krakek Profile picture
a Quasi-NEET interested in all things military.
Fadri Lüthi Profile picture 1 subscribed
Mar 27 6 tweets 2 min read
Nuclear detonation detectors (small hemispheres based on the ground, 9, 11) are ubiquitous in the late Soviet, modern Russian design.

They are there to improve the survivability of the ICBM, allow it to fulfil its mission after the enemy attack.

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They achieve this in several ways:
- delaying the launch so that the flying missile doesn’t get hit by the following blast
- switching silo equipment into autonomous (ie power) mode
- switching the guidance system into the seismic mode, to reduce the degradation of precision

2/4
Mar 24 6 tweets 3 min read
Here are more cool diagrams for the Korund and Korund-M systems.

While its first channel was used to carry SMF’s signals (42 channels for vanilla), the second repeater channel would also carry other users, Ruchei system for far away MDs, Surgut for senior political leadership.
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And here for the joint system (ЕССС), that was built using both the HEO and GSO sats, 1st and 2nd gen.

This system carried both communications (telephone, data) and video (TV) signals.
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Mar 2 10 tweets 3 min read
Let’s do another thread on the Soviet NC3.

One may have noticed that Soviets have shifted to highly automated main NC3 system for the SMFs starting from late 1960s.

Communications for this (and follow up) system(s) were built upon data exchange via formalised messages.

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Such messages would be carried originally by telegraph (teletype) channels, typically over compressed telephone lines, either organic to the service or leased civilian ones.

Ofcourse the civilian nature doesn’t mean the network was soft - there was a common hard network.

2/8
Dec 16, 2023 9 tweets 3 min read
A recent interview with Karakaev, commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.

()

Some interesting take aways below in a thread:

1/7 redstar.ru/strategicheska…

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One of the early points is the description of the spring visit by Shoigu, which mentions the active protection system.

Unfortunately it seems that the term describes what should be called a CMS, a soft kill system focussed on PGM defence.

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Dec 3, 2023 9 tweets 5 min read
Lets talk about the Soviet regimental CPs again.

Such a CP is the lowest level within the Strategic Missile Forces, where a crew would normally interact with a silo based ICBM.

It is also a part of the missile complex (weapon system).

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By third generation of missile complexes (mid 1970s-mid 1980s) such CPs evolved to a common type, where a canister would be suspended in a silo, typically co-located at one site with a combat silo (the so-called “central position” of the regiment).

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Jun 6, 2023 5 tweets 1 min read
My hypothesis here is that this was a combination of the following:
- previous attacks by Ukrainians
- poor maintenance due to it being in an active combat zone
- recent heavy rainfall
- water dumping upstream
(Not necessarily in that order) That said Russian response seems to be very slow, it appears that there were signs of the imminent dam failure days ago, yet measures were not taken to secure it (Ie emergency repairs, water dumping etc) or limit the damage (evacuations from impacted areas).
Dec 17, 2022 11 tweets 7 min read
Finally going to cover this, now 6 months old, episode on Sarmat: ()

A thread on hardened protection bits (but it is fairly solid overall, if you cut out political parts, Ie it was the source for R-36M2 platform pics). 1/11 It begins with the refurbished SMF central command post. This is an old, shallowly buried hardened protective structure and is the non survivable command option. 2/11
Apr 1, 2022 8 tweets 4 min read
So, we all love the secret bunkers. Decisionmakers can work out of them should there be a military or other threat to them.

Many search for them outside of major cities - either under tall mountains or dispersed at many recreational fascilities all around the country. 1/8 ImageImageImageImage Yet as history shows with the development of ever more potent weapons and ever quicker delivery systems lead to the requirements for both costly hardening and co-location with normal operation to make quick evacuation under attack viable. 2/8
Dec 22, 2021 5 tweets 2 min read
Speaking of the short to intermediate missile threat from potential forward US/NATO basing in Baltics and Ukraine.

In addition to the rhetoric that one may discount Russia has been consistently building up resilience against it, which is a form of an honest signal I believe. 1/5 What does such resilience require?

First of all - early warning and tracking. In addition to the normal radar network provided by Voronezh series Russia has been investing into the OTHRs (Container) and re-locatable smaller radars such as 80P6. 2/5
Dec 21, 2021 4 tweets 1 min read
So Russia has completed the deployment of the first full Avangard unit of 6 silos and the regimental CP.

What is interesting is the public expert debate about what this capability is for.

A very short thread, I promise. 1/4 My hypothesis is simple - abortable LoW use, to defeat missile defence and enable the follow up, weakened, LUA/DSS should the warning have been real. Or abort their flight if it was not.

Some circumstantial evidence may be consistent with this, ie EKS space comms. 2/4
Jul 20, 2021 13 tweets 2 min read
So far it is fairly, ehh, marketing/showmanship heavy.

Not my thing.

It does provide some decent angles of the plane I guess. @TheDEWLine.

