Tom Shugart Profile picture
Sep 8, 2020 22 tweets 7 min read Read on X
Some thoughts on the PRC’s growing IRBM force:

I recently pointed out what I thought was the biggest news in the recently-released 2020 China Military Power report: an apparent more-than-doubling of the PLA Rocket Force’s DF-26 IRBM inventory.
This growth to IRBM launchers is a continuation of previous trends: the 2018 report had listed "16-30" launchers, then 80 in the 2019 report, and now 200 in this year's report. iiss.org/blogs/military…
I said in my commentary that, if this growth in capability is real, it could present a more significant challenge to the American way of war in the Western Pacific.

I'd like to expound on that a bit more.
The report lists "200+" as the number of likely missiles available, given 200 launchers. We know from Chinese TV footage that DF-26 units practice reloading missiles, and that the missiles have different warhead types that are swappable.

armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120940…
Thus, if each launcher had only one reload missile available (and there may be more than that), this would mean an IRBM force of more than 400 DF-26's, all configurable to anti-ship or land-attack missions (including nuclear, though that's not what really concerns me).
Some observers may not be too concerned about the deployment of a single such weapon system, but the scale of this change matters: going from dozens of missiles to hundreds is a quantitative change big enough to drive qualitative effects, esp. given the longer range of the DF-26.
First, at sea the number of missiles could broaden the PLARF's antiship mission from a "carrier-killer" focus to a generic "ship-killer" mission. China itself describes the DF-26 as capable against medium *and* large ships. globaltimes.cn/content/119694…
This change could matter in how it intersects with the USN's distributed lethality construct: an effort to distribute offensive combat power - partly given the threat of what were dozens of DF-21D ASBMs - away from carriers to smaller, more numerous ships. usni.org/magazines/proc…
With a much greater number of available ASBMs, these smaller warships - LCSs, DDGs, and especially logistics ships - could become "ASBM-worthy" as well. businessinsider.com/in-war-china-u…
The story is no better for USAF tactical aircraft & bombers based in-theater. With smaller numbers of long-range missiles, air operations might be possible from Guam or dispersed locations. But with hundreds of missiles available, this seems unlikely IMO. defensenews.com/digital-show-d…
While some might point to the heavy bombers as an answer to providing land & maritime strike (I agree, to a point), one wonders how long they would survive - or be able to find targets - without effective tac air support available from local airfields. reuters.com/investigates/s…
The next way the DF-26 force matters is through its much greater range, in particular the specific additional areas that it can strike. In the Philippine Sea, areas of relative sanctuary beyond the range of the DF-21 (1500km+) lie well within range of the DF-26 (4000km). Image
These areas have mattered in how US defense thinkers looked at the regional A2/AD challenge, positing the ability to operate forces reasonably safely outside the 1st island chain as a means to enable operations closer-in to defend our interests & allies. cimsec.org/tightening-the… Image
Further southwest, PRC thinkers have obsessed over the "Malacca dilemma", with China's vital imports vulnerable to chokepoint interception en route. With large numbers of DF-26s, the PLA may now have the ability to strike US/allied warships attempting to maintain such a blockade. Image
The same could now be true in the vital sea lanes leading from the Mid East to Asia and Europe, with coverage extending from PLARF bases in western China. Image
Now, some commentators have been incredulous that the PLA's IRBM force could have grown so quickly given the scale of expansion that would be required.

forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…
From my perspective, I doubt that the DoD would just make up these numbers, and TELs are not like mysterious underground WMD sites or an adversary's strategic intentions. They are distinct physical objects that can be counted from space.
Perhaps they're not fully integrated into effective combat units yet; but if that is the case it's still just a matter of time.

Other observers were already tracking an unprecedented expansion of the PLARF; seems like a continuation of that trend to me. popsci.com/story/blog-eas…
Some observers have also doubted China's ASBMs have the ability to strike moving targets at sea. But for the 2nd year in a row the report states flat out that the DF-26 "is capable" of conducting strikes against naval targets. This is pretty strong language for an intel report. Image
And for the 2nd year in a row China has launched them into the South China Sea. globaltimes.cn/content/119694…
To be sure, as has been discussed by USN's leadership before, the range arcs of the PLA's ASBMs are not impenetrable, nor is the PLARF its first "A2/AD" challenge.

But IMO it's hard to deny a substantially increased level of risk, over a much larger area.
businessinsider.com/navy-can-fight…
I'm still working on my thoughts about what to do about all of this, as to be sure I don't think there are any easy - or even very palatable - answers.

But my sense is that the trajectory that we are on as a nation is not keeping pace with the threat to our interests and allies.

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More from @tshugart3

Mar 9
Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.
These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.
First, let’s look at hull count. By my estimate, the PLAN launched 157 warships over the years 2014-2023. As always, these numbers are from open source data for ship launches which China doesn't always publicize, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 15 tweets
Dec 3, 2023
UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.
So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯 Image
There have been rumors in the media that this new yard would start construction of a new class of amphibious assault ship - the Type 076. And it looks like that might well be the case. scmp.com/news/china/mil…
Read 6 tweets
Nov 7, 2023
This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my…
That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them. Image
Let's look at the evidence he puts forward in support of Myth 1. First, there's the primary link describing the them...

Oops, broken link!

Now, this happens. Authors can't control web site changes. (Most links for my older articles are broken.) But this article is 1 day old. 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 22 tweets
Oct 23, 2023
Ok, moving on to Part 2 of my thoughts on the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR).

We’ll jump straight into the PLA Rocket Force, which I think has some of the biggest news in this year’s report.
Let’s get straight into the top-line numbers. The report shows major increases in every category of China’s long range missiles.
Fielded ICBM launchers jump from 300 to 500, and the number of missiles goes up from 300 to 350 (I guess they haven’t filled all those silos yet).
Image
Image
While the number of launchers stays the same, the estimate of the number of intermediate-range missiles (i.e., the “Guam Killers”) goes from a somewhat vague “250+” to a solid 500.
Read 39 tweets
Oct 23, 2023
This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report: Image
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).

While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore. Image
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).

We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. Image
Read 21 tweets
Sep 24, 2023
UPDATE: three of the Bo Hai ferries: Bo Hai Cui Zhu, Heng Da, and Bao Zhu; are now at what appears to be an industrial wharf in Xiamen, across the Strait from Taiwan. My guess is they're doing on-load/off-load ops for a PLA operation/exercise of some sort.

Image
Image
Bo Hai Fei Zhu appears to be at anchor off a beach just southwest of Xiamen. This is consistent with previous exercises that practiced amphibious landing operations at similar beaches nearby. Image
Bo Hai Jin Zhu is now broadcasting a destination that I think is supposed to be Yantai, back north on the Yellow Sea, so it may be heading home. Image
Read 4 tweets

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