Thread by @docrussjackson

Ruth Wodak is a brilliant linguist who has been analysing far-right populist discourse for decades.

In the context of the latest "migrant crisis" & the demonization of refugees by those on the Right, everyone would benefit from her analysis & insights.

eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/1402…

Many of the issue-related arguments, metaphors and other rhetorical tropes as well as discursive strategies of exclusion from around 1989 can be discerned once more in the discourses surrounding the refugee movement (the so-called ‘refugee crisis’).

Such discourses and argumentation schemes are implemented by the respective far-right populist parties and their politicians, including Donald Trump, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party & Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz.

What kinds of strategies are we dealing with here?

Wodak: "These strategies include, for example, the so-called ‘victim/perpetrator reversal’, whereby migrants are presented as powerful and aggressive, even as ‘invaders’, while the majority population is presented as powerless and weak".

'Linguistic strategies in discourses about refugees & migrants frequently involve metaphors of floods & other natural catastrophes ('waves'), as well as dehumanizing comparisons equating foreigners with animals, especially vermin, & pathogens (like ‘parasites’ or ‘viruses’).'

'This rhetoric evinces a general frame of ‘war’ & ‘struggle’, thereby referring to a typical body politic, an imaginary of a Volk* (in the sense of ethnos) into which foreigners are forcibly inserting themselves.'

* radicalrightanalysis.com/2019/10/21/eth…

'This nativist ideology evokes associations with fascist ideologies: first, dehumanization & metaphors of war incite fear; next, the leaders stylize themselves as ‘saviors of the nation’ who are able to & must protect the arbitrarily defined & allegedly homogeneous ‘true people’.

'This simultaneously establishes simplistic dichotomies intended to characterize society according to ‘struggle-frame’: The world is systematically divided into ‘Us’ &
the ‘Others’; these Others are bad & the sole cause of all the problems that should be solved.'

'The ‘Others’ can be defined according to any given context. In the third stage, the ‘scapegoat strategy’ allows for these arbitrarily defined ‘Others’ to be blamed for all great challenges and problems. The ‘others” are subsequently excluded.'

In 1989, the ‘Others’ were migrants from former Eastern bloc countries; since 2015, refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran & other war zones. All foreigners (whose entry one aims to prevent) are subsumed under one category
& simultaneously criminalized: labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’.

"At this point, I should also add that there exist welcome migrants as well: for example, tourists or wealthy & qualified/privileged migrants (such as those who
work for international organizations, prominent academics or CEOs of big international businesses, etc.)"

Far-right populist ideologies have four dimensions:

First: nationalism/nativism/anti-pluralism,
meaning that such parties refer to an allegedly homogeneous ethnos (community or Volk)
that's frequently defined according to ethnic – often even nativist (blood-related) - criteria.

Another emphasis here is on a so-called heartland (or homeland/Heimat) that ostensibly needs to be defended from ‘dangerous intruders’.

This allows for threat scenarios to be developed – the homeland or the ‘Us’ is being threatened by the ‘Others’.

Second: an anti-elitism is espoused & connected to EU-skepticism. The quest for a ‘true, direct democracy’ is contrasted with a so-called ‘formalist democracy’ as its antonym. This would allow for the majority to be privileged, whereby minorities would no longer be protected.

Third: authoritarianism plays a central role: A
savior, a charismatic leader, is venerated, whose role switches between that of a Robin Hood (protection of the welfare state & support of the ‘man and woman on the street’) & that of a ‘strict father’.

This savior would obviously provide security through restrictive 'Law & Order!' policies.

Fourth: the dimension of conservatism & historical revisionism plays a central role: Traditional, conservative values (traditional gender politics & family values) are at stake;

either one insists on the status quo or turning back the clockone (a retrotopia). The protection of the homeland necessitates a belief in a common narrative of the past in which the ‘Us’ were heroes or victims of evil eg victims of a conspiracy by the enemies of the fatherland.

In the framework of welfare chauvinism, welfare benefits should only be accorded to ‘real/true’ members of the ethnos.

Such parties advocate for change, turning away from an allegedly highly dangerous path leading to a future described as an apocalyptic inferno.

However, "such complex phenomena can best be studied in an interdisciplinary fashion and should always be examined in context-dependent ways. The many different far-right populist parties and the reasons for their successes should by no means be tarred with the same brush."

For example, such parties have led extremely successful election campaigns and enjoyed great popularity in very rich countries like Norway, Switzerland, Denmark & Austria, although the financial crisis had a far lesser impact there than in Southern Europe.

