Many pointing to studies that $600/week did not increase disincentives. Those studies relevant in saying that policy was good in April, May and June. But they have limited relevance for how to set policy in Dec and Jan when economy will be very different than it was in lockdown.
Moreover, part of why the $600 didn’t cause disincentives is that many expected them to be temporary so would rather be in a job. If they had been smoothly extended through January as many originally wanted that would have undone some of that temporary expectation.
Supporters of triggers and enhanced automatic stabilizers should ask themselves what formula they would have for unemployment benefits. Would you pre-specify that at 8% UR it would be $600/week? And if so was it WAY too low with UR of 15% in the spring?
Even if the weekly boost came down to $400 that would be much higher than the $25 per week in the last recession and enough to ensure that about two thirds of workers were getting more from unemployment benefits than they had been paid on their jobs:
It is too late to shift to replacement rates instead of flat dollar amounts. But that should be a priority for the future. Until then, we should adjust the flat weekly amount based on economic circumstances to balance support for consumption with fairness/work incentives.
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Shelter inflation was moderate and the three month moving average continues to basically trend down, albeit slowly.
But you can't just assume elevated items like shelter will get better but that everything opposite won't get worse.
And that's what we've (predictably and predicted) seen: goods inflation was negative for a while but turned positive for 4 straight months. Offset shelter cooling.
Tariffs & exchange rates. A short explainer of the simple case of 10% across-the-board tariffs. Let's start with no retaliation.
Brief version: Tariffs will strengthen the U.S. dollar which will reduce impact on consumers but exacerbate it for exporters.
Three cases:
1. No exchange rate effect. In this case imports are 10% more expensive for consumers. Exports are the same (because the exchange rate did not change) and the trade deficit shrinks. The entire tariff is paid by Americans.
2. USD appreciates by X% where 0 < X < 10%. Imports are 10% - X more expensive & consumers cut back on imports. But the xr appreciation also makes it more expensive for foreigners to buy exports so exports fall. Trade deficit effect is ambiguous & foreigners pay part of tariffs.
Labor market tightness has stabilized over the last several months after a loosening steadily through the summer. Job openings were up and quits down. My favorite metric, job openings per unemployed, was stable.
Here are openings and quits. They've been telling a somewhat contradictory story in recent months as openings are up and quits are down.
The economy remains on the Beveridge curve--admittedly the tight part of it.
Broadly speaking what has happened is core services inflation as only slowed a little (less than people were hoping on lagged shelter) while goods prices have started rising--with unusually large auto price increases in November that could still be hurricane-related.
I believe it is useful to make small contributions to big things (many engaged in doing that now) & also bigger contributions to small things.
On the later, in @BostonGlobe I argue for zoning reform to enable Cambridge to help build more than 1,000 additional housing units.
A🧵
States and localities can resist the likely regressive thrust of federal policymaking while doing what they can to build a more progressive, inclusive and upwardly mobile society.
To do that we need cheaper housing.
And to do that we need more housing.
VP Harris was right to set a goal of building 3 million housing units. On a proportional basis that would require 1,050 from Cambridge. Unfortunately on current course we'll get 100. But with reforms proposed by the City Council that could be raised to more than 1,000.
I know many skeptics of prediction markets. I don't have an ideological faith in them (OK, maybe quasi ideological). But the empirical evidence is they have worked really, really, really well. And did again on Tuesday night.
A short 🧵 about this remarkable picture.
Markets gave Trump a 60% chance. How does that prove they know what they're doing? If Harris won could say, "but she had a 40% chance" so wasn't wrong.
That's correct. Can only judge when you've seen them many, many times. Do 60% chance things happen 60% of the time?
In Ec10 we should them 15 million data points from sports betting from @andrewlilley_au comparing the prediction market probability to the outcomes.
And guess what: if you collect 100 markets with a 6% chance of a team winning and look at the results you'll see them win 6 times.