@DmitriTrenin seems to argue that Germany's energy interdependence with Russia has made the Kremlin more open to compromise in Ukraine and Belarus. Yet Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and the current silent takeover of Belarus suggests the opposite.
Germany reacts to changes in Russia: a more authoritarian system leaving less space for opposition; no compromise in Ukraine; war crimes in Syria; the propping up of the Belarusian dictator. The old strategy of interdependence has produced the opposite of what was intended.
A big cyber attack on the German parliament and the killing of an opponent of the regime in plain sight in Berlin has demonstrated to Germans that the Kremlin has no respect for German sovereignty -- that it doesn't consider Germany a partner.
If there has been hostility in the last years, then certainly not from the German side.
Germany remains to be willing to engage with Russia if the Kremlin is interested in meaningful dialogue. But German red lines have been crossed many times, and Berlin increasingly thinks that deepening German energy dependence on Russia isn't in Germany's and Europe's interest.
Therefore Germany is increasingly moving from modernisation theory / liberalism towards a more muscular realpolitik. Something that should be familiar to Moscow.
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The US and Israel can degrade Iran's nuclear program and diminish its ability to attack neighbors.
But if the regime survive, Russia and China may help it to rearm; and it may become even more dangerous -- and able to present a third front in a China/Russia vs West war scenario.
If the current campaign is supposed to lead to regional stability in the Middle East and to the weakening of China's and Russia's global power, there is no other way than regime change.
Europeans have a strategic interest in helping the US and Israel to achieve such an outcome. As have the Gulf Arabs, Turkey and Japan, India and other Asian countries who oppose Chinese hegemonic ambitions.
Russia's war against Ukraine could have been the moment at which the Europeans would have gotten together and proved that their talk about "sovereignty", "learning the language of geopolitics", "Europe as a power" is a true ambition, backed up by deeds.
Yet that didn't happen. Only the North and the Northeast delivered. Most European countries failed to rise to the occasion. They were happy to be led by Biden. Only under the shield of the US were they ready to deliver weapons to Ukraine. And they always just did the minimum.
The fact that the US is leading the negotiation with Russia is not an accident; it is a logical consequence, a reaction to the non-existence of Europe as a serious, homogenous power willing to push back against Russia seriously.
My quick take on tomorrow's meetings in Washington.
The problem: After having failed to convince Putin, Trump has lost interest in Ukraine.
The risk is that he a) blames Zelenskyy for the failure, and b) entirely stops supporting Ukraine.
Europeans join Zelensky to prevent that he gets ambushed by Trump -- that Trump tells him what he has agreed with Putin and that he must pursue on that path.
Putin has skillfully laid that trap.
What Europeans want to achieve is a) that Trump doesn't look at Ukraine from Putin's perspective (after the meeting with him), and b) doesn't entirely turn against Ukraine, stopping all support, even weapons that Europeans can buy from the US.
Iran has built his bet to dominate the region as the new hegemon in a "post-American world" on its ally-proxies (Hamas, Hisbollah, Houthis, militias in Syria and Irak), on its missiles and its nuclear program.
After the attack by Iran's ally-proxy Hamas in October 2023, Israel has decided that it has to act to stop Iran's aggressive expansion -- and diminished all three pillars of Iranian power.