This is due among other things to the enormous
fears of deprivation, the fear that something could be taken away from ‘us’, & to a demographic panic (‘We’ might die out). Identity politics & welfare chauvinism were important in these countries, in the past as well as the present.

They argue that social achievements cannot be allowed to disappear and that they are exclusively the preserve of the ‘true’ people, of the ‘real’ Austrians, Finns, Germans, Hungarians, French, and so forth.

The situation is different in, say, Italy, Spain, Portugal & Greece, where the financial crisis had a devastating impact & there is still mass unemployment among the young. Neoliberal austerity have massively increased the income gap, & many countries have cut welfare benefits.

Many people’s perception was & remains that it was the banks, & not the people, who were saved by the state. Therefore, in Greece for example, an intense polarization has arisen between left-wing populist & far-right populist/right-wing extremist parties (SYRIZA vs Golden Dawn).

Donald Trump also generated a lot of resonance in deindustrialized areas & impoverished cities, though not exclusively in these areas – though Trump’s electoral success was dependent on many different factors.

What implications do these ‘discursive shifts’ have for our understanding of coexistence?

Wodak: First of all, the boundaries of what can be said have significantly shifted; this has led to a normalization of right-wing extremist, formerly taboo contents and terminology.

Despite the appropriate consternation they cause, the so-called (everyday) ‘isolated cases’ that occur involving breaches of taboos by politicians such as hate incitement, antisemism, Islamophobia, misogyny allusions to Nazi jargon etc are having an accustoming effect.

The erosion of democratic institutions & the creeping yet frequent & systematic redefinition or even rejection of democratic procedures (eg lies, attacks on the press & the independence of the judiciary) are leading to increasingly & explicitly authoritarian forms of government.

Due to social media, the fourth pillar of pluralistic,
liberal democracies, journalism, is beginning to lose its significance for some politicians & may become obsolete: Politicians now turn directly to ‘the people’ & reach their ‘friends & followers’ via Facebook, Twitter etc

In many places, the Muslim population is being increasingly ostracized. False generalizations
exacerbate prejudices – not just in countries with small but significant Muslim populations but especially in those regions or countries where few if any Muslims live, such as Poland.

The traditional Feindbild (negative concept of the enemy; bogeyman) namely the so-called ‘Jewish world
conspiracy’, is moreover serving again as a global scapegoat: Hungarian-born American Jewish philanthropist George Soros is thus construed metonymically as the symbol of evil:

Orbán, Trump & many other far-right populist politicians accuse Soros of pulling the strings that are allegedly bringing all the refugees & migrants to Europe and the United States.

Anti Muslim, xenophobic & antisemitic stereotypes are combined into one giant threatening conspiracy theory very reminiscent of the 1930s: Then, ‘Rothschild’ was the symbol of the imagined powerful Jews onto whom all the complex social problems were projected, now it's ‘Soros’.

Another significant shift in discourse I term ‘shameless normalization’: Many existing conventions (politeness, conversation maxims, conventional norms & rules governing discussions, negotiations, conflict management etc) are increasingly being jettisoned in political debates.

This includes Donald Trump’s unspeakable, sexist statements towards & attacks on female politicians &
journalists as well as the lies & untruths he launches on an almost daily basis, whether via traditional media, or via social media.

While these are always debunked, the crucial point is that this behavior entails hardly any, if any, consequences. Apologies no longer seem necessary, insults are left standing. People are moving in different, segregated discursive worlds, where different norms & rules apply.

There exists often no interest in factual debates; discussions are led destructively, as fights. Cumulative attacks against arbitrarily defined elites are generating increasingly positive resonances eg ‘Finally, someone dares to say what everyone is thinking’.

In this context, a straw man fallacy becomes relevant: Far-right populist parties claim to be fighting against a ‘language police’, against a ‘political correctness’ perceived as censorship – although freedom of
speech reigns everywhere, provided that certain laws are abided by.

At the same time, such politicians themselves reject any criticism & - if criticized - stylize themselves as victims (e.g. of an antagonistic campaign, a conspiracy).

This behavior is often connected to the victim/perpetrator reversal strategy.

All of this has a concomitant effect – not viewed causally – on our political and media culture . We can also observe an increasing loss of trust in national & transnational politics, leading to ever more frustration with politics, a depoliticization, a ‘post-democracy’.

This may finally be accompanied by the desire for ‘a strong man’, a ‘saviour’.

The rejection of academic elites & scholarly expertise moreover leads to a rejection of critical, independent experts; in other words, a rejection of fact-based knowledge.

Facts are being degraded to the status of opinions, to so-called ‘alternative facts’. Simple solutions naturally allow for rapid successes, yet they frequently turn out to be shortsighted, ineffectual or even false.

