Many pointing to studies that $600/week did not increase disincentives. Those studies relevant in saying that policy was good in April, May and June. But they have limited relevance for how to set policy in Dec and Jan when economy will be very different than it was in lockdown.
Moreover, part of why the $600 didn’t cause disincentives is that many expected them to be temporary so would rather be in a job. If they had been smoothly extended through January as many originally wanted that would have undone some of that temporary expectation.
Supporters of triggers and enhanced automatic stabilizers should ask themselves what formula they would have for unemployment benefits. Would you pre-specify that at 8% UR it would be $600/week? And if so was it WAY too low with UR of 15% in the spring?
Even if the weekly boost came down to $400 that would be much higher than the $25 per week in the last recession and enough to ensure that about two thirds of workers were getting more from unemployment benefits than they had been paid on their jobs:
It is too late to shift to replacement rates instead of flat dollar amounts. But that should be a priority for the future. Until then, we should adjust the flat weekly amount based on economic circumstances to balance support for consumption with fairness/work incentives.
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Core CPI inflation rose during the month of January. But it fell and was relatively muted over longer periods of time--although still some concern the numbers a bit lower due to shutdown-related quirks.
On the surface a strong jobs report (130K jobs & unemployment falls to 4.3%).
And just about every detail makes it even stronger: participation up, involuntary part-time down, hours up, wages up.
The mystery of strong GDP and weak jobs is being resolved in the direction of GDP.
The job growth happened despite further cuts in federal jobs. Private employment was up an impressive 172K.
Note, breakeven job growth is currently about 25-50K because of reduced net immigration & also more fully recovered participation. So job growth has slowed but the unemployment rate now seems to have stabilized after slowly and steadily increasing since mid-2023.
I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.
Depending on how you look at it growth in Q3 was very very strong or very strong or just possibly merely strong. Annual rates:
GDP: 4.3%
Real final sales to domestic purchasers: 2.9%
Average of GDP & GDI: 3.4%
GDI: 2.4%
A big part of the story was consumer spending up at a 3.5% annual rate. Started the year looking weak but new data and revisions have made consumers very strong.
Business fixed investment a bit weaker but also very heterogenous. Equipment investment and IPP up but non-residential structures down for the seventh straight quarter.