While during the early Cold War Soviet leadership was looking to create large, centralized but hardened command posts for COG/COOP purposes, as the cold war progressed, it became obvious that many such structures were quickly becoming vulnerable with advances in weapons.

1/4 This lead to a parallel strategy of dispersal, creating a cloud of smaller re-location sites around Moscow.

To support this cloud and to enable bypass of coms around Moscow (should Moscow be destroyed) novel infrastructure had to be developed.

2/4

A review of this post by Fabian Hoffmann, a thread.

( )

1/9buff.ly/40W5wZb One would have hoped for a literature review here, with specifics on the Russian pit (and warhead in general) manufacturing industries, tritium generation.

There are papers written on this topic, but maybe the language barrier is an issue.

2/9

An interesting article by FT.

The claim they make is that there is extensive construction for a new command post area in the western Beijing, including hardened protective structures to protect leadership, C2 in case of an attack.

1/7 While I may be missing something (I am no IMINT expert) and while FT may have other more conclusive imagery it seems to me that there are only shallow excavated areas present.

2/7

On the Russian EWS.

Russian EWS has several major components, I would classify 5 of them:
- BM EW radar network
- Space based BM EW and Comms component
- radar network for CM/ABT EW and BMD support
- C3

A short thread:

1/9
The primary BM EW radar network is based on Voronezh-M/VP, Voronezh-DM series radar and a rented Volga radar in Belarus.

It provides mostly overlapping coverage in VHF and UHF bands, with different operational sectors.
2/9

Reconstructing the Oreshnik IRBM from available data is hard.

One of the challenges is that if it uses Rubezh TEL, then it will be limited in terms of mass and length by that chassis, probably insufficient to house lower YaRS stages.

1/3 Available imagery of the PBV debris appears to indicate that it has a small (1-1,5m) diameter, with the adjacent stage also likely sharing it.

This makes the re-use of Bulava or YaRS PBV unlikely.

2/3

Regarding the recent discussion on the expansion of the Russian solid rocket fuel motor production.

A short thread.

(buff.ly/3ZhTcld )
(buff.ly/3ZhTAjF)

1/5 While it likely is mostly related to more immediate needs of the ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine, with the heightened demand of SAM rounds, Iskander-M and Kinzhal BMs, MLR rounds and other such munitions, there may be other drivers.

2/5

A thread on mobile ICBM launchers.

Previous thread on silos seemed to be popular, I hope this one provides a palette cleanser from the current events.

1/18
Early ICBM launchers were soft affairs, both due to the novelty of the weapons and difficulty of hitting targets deep in the enemy rear promptly.

They would also be liquid fueled, with non stored propellants, hot launched.

2/18

A thread on missile silo design.

I hope you find it of interest.

1/15 By the time this launcher type matured in mid 1960s there was a significant degree of convergence in design - large silo tops, sliding silo doors, hot launch, in silo maintenance.

2/15

A short high level overview of the initial SMFs NC3 system - Signal

A thread.

Please feel free to ask questions in comments below.

1/17 First of all some background

SMFs became an independent service in 1959 and quickly realized that it was hard to timely and properly C&C it's geographically dispersed forces, particularly with the massed deployment of 2nd gen missile complexes in stand alone silos.

2/17

The mobile ICBM TELs have become quite iconic for the Russian SMFs, but this was not always the case.

Temp-2S had a limited success and deployment, with 4th gen Topol being the first system to enter wide spread service.

1/7 However Topol development had issues and delays, leading to staggered deployment:
- 1985 first unit with fixed CP and interim launcher
- 1987 first unit with an interim mobile CP
- 1988 first unit with full structure and acceptance into service

2/7

Regarding NC3 and infrastructure.

Infrastructure is hard to build timely.

And while Russia did carry out significant nuclear modernisation in 2010s it ran into many issues.

While some of those were technological, ie developing and testing Bulava SLBM, there were others.

1/10 Let’s focus on the SMFs, the premier Russian leg of the triad.

What were their main programs in the past 2 decades?

2/10

Regarding the recent news about the deployment of US INF-range weapons in Germany and other events, such as the bipartisan recommendations from a while back.