Key points:
- high altitude all weather basing
- modularity/cost reduction/logistics/post sale support
- APU
- simplified maintenance/operations
- modest AI support
Jul 18, 2021 4 tweets 2 min read
A short thread, created due to the @russianforces's concerns regarding how it appears that the new Chinese silos (find courtesy of @dex_eve) have their tops above the normal elevation of the area.

Such a set up is fairly common for Russian sites. Here you can see a reconstruction of a silo type structure (regimental command post) at Dombarovsky. Note that the ground level at the crane (used for the work on it) is elevated relative to surrounding area. ImageImage
Jul 4, 2021 22 tweets 14 min read
On Ramenki site, a thread.

Many have seen the existing sources on the topic, such as the CIA reports (map related) or the books by Bruce Blair&Yarunuch.

Fortunately today we can also rely on recently de-classified archival materials.

1/20 Those materials adequately cover 1930s-1960s (and you can read more in Yurkov's book here: amazon.com/gp/product/560…) however even they are imperfect, information towards the end becomes sparse, especially for military sites and the intended uses of sites.

2/20
Mar 21, 2021 10 tweets 3 min read
I think in addition to the inertial scenario (ie modest improvements to modest Moscow BMD) there may be concerns about a grander push for BMD.

Now which elements may form this greater BMD set up?

A thread:

1/10 First lets talk sensors.

Over the recent past Russian system has nearly completed two complimenting above horizon radar layers for EW (Voronezh-M/VP and DM) as well as pushed the EW space based sensors (and comms) through IOC, with beyond horizon EW radar layer underway. 2/10
Mar 20, 2021 4 tweets 1 min read
An interesting blog entry, with the caveat that it begins with questionable reporting (as @steffanwatkins mentions) on the GPS systems.

Makes one wonder about the extend the security discourse and actions are affected by the internal influence operations. Otherwise a decent take on the challenges in optimising the security posture.

My 50 cents would be that scale matters, being able to deploy an Army Group (or atleast strong Corps) is different to the ability to deploy a mass of brigades such force would be composed out of.
Feb 16, 2021 6 tweets 5 min read
A short thread.

If Yahroma is a meter band radar on the lines of Voronezh-M/VP it would make sense for it to be built in Sevastopol as well as in Chukotka (KMZ courtesy of @russianforces) as the coverage there for that band is nonexistant. 1/ Same would apply to the "high potential dm-band" site announced for Murmansk area - that is where the gap in Voronezh-DM radar coverage happens to be.

As such those two new sites (M/VP-like in Sevastopol and DM in Murmansk) would complete dual band EW coverage. 2/
Jan 12, 2021 5 tweets 3 min read
Some context on the earlier discussion.

Below you could see polygon formed by the Alaskan missile defence site and the two relevant Russian EW radars.

(sorry for the quality, middle part of this horrible polygon is ~200km high above sea level) As you could see missile defence interceptors from Alaska are unlikely to enter the radar coverage even if they fly optimal ballistic trajectories.

So the only sensor capable of detecting them would be EKS/Kupol or possible future radar at Chukotka.
Jan 12, 2021 5 tweets 4 min read
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…

TASS source allege that Yakhroma radar to be planned for deployement in Chukotka.

Previously radar of this type was reported to be planned for construction in Crimea and speculated to be related to missile defence. Such a radar forward deployed in Chukotka, with 270 degree sector may be there to provide coverage for the region, possibly for US BMD interceptors as other radars are deployed to south-west.

Or for some BMD function.

That is if TASS did not make this up.
Nov 10, 2020 9 tweets 3 min read
A short refresher thread on the legacy Russian NC3.

First, there was a supporting system for the NCA, which allowed the President (and the MoD) to communicate with the military and to release the unlocker codes for the launches.

Unlocker codes are then pushed down to launchers. Proprietary ownership by civilians was/is important because it ensured that only the relevant civilian authorities can order the launches, military authority would not have the unlocker codes.

My understanding is that Perimeter also receives them as a part of pre-delegation.
Oct 18, 2020 7 tweets 4 min read
Food for thought, over 2020s we may see a trend of existing S400 regiments (30+ of them) being reinforced with S500 divizions, which would lead to addition of ~180+ engagement channels focussed on MRBMs, IRBMs and possibly with some ICBM capability. 1/6 This force may provide not only a system for strategic defence against sub-ICBM BMs (ie from Middle East and elsewhere, as those proliferate), but also some capability against the potential HGV and other similar threats.

But I would expect this to be overshadowed... 2/6
Oct 8, 2020 8 tweets 3 min read
On the topic of arms control, de-alerting and the like.

As we prepare for possible extension of NST specifically and some sort of future arms control in general I would caution against mirror immaging and copypasting exact approaches across the board. 1/7 Image This is not only true due to different concerns the parties may have and thus seek to adress but also due to technical, doctrinal and geographical differences between the parties.

So lets look at the de-alerting as one of the common ideas floating around. 2/7