I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.

digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/18/ This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1982899239136240098

Ok, continuing on this thread on the 2025 CMPR...

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/2005315617906401580

...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.

Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report: I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.

Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.

PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.

Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers. To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.

This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.

However...
usni.org/magazines/proc… ...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.

It's taken me a bit of time to get around to addressing this article by Jennifer Kavanagh about US-PRC-Taiwan relations in the NYT, but here we go.

https://twitter.com/defpriorities/status/1969097497277546639

She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.

Ok, a few more thoughts on some of the things we saw in this week’s PLA parade. I’ll start in the undersea domain, with this large UUV.

Going back and looking at the footage, you can see in this shot that it appears to have a couple of sonar arrays. My guess is that those are a flank array and a bow array.

We can also see 4 masts/antennas: 3 appear to be retractable with a closure panel and one fixed on a short mast near the stern (see above).

China’s parade is about to get started. Xi is making a speech where he says China is a force for peace, development, etc. Anyway…time to roll those new missiles, UxVs, armored vehicles, etc.

(I’ll be posting any stuff that I see that’s particularly interesting. Here we go…) Right now it’s just Xi driving by - wondering now if they’re going to roll this stuff past like in the past or if this is it?

hooboy, that's a lot of doing things the wrong way...😬

In the "you can't make this stuff up" category, in this 16 Apr image of COMEC's Longxue shipyard in Guangzhou you can see 5 of China's new Shuiqiao-class "invasion barges", whose only apparent purpose is to invade Taiwan, as well as... ...based on AIS data, what also appears to be a container ship under construction for a TAIWANESE Company, Evergreen Lines.

(and a couple of Zubr-class assault hovercraft, PLA Navy auxiliaries, and more.)

A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1. This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/1766471657885925753

Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/ @ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways.

UPDATE: three of the PRC's new landing ships (I called them T-LPTs) have left the GSI Longxue shipyard. 🚨🚨🚨

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1881429087627137310

In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).

As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction.

@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…

@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti… First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China

One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2… Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.

Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

What follows is an update, based on high-res imagery I've acquired:
navalnews.com/naval-news/202… Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".

I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:

I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific. Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/1638995381236256768

"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi… ...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:

A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t… As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time:

Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).