Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
Andrea Stricker
@StrickerNonpro
Deputy Director & Research Fellow @FDD's Nonproliferation & Biodefense program l Frmr @TheGoodISIS l 17 years of nukes l Non-partisan l Twin mom l Own views
Mar 5 • 28 tweets • 4 min read
🧵Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report

Iran can now make weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for up to 13 nuclear weapons, on a timeline of seven nuclear weapons in one month, nine in two months, eleven in three months, 12-13 in four months, and 13 in five months. This represents an increase of one weapon since Nov., where the increase is added to the first month of a breakout.

Using only a portion of its stock of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU), Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in as little as seven days.
Jun 5, 2023 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Israel is lashing out at the #IAEA because America and Europe are not pushing to hold Iran accountable at the Board of Governors. Tehran gets away with violations by providing dubious explanations. 1/
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… Netanyahu: “The IAEA’s ineffectual conduct in the face of these weak excuses conveys a message to Iran’s rulers that they need not pay any price whatsoever for their violations, and that they can continue deceiving the international community with their efforts to obtain nuclear… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
Jun 5, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
As Israel/Saudi normalization talks proceed in which the U.S. plays a role, issue of Saudi enrichment and a potential proposal for American enrichment on Saudi soil is heating up. 1/ bloomberg.com/news/articles/… See also @jaysolomon @semafor who reported more details than available to date on a "Nuclear Aramco." 2/ semafor.com/newsletter/06/…
Jun 5, 2023 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
During today's press conference at opening of IAEA Board of Governors, @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi pushed back against accusations that agency has "watered down" verification standards for political considerations. 1/ iaea.org/press/press-co… Says, if anything, this process (of IAEA looking into undeclared sites in Iran), agency has been "strict", "technically impartial," "fair," and "firm." 2/
May 15, 2023 • 4 tweets • 4 min read
In Den Haag, Netherlands closely following the @OPCW #RevCon5 on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Unfortunately, two member states decided to block FDD’s participation (the only U.S. org, as well as two Syrian, one Israeli).

We will not be silenced. Stay tuned. Image Joint statement by 52 countries concerning accreditation of NGOs. Thank you, friends. @OPCW #RevCon5

“A very small minority of States Parties [is] blocking the accreditation of NGOs that have a proven track record of working on issues demonstrably relevant to the object and… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… Image
May 10, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
New @FDD memo out today ahead of next week's Chemical Weapons Convention review conference @OPCW.

Syria's suspension two years ago has been positive for the organization. Member states must next turn to giving Russia an ultimatum for compliance.🧵
fdd.org/analysis/2023/… #OPCW member states voted in April 2021 to suspend #Syria’s voting rights & privileges, the first suspension of its kind, holding Damascus to account for prolonged non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. 1/
Nov 14, 2022 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
Analysis of the IAEA's latest report on Iran's NPT compliance with @TheGoodISIS:

🧵Our recommendation: Due to Iran’s prolonged, ongoing lack of cooperation, the IAEA Board of Governors should pass a resolution condemning Iran’s non-cooperation and refer the issue to the UNSC. 1) For four years, the IAEA has been investigating the presence of man-made uranium particles at three Iranian sites.
Apr 29, 2022 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
Happy 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)! The CWC & its implementing body, @OPCW have been successful at dismantling 99% of chemical weapons stockpiles, instituting oversight over facilities & chemicals. Yet the CWC is under threat. Russia, Syria, and North Korea have used chemical weapons over the past decade. China and Iran may still have undeclared CW programs. The State Department has concerns about an ISIS program.
Apr 19, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Working on an update that tracks results of OPCW decisions put to a vote from 2018-2022 & have some data on adverse votes and problematic abstentions in the Conference of States Parties.

Who is causing the most trouble? Let us explore... Coming in with the most adverse votes by far out of 21 possible votes are:

China, Iran, & Russia (the usual three) (21 votes);

Belarus, Nicaragua, & Tajikistan (20);

Bolivia, Cuba, & Kazakhstan (18);

Myanmar & Syria (latter suspended from votes in April 2021) (17);
Apr 18, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Iran confirms it is splitting centrifuge manufacturing between two new underground sites, fortified against sabotage & military strikes.

