X - Experimental (pre-IOC)
02 - Second type
The midcourse interceptor referenced in the next sentence is probably the DN-3.
The report includes surprisingly little new information on the DF-17, JL-2, JL-3, and the DF-100 (not mentioned at all).
Very interesting paragraph on the PLASSF, which we should all be paying more attention to.
This reasoning about the DF-26 being the most likely receptacle for a future potential lower-yield warhead is interesting. But DF-21D may similarly be eligible (ASBMs are inherently required to be precise).
Final sentence here implies multiple such systems will be fielded.
This paragraph is quite odd. It just quotes, at length, the AVC compliance report on Lop Nur (which isn’t in violation of anything in particular).
It’s the sort of thing you might do if you were obliged to mention something, but didn’t quite want to endorse it.
Based on the attribution to “media reports” and no apparent independent US intelligence assessment backing their existence, my take on the DF-31B and DF-5C is a solid 🤷🏽♂️.
Also, tells you a little about the standards to which “authoritative” documents like the Nuclear Matters Handbook are written. The DF-5C made an appearance there and is noted as “in production within 10 years” (!!!). acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhb/…
