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In the light of the soon demise of the NST, some long term trends for the Russian triad, in a short thread.
Overall the triad seems to be stable in terms of numbers, with modernisation being focussed on the like for like replacements and development of new capabilities. 1/10
First of all, what kinds of new technical capabilities can we expect? In addition to the Avanguard HGV that sort of went through IOC already there is a smaller HGV for the Sarmat (for MIRV) and what appears to likely be a powered HGV (Anchar-RV), most likely on light ICBMs. 2/10
There is also the concept of parallel staging comming about in the form of likely parallel RV dispersal on Yars and possibly other ICBMs (ie Sarmat).

This is there in anticipation of space based weapons systems as allows faster (earlier?) deployement. 3/10
Secondly, what is the expected composition?

In the 2020s we are probably looking at around ~60 heavy silos and ~70 light silos, ~180 TELs, ~10-12 SSBNs, ~70 bombers.

This composition, based on inertia and other factors, would most likely shape the employement. 4/10
With the heavy ICBMs and silo based ICBMs in general driving up the throw weight (and thus eventual capability spread between RVs and penetration packages, manuever capability and so on), with only light TEL based ICBMs and SLBMs (compare Bulava, Sineva and Trident-II). 5/10
Namely due to the fairly low readiness levels (~1/6 for TELs and SSBNs) the silo based force is disproportionally responsible for the throw weight and from that RVs, penetration packages and thus utility generated.

And while some survivability enhancement is done... 6/10
Via say silo based APS/CMS, possible return of SAM coverage over the ICBM basing areas and so on the reliance on LoW seems to be the most likely way survivability would be assured.

This is not the same for the US due to Trident-II's capabilities and SSBN readiness rates. 7/10
Now, because the environment has changed LoW means not only launching on a warning of an inbound massed ballistic missile attack, but would also apply to massed conventional (or lower yield ie LYT) attacks (ie HGVs ie С-PGS), as those now have a counter-force capability. 8/10
This is quite clearly being demonstrated in the recently published declaratory policy (though this is not anything new either), but not only that - the policy document is backed up by acquiring real capabilies ie to detect a massed CM attack (Container EW radar). 9/10
In addition to deploying and development normal systems and means, such as upgrades to the NC3 system (both in electronics and shelters), deployement of Voronezh EW radar network (including BMD centric -SM) and EKS EW/C2 network. 10/10
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