The "Realistic" unemployment rate remains higher than the official one for two reasons:
1. 1.1m workers misclassified as employed
2. 3.7m have left labor force, more than would be expected even with the rise in unemployment.
The "Full recall" unemployment rate is a hypothetical that measures what would happen under the (wildly optimistic) scenario that all of the 5.4m added to temporary layoff went back to their jobs right away & that participation rates rose in step.
It fell to 6.6% in Aug.
If we got/administered a vaccine today the unemployment rate would likely fall towards 6.6%. But getting the rest of the way to sub-4% unemployment would likely still be a long, hard slog. Maybe a little less long and hard than I had feared a few months ago.
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The jobs slowdown is here with 73K jobs in July & large downward revisions to May & June bringing the average to 35K/month.
Not quite as bad as you might think because steady-state job growth is much lower in a low net immigration world but unemployment still gradually rising.
A small portion of the weaker jobs numbers in recent months are Federal cuts.
But the bigger issues is the slowdown in private job creation.
My latest @nytopinion attempts to answer the question, "The Tariffs Kicked In. The Sky Didn’t Fall. Were the Economists Wrong?"
Part of my argument is the economy actually has slowed & inflation has picked up, as you would expect.
Plus Trump called off some tariffs and lags.
But there are two broader lessons here:
1. U.S. economy is mostly domestic services. Trade matters but it doesn't matter as much as some of the hype might make you think. (And I confess, I do suffer from TDS, tariff derangement syndrome.)
2. Much of macro is small on a percentage basis. But small things really matter a lot.
0.5% off one year's growth rate and $1,000 per household per year forever are the same. But the former sounds small and the later makes it clear it is a large unforced error.
No matter what horizon you're looking at this is too high. (Although there is a case that it is transitory due to tariffs.)
Here are the full set of numbers.
Services excluding housing is the one slice that is muted. But that is what we were counting on to get inflation back to 2%. The problem is goods inflation of this magnitude was not expected (prior to tariffs).
There were massive timing shifts that shifted reported growth from Q1 to Q2. The much better way to look at the data is averaging the two which is a 1.2% annual rate. That is well below the pace in 2024 or the Nov 2024 forecast for 2025-H1.
Here are the GDP numbers. In Q1 inventories added 2.6pp but imports subtracted 4.6pp. In Q2 it was the reverse, with inventories subtracting 3.2pp and imports adding 5.0pp. These are volatile categories and inventories, in particular, have large measurement error.
Here are those import and inventory numbers. In Q1 firms imported a lot to get ahead of tariffs. Then in Q2 imports fell back down to a more normal pace (about the same as in 2024). A lot of those imports went into inventories in Q1 and came out of them in Q2.
You can see signs of tariffs in these numbers and that is only likely to grow.
Here are core goods and core services. The service increase is relatively normal (even muted as shelter was low this month). Goods was unusually high including increases in tariffs sensitive items like appliances and apparel.
Here are the full set of numbers. Notably everything ex housing is worse for the month of June, a reversal of the pattern we had seen earlier.