Thread by @mlrchtr

I am so tired of the argument that the best way to deal with Russian disinformation is to fix our own vulnerabilities. There is really no greater gift to our adversaries than ignoring how they are harming us in favor of ruminating on our own failings. Thread. 1/

https://twitter.com/mlrchtr/status/1291759376215281665

This is like telling a woman who stays in an abusive relationship that the abuse is her fault. Should she be encouraged to leave and protect herself? Of course. But should the asshole who beats her face consequences? DUH. 2/

What frustrates me most about this framing is that it conflates two separate problems: 1) information disorder (which stems from the broken incentive structure of our online environment) and 2) authoritarian political warfare (which goes far beyond disinformation). 3/

Both 1 and 2 are serious threats to democratic security. They sometimes overlap, when 2 exploits 1. Fundamentally, however, they are *separate problems* that require separate solutions. 4/

The information disorder requires primarily resilience-oriented (inward-looking) solutions: tech and algorithmic regulation, investments into education, civil society, etc. The long game is the building of a more just and equitable society with high levels of public trust. 5/

The authoritarian threat, however - whether Russian, Chinese, or otherwise - requires deterrence-oriented solutions: the imposition of costs on malicious and/or criminal behavior. Anything less is a green light for the abusive asshole to keep punching us. 6/

Bottom line: resilience and deterrence are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary. We need to defend our democracies both from within and from without if we want to get it right. One without the other doesn’t cut it. 7/

I wish that others in this field would be more precise in drawing these distinctions, esp to the benefit of those who don't work on these topics professionally. We're dealing with an incredibly complex threat landscape. Conceptual clarity is essential. 8/