"We moved an important part of the machines & transferred the rest to Natanz and Isfahan,” said AEOI spox Kamalvandi. apnews.com/article/europe… Kamalvandi also "reiterated Iran’s stance that Tehran will not provide data" to the UN nuclear watchdog from video cameras at both sites if the West does not lift sanctions.
Oct 5, 2021 • 7 tweets • 7 min read
[Thread] 1/ @OPCW Exec. Council-98, U.S. & 44 other countries requested clarification from #Russia regarding its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention #CWC, under article IV, para 2, more than a year after Moscow's attack on @navalny. state.gov/u-s-leads-effo… 2/ This is not the suspension ultimatum @NatSecAnthony & I recommended, but may be part of a medium-to-long-term effort to build a case on Russia's #CWC non-compliance & muster political will for eventual suspension, if compliance is not forthcoming. thehill.com/opinion/intern…
Apr 13, 2021 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Only thing that didn’t “work” about max pressure was it wasn’t correctly framed as a long-term effort to contain the regime in Iran’s aggression, push for changes in behavior, and give the Iranian people tools to demand better. Sanctions pressure clearly worked on the economy. Claiming the main objective was to get a stronger nuclear deal provided ammunition for critics to call the policy “discredited” and a “total failure” after just two years and change, with oil sanctions in place for only part of that period.
Apr 12, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
The @OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) has issued a new report determining that Syria used a toxic chlorine gas against its own people in February 2018. Damascus did not cooperate or provide relevant access to the IIT. opcw.org/sites/default/… 1/ The IIT provided to member states the names of responsible Syrian officials. It is now up to UN member states (facing a Russian veto) -- and more likely to individual states -- to sanction the Syrian officials who were responsible for the attack. 2/
Feb 25, 2021 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
Analysis of the IAEA's Iran monitoring and verification report with @TheGoodISIS. Thread on key findings: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1) Iran's breakout time to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon, if it chose to do so, has a range of 2.7 to 3.5 months, where the average is 3.1 months. Iran could produce a second amount of WGU, and have enough for two nuclear weapons, within five months.
Jan 13, 2021 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
As @laurnorman reports & Iranian officials attest, Iran has notified the IAEA of its intention to start an assembly line at Esfahan to produce uranium metal as part of advanced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 1/

wsj.com/articles/iran-… It’s worth exploring Iran’s experience with u-metal, a key material that can also be used to produce nuclear weapon cores. We know that Tehran has quite a bit of experience thanks to the Nuclear Archive documents, seized by Israel in 2018. 2/
Oct 16, 2020 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
Regarding Iran nuclear site claims this morning from NCRI: what we know about the described sites and/or their activities.

Newly revealed facility in Sorkheh-Hessar region - an administrative-appearing building allegedly used by an SPND Geophysics Group, the "Chamran Group" 1/ Allegedly the team carries out research related to underground nuclear tests, geophysics, and seeks an underground tunnel. Allegedly it has illicitly procured ground penetrating radar and seismometers from abroad. 2/
Sep 6, 2020 • 22 tweets • 4 min read
Key findings from ⁦@TheGoodISIS⁩ IAEA Iran safeguards report:

1. Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late Sept 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. Iran may have enough LEU to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon. isis-online.org/isis-reports/m… 2. The second nuclear weapon could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months.
Aug 26, 2020 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
Thread: IAEA & Iran have reached agreement that the agency will visit two sites, which are obliquely identified in the latest NPT compliance report.

1st site: pilot uranium conversion facility

2nd site: high explosive test site called Abadeh

1/

isis-online.org/isis-reports/d The facility "may have been used for the processing and conversion of uranium ore, including fluorination in 2003" and "underwent significant changes in 2004, including the demolition of most buildings," pointing to it being for uranium conversion. 2/

iaea.org/sites/default/…
Aug 5, 2020 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
Yesterday, @WSJ reported that Saudi Arabia is quietly constructing a uranium ore concentration plant with China's assistance. @TheGoodISIS has located a candidate site.

A thread on the Saudis' nuclear activities and issues ahead: 1/

wsj.com/articles/saudi… The Saudis are also nearing completion of a small research reactor built with the help of Argentina: 2/

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Mar 17, 2020 • 14 tweets • 6 min read
Today, the administration added five Iranian individuals to the Commerce Dept's Entity List. @SecPompeo says they were "involved in Iran's pre-2004 nuclear weapons program, known as the Amad program."

Some background on these men: Sayyed Mohammad Mehdi Hadavi:

A former Ministry of Defense official, named in the Iranian Nuclear Archive as involved in 2003 decisions to hide nuclear weapons activities that Iran planned to continue.

See our report mentioning him: fdd.org/analysis/2018/…
Mar 11, 2020 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
US Ambassador to Vienna’s ⁦@usunvie⁩ stmt to the IAEA Board pulls no punches on Iran:

“Even for Iran, which has a long and truly infamous history of obstructing the Agency, its total refusal to cooperate on these issues is a new low.” vienna.usmission.gov/iaea-bog-u-s-o… “First, Iran has refused to address the Agency’s questions regarding possible undeclared natural uranium at a location that has been heavily sanitized.

In the Agency’s assessment, the nuclear material in question may potentially be uranium metal.”