Last week saw the publication in @ForeignAffairs of this article by Zhou Bo, a Senior Fellow at a Tsinghua University think tank and a retired Senior Colonel in the Chinese PLA.

A few thoughts on the article and its publication by FA: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… The gist is that mostly due to US pushback at the rise of the PRC, the US-PRC relationship has deteriorated. But the two nations should talk more & work together where they can.

IMO the article has many misleading statements and half-truths, and serves as propaganda.

Anyone know what this NOTAM off of Baja California is about?
Is the Russian Federation firing rockets to impact off the west coast of N America? If so, what rockets? Ok, did a bit more looking into this this morning - bottom line, I think it's an impact area for a humdrum Russian space launch.

There's another NOTAM impact area at the same times in the Barents for Russian space launch activities.

PRC FERRY UPDATE: the Bohai Ferry BO HAI BAO ZHU has deviated from its normal route across the Yellow Sea, and appears headed south.
Of note, it's transmitting a false AIS destination - that it's operating from Dalian to Yantai - when it's clearly not headed to Yantai. At the same time, its sister ship Bo Hai Zhen Zhu now appears headed to Xiamen, after loading near Nanjing and then heading up to Ningbo, though it doesn't appear it moored at Ningbo.

Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1645174487028056067

These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.

UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1672375991036006400

So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯

This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my… That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them.

Ok, moving on to Part 2 of my thoughts on the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR).

We’ll jump straight into the PLA Rocket Force, which I think has some of the biggest news in this year’s report.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1716259376183361842

Let’s get straight into the top-line numbers. The report shows major increases in every category of China’s long range missiles.
Fielded ICBM launchers jump from 300 to 500, and the number of missiles goes up from 300 to 350 (I guess they haven’t filled all those silos yet).

This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report: Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).

While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.

UPDATE: three of the Bo Hai ferries: Bo Hai Cui Zhu, Heng Da, and Bao Zhu; are now at what appears to be an industrial wharf in Xiamen, across the Strait from Taiwan. My guess is they're doing on-load/off-load ops for a PLA operation/exercise of some sort.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1704947887472287985

Bo Hai Fei Zhu appears to be at anchor off a beach just southwest of Xiamen. This is consistent with previous exercises that practiced amphibious landing operations at similar beaches nearby.

Facts:
- both the USN sailors indicted for passing sensitive national security information to PRC intelligence services were naturalized US citizens.
- at the time one of them started passing such information, he was a PRC national serving on a USN warship.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-us-… - he subsequently gained his US citizenship, as well as a SECRET-level security clearance, while active as an agent of PRC intelligence agencies.
- I don't know when the other sailor gained his citizenship (or clearance), or if he served for a time before gaining citizenship.

Hey folks, if you’re looking for something to peruse today, how about some updated imagery showing construction of the Chinese PLA’s new base at Ream, Cambodia?

(Yes, the one that Cambodia & China denied just last summer.)

Let’s get to it! rfa.org/english/news/c… Since the last @googleearth imagery update was from Dec. 2022, I acquired some @planet imagery via @SkyWatchApps to see what’s going on.

The imagery below is a collage from May/June 2023, overlaid on an older GE basemap pre-construction (Mar 2020).

Here’s the overall comparo:

Has China launched a 3rd Type 093B SSGN, with all three of them launched in a little over a year?
I'd say the answer is a definite "maybe". 🤔 Let's start with the first - an apparently new variant of the Shang Class SSN which appears to have a new set of vertical launch missile tubes (making it an SSGN per DoD).
This first hull was launched at Huludao in May 2022 & spotted on commercial imagery. defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/…

A good step, but how about we build some aircraft shelters Out West that are built out of concrete, too?
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/i… Because here's the thing: assuming the PRC has regular EO/IR satellite passes over the bases we plan to use (and I assume that they do), then something like an inflatable rubber hangar that appears overnight will obviously be fake, as a real hardened shelter takes time to build.

Stumbled onto an interesting (to me) development over at COSCO shipping, a PRC state-owned shipping company that works with the PLA, and routinely takes part in amphibious landing exercises. Turns out that due to rising demand for export of Chinese cars, COSCO has come up with a way to convert bulk carrier ships (plain old cargo ships with big, empty holds) into car carriers. Makes sense: they can transport cars out & bulk raw materials back. maritime-executive.com/article/cosco-…

Just a reminder, now that we have evidence of UUV-capable Russian ships operating near Nordstream 2 at just the right time to sabotage it…

https://twitter.com/dolivermore/status/1653932150570246144

…that @RStatecraft—which claims to be a serious think tank—has been flogging Seymour Hersh’s absurd America-blaming conspiracy theory for months…

https://twitter.com/rstatecraft/status/1626974830942736385

Lots of agree with here, of course, but a couple of maritime nits to pick with some of the Chairman’s statements here: foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/how-t… First, he characterizes Ukraine as a “landlocked” country. While the war has mostly been a land war, Ukraine has a coastline over 2700km long, and the maritime picture has mattered a fair bit in its progress - remember the Moskva sinking, grain convoys, Snake Island, etc.

We recently saw the release of the USN's FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan. Based on that report, plus @CRS4Congress's most recent report on PLA Navy modernization, here is a chart of both navies' past and future (estimated) ship inventories over time. 😐 Source data for the USN came from here: news.usni.org/2023/04/20/rep…

I hesitate to further the distribution of this @Newsweek piece, but I just...can't let it percolate out there without addressing some of its misleading statements and misunderstandings concerning the U.S. submarine force and submarine operations.
newsweek.com/2023/05/05/exc… First, let's start with the basic premise: that we're going to spend a lot of money (more on that later) on subs that we "barely use". The first thing presented is: USN "can deploy barely a quarter" of the SSN force at any one time, & only 10% "operated stealthily". 🤔

A couple of times now, I've posted calculations of the total tonnage of warships launched by the PLA Navy over a 5-year period, providing a comparison with similar totals for the USN & allied/partner navies.
Let’s take a deeper look: over the last decade.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1638293098760486912

These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2013-2022, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.

Folks are about to find out all about China's 3rd navy - the "Maritime Safety Administration". For those who wondered why China built 10,000-ton, cruiser-size "maritime safety" ships, well, we're all about to find out. reuters.com/world/asia-pac… 10,700 tonnes is a whole lotta maritime safety able to be imposed on China's neighbors. More details here: navalnews.com/naval-news/202…

Update: DoD, along with partner nations Japan, Taiwan, the ROK and the Philippines, have announced a new and massive base hardening and force dispersal program, which will include several key lines of effort.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1638995381236256768

First, recognizing the lack of survivability of its own airfields, the ROCAF will—in the event of an imminent invasion—execute plans to immediately disperse to Philippine, Japanese, and ROK fields, to include civilian airports. Dispersal exercises start next week.