Thread by @StrickerNonpro

Key findings from ⁦@TheGoodISIS⁩ IAEA Iran safeguards report:

1. Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late Sept 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. Iran may have enough LEU to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon. isis-online.org/isis-reports/m…

2. The second nuclear weapon could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months.

3. Iran’s LEU stock now exceeds by ten-fold the limit set in the JCPOA. As of Aug 25, 2020, Iran has a stockpile of about 3114.5 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), all enriched below 5 percent, or the equivalent of 2105.4 kg (uranium mass).

4. Overall monthly LEU production has decreased slightly, from 181.5 kg per month in the previous reporting period (Feb 2020 - May 2020) to 165.1 kg per month during this reporting period (May 2020 - August 2020).

5. This decrease only affected the below 2 percent uranium production. The monthly average production of 2 to 4.5 percent LEU increased slightly.

6. Iran’s total estimated enrichment capacity has decreased slightly to 7693 separative work units (SWU) per year during this reporting period, although this maximum should not be used in breakout estimates.

7. Iran is starting the process of installing advanced centrifuges in the underground halls of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, only minimal activity has happened thus far, and Iran has already shifted its plans.

8. Iran informed the IAEA that the operator of the PFEP at Natanz “intends to transfer and displace 3 production cascades (No. 4, 5 and 6) from this facility” to FEP. Cascades 4, 5, and 6 contain IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 cascades respectively.

9. Subsequently, Iran changed its plans, and now intends to “install equivalent cascades at FEP, rather than transfer the existing ones, and that when these become operational at FEP, the three corresponding cascades at PFEP will cease operation.”

10. Lines 2 and 3 at the PFEP contain a variety of centrifuge types and numbers, many accumulating enriched uranium. Not many changes since the last report.

11. Iran also accumulated enriched uranium in lines 4, 5, and 6. Lines 4 and 5 contain redeployed IR-4 and IR-2m centrifuge cascades containing 156 and 164 centrifuges, respectively. Line 6 has a IR-6 cascade (120 centrifuges).

12. Line 1 currently holds an inoperable cascade of IR-1 centrifuges. Iran announced plans to use line 1 for testing IR-5 and IR-6s centrifuges in a full cascade of up to 172 centrifuges or two intermediate cascades of 84 centrifuges.

13. At Fordow, in total, 1057 IR-1 centrifuges were installed. Iran installed an additional 12 IR-1 centrifuges and one IR-1 centrifuge was installed in a single position; these were involved in initial research and development activities related to stable isotope production.

14. Iran exported 4.9 metric tonnes of heavy water, bringing it under the 130 metric tonnes cap of heavy water Iran is permitted to possess under the JCPOA.

15. On August 24, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization spokesman, Behrouz Kamalvandi, stated regarding Iran’s exports of heavy water, “We sell to countries in Asia and Europe. In order to avoid pressure on the companies in these countries, we do not name them.”

16. In December 2019, Trump administration officials clarified to the Washington Free Beacon that purchasing Iran’s heavy water would be a sanctionable activity. It is unclear whether the administration is pursuing pressure or sanctions against buyers of Iran’s heavy water.

17. It is unclear whether the Arak conversion project continues. “Iran…installed a main component of the [reactor’s] refuelling machine. Iran indicated that this machine was constructed based on the original design and is planned to be adapted to the new design of the reactor.”

18. The IAEA reported limited new information about the results from its investigation into the IAEA’s detection of refined uranium particles at an open-air warehouse in the Turquz-Abad neighborhood of Tehran.

19. The IAEA “recently informed Iran that there are a number of other findings for which further clarifications and information need to be provided and questions need to be answered.” According to knowledgeable officials, the IAEA is planning to report more fully in November.

20. IAEA stated that it has had accesses under the Additional Protocol “to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit, with the exception of a location at which a complementary access will be conducted later in September 2020 on a date already agreed with Iran.”

21. The IAEA refers here to its separate NPT safeguards investigation under which it has sought access to two sites and Iran’s explanations about a third site.

Those are the top 20 or so findings. Read more here and thanks to @TheGoodISIS for letting me moonlight on the analysis.

isis-online.org/isis-reports/m…