It is also noticeable that the performance of politics is gaining the upper hand at the expense of differentiated as well as complex content. Slogans have taken
over the function of arguments – superficial consensus the function of a plurality of opinions and of discussion.

Intellectuals such as Chantal Mouffe have proposed a ‘leftist/left-wing populism’ as a reaction to these discursive shifts, & some prominent politicians who share this view. How sensible do you find such reactions & demands with regard to democratic understandings of discourse?

Wodak: Mouffe’s approach is, of course, very interesting. Left-wing populism, she claims, opposes ‘the people’ to an ‘elite’, whereas the populist far-right adds a third party, typically migrants, whom the ‘elite’ are accused of favouring.

Nevertheless, the challenge of how to include strangers & newcomers into our societies is certainly the most important one in the near future, also for left-wing populists. However, the question ‘Yes, but how?’ remains unanswered by Mouffe.

I think that different contexts call for different styles of communication, contents & genres.

Naturally, slogans are important in the context of electoral campaigns; positive narratives & different framings can also be effective as counter-discourses.

In general, stronger initiatives & agenda-setting are called for, not just reactions to provocations. Ultimately, I think more opportunity to participate in decision-making, especially on the local level, is crucial. More dialogue on an equal footing is called for.

The Irish model is a good example: 100 randomly chosen individuals work together continuously for a year on very complex issues with the support of moderators & experts, their suggestions then being considered in the decision-making process before a parliamentary vote is taken.

Their participation is institutionalized and the participants are very satisfied afterwards, feeling that their ‘voice’ has finally been heard.

Q Why are there so many reactionary movements & politicians at the moment who are influencing & determing socio-political discourses?

Wodak: On one hand, the dissatisfaction & insecurity among much of the general public were underestimated by mainstream parties, while on the other hand, lies & untruths, even purchased data (eg Cambridge Analytica/Brexit) were used to decisively influence referenda & elections.

Fears of losing out, resentments & envy have been cunningly stoked & manipulated. The neoliberal politics of austerity, the focus on the individual & on competition as well as achievement has also increased significantly at the expense of a collective feeling of solidarity.

Growing inequality & rising poverty have been paid too little attention by the mainstream, which has also led to a justified ‘rage’ among many people (‘the banks were saved, not the people’!

The impact of increased migration to the cities & the consequences emerging as a result have not been accounted for, for far too long. As a result, too few steps were taken to finance, support & implement sensible measures for the integration of foreigners.

As we know, in times of great insecurity (see Bauman), authoritarian & simultaneously simplistic solutions that implement targeted strategies of scapegoating are very effective.

Q New forms of authoritarian politics are in demand not only in countries with authoritarian, Nazi & fascist pasts. Are there sociological determinants through which these present-day societal developments can be approached? How adequate is the ‘desire for strong leaders’ thesis?

Wodak: We live in times of great acceleration, of huge challenges, & of partially unforeseeable crises. This can lead to feelings of collective powerlessness & globalized media incapacity among individuals; national politics is also connected to transnational & global phenomena.

The economy seems to be driving politics, not vice versa. We're more connected, yet challenges (climate crisis, terror, migration etc) are leading to a retrospective, nostalgic gaze, a retrotopia, a resurgence of nationalism & the drawing of new material & symbolic boundaries.

The Brexit referendum & Trumpism reflect great urban/rural differences as well as (im)mobility as a distinctive characteristic of voting decisions: Mobile, educated people tend to live, so the assumption, in urban areas and are perceived as more cosmopolitan.

Generational differences also play a role (eg older people voted Brexit). Gender politics are moving into the foreground: Nativist & heteronormative, exclusionary national identities are increasingly being confronted by multicultural & diversified, inclusive national identities.

It is a proven fact that more men than women vote for farright populist parties.

Q: What is needed to bring the different spheres of society & their ‘truths’ (‘postfactual realities’) back together again and what can scholarship contribute to this end?

Wodak: Scholarship can make a significant contribution to enlightenment, yet ‘scholarship’ needs to take a stance & express itself in comprehensible ways, in many different public spheres & via different genres of text & talk.

While academics (especially younger ones) have to publish in as many impact journals as possible (meaning their findings aren't accessible to the broader public), they will hardly exert any influence.

Academics & intellectuals belong to ‘the elites’ being rejected on many sides!

We must therefore enter into dialogue with many different people, answer questions & listen without moralizing, but also indicate clear boundaries of the acceptable, based on the principles of our pluralistic democracy & constitution.

*ENDS*