Zoomed-in view to better understand withdrawal timing.
- AS1299 begins withdrawing at 19:22 UTC
- AS2914 begins withdrawing at 19:33 UTC
- AS6939 had route withdrawn by 19:38 UTC
(cc: @JobSnijders)
For good measure. AS209 also began announcing the 32 /24's that make up this space at 20:50 UTC.
For example, 64.193.176.0/24:
Epilogue: As of 20:01 UTC today the hijacked routes were withdrawn.
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It seemed a good time to run the numbers for the whole routing table.
The big takeaway is that propagation is cut in half when a route is evaluated as RPKI-invalid (mostly due to most tier1's rejecting invalids). This will have the effect of blunting the impact of a future origination leak, for example.
Despite many outages, Ukraine's Internet is still online due in part to the heroic efforts by local techs fixing disruptions at great risk to themselves.
A 🧵 of 30-day snapshots of Ukrainian internet connectivity...
From @Kentikinc’s view, overall peak traffic levels into Ukraine have declined by about 20%.
This reflects a drop in internet usage that can be attributed to damaged infrastructure and fewer Ukrainian users due to millions of Ukrainians fleeing, among other factors.
Alternatively, @gatech_ioda focuses more on infrastructure and less user traffic levels.
It observes a visible decline in BGP routes, hosts responding to pings (active probing), as well as background traffic.
"When Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014, one of its first actions was to cut a submarine cable linking the peninsula to the outside world."
That cites…
An article by LCDR Dennis E. Harbin III entitled Targeting Submarine Cables… tjaglcs.army.mil/-/-targeting-s…
Which states:
"During the annexation of Crimea…, one of Russia’s first acts was to disrupt internet connectivity to the Crimean peninsula and isolate it…"