This is not a reflection of any Russian policy, but rather a thought I had.

1/7 At the moment the trend appears to be to deploy long range PGMs, capable of holding at risk targets deep into Russia, leadership, military (including SNFs), value (critical infrastructure).

As such they are, de-facto, strategic offensive arms (SOAs)

2/7

I disagree.

Note the site’s location and sensor arcs.

While it does cover some Ukrainian launch areas it does so at range and the edge of the scan sector, with sidewise view.
So it is unlikely to provide much warning of ATACMS launch, even if launch area is covered.

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1793986215449940211

Nor is there a C3 link presently between the EWS and the actual shooters - ie S-400 units.

The other issue is that Voronezh-DM is not focussed on tracking/discrimination mission, there are other variants for that, ie Voronezh-SM at Vorkuta.

Because Soviets worked to have tight political/civilian control over the nuclear forces one of the challenges was maintaining constant communications between key decision makers and the military command, to allow prompt release of unlocker codes under attack.

One of such channels was set up on the same sats used by the SMFs, to allow such VIP comms when they are away from normal command posts and such.

UR-100 (aka SS-11, a light 2nd gen ICBM) was one of the most widely deployed ICBMs, with over 1000 silos deployed 1965-1972.

(Compare and contrast to ~200 1st gen ICBM launchers deployed in total)

It also was an emergency crash program.

1/11

The first generation of Soviet ICBMs (ie R-9, R-16, etc) had many problems, mainly:
- cost
- complexity/difficulty of manufacture
- inability to maintain prolonged alerts, low readiness
- soft, non survivable launchers
- tightly packed basing locations

2/11

Belorussian component of the Russian lead NSNW exercise.

It is interesting because the Russian exercise appears to be the Southern MD centered, with Belorus outside of its area of responsibility.

Apparently the Belorussians did dispersal of aircraft and other steps towards use. Apparently a squadron of Su-25s and an Iskander-M divizion (aka battalion) are participating on the Belorussian end.

I would note that Iskander-M needs some prep work for nuclear use, ie deploying the environmental control modules on launchers.

In the context of the recent US aids package that allegedly includes more ATACMS rounds let’s talk about the current state of the Russian theatre BMD.

1/

First - the shooters.

Presently the most common BMD capable systems would be (a) S-300PM/S-400 and Buk-M2/M3.

After those there is (b) the S-300V3/4.

There are also new generation systems in limited service (c) - S-350 and S-500.

2/

An interesting observation - Soviets at one point were moving towards a force composition similar to that of US.

1/11

Both countries had a troublesome first generation of ICBMs - they had poor response times, could not maintain long term alert, were not survivable to the enemy attack.

This lead to a preference for pre-emption, attacking first (not necessarily vs force targets)

2/11

Hypersonic intermediate range weapons provide a challenge for strategic stability.

The more obvious concern would be fast flight times to many key targets in European part of Russia, meaning that Russian leadership would be pressed to make hasty decisions.

1/7

The less obvious is the ambiguity in their final target. While CMs have already presented that challenge in the past, the combination with the very short flight times is unique

Last but not least - they are also challenging to detect and track, due to the depressed profile.

2/7

A Ru NC3 thread.

I have already covered the three primary triad services so…

Let’s now talk about the top level of the Russian nuclear forces. This would discuss the EW system and the NCA, as well as the GS and the common system.

1/9

First - the EW.

The EW system has a variety of sensors, but primarily relies on two primary radar types, providing overlapping coverage in different bands, and on a HEO satellite force.

Additional sensors, ie in cm bands, are used for some sectors and to cue in the BMD.

2/9

A Ru NC3 thread.

Now that the SMFs got covered let’s do the other two legs of the triad.

While Navy and the RuASF have separate systems developed by separate organisations there is a degree of commonality.

1/4



Both have the primary tract that uses a routed data exchange network to deliver orders, commands, reports as formalised messages.

Typically primary tract terminates in radio stations, be that ie HF (bombers), ie VLF (SSBNs), for communications with the launchers.

2/4