"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi… ...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:

A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t… As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time:

Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).

Moving on, here's part 2 of this thread on the 2024 China Military Power report.

First up, the PLA Rocket Force, which is where IMO biggest news resides.

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/1869747458152284414

First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.

Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.

Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).

I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.

(part 1) In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).

The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.

1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.

https://twitter.com/AndyBxxx/status/1839664868703801582

1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…

What if I told you that as I type this there was a vessel, associated with the Chinese PLA, that *could* be equipped with many dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles—and was parked less than 4 miles from the bulk of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Well guess what: it's happening—for real. The vessel in question is a container ship named COSCO Shipping Sakura. It's a massive ship, more than 360m long (~1200 ft), and weighing far more than a U.S. aircraft carrier. Built in 2018, It can carry more than 14000 shipping containers.

This USNI Proceedings article advocates a "trade denial" strategy - though not a blockade - as a "low-cost option" for deterring PRC military aggression against Taiwan.

While I like the idea of finding new ways to deter China, I have some issues with this article, as follows:

https://twitter.com/USNIProceedings/status/1821879165349396669

My overarching concern is this: for years there's been a strain of thinking that China will never attack because the U.S. & allies could "just cut off their oil" or the like. That kind of thinking undercuts support for the necessary resources to actually deter the PRC militarily.

Imagery update: looking back at some commercial imagery at Wuchang Shipyard (one of China's conventional submarine builders), if I'm not mistaken I believe there may be a new class of Chinese submarine out there. I recently acquired this interesting image of the shipyard from 26 April 2024.

On the left, you can see what appears to be a freshly-launched Hangor II-class submarine, the 1st of 8 being built for Pakistan.

You can also see the other, possibly new class of boat.

Got some fresh @planet imagery of China's new base at Ream, Cambodia. Looks like they continue to be busy bees, constructing what looks to be a sizable naval base.

First, here's an overall comparo of where things are now-ish (6/2020) to before construction started (3/2020).

They've now completed enough of the drydock & wharf that we can now see their final dimensions: right at 140m from the back of the drydock to where the caisson would go, & a 270m wharf.

Also, there's what looks like a ramp to pull smaller vessels out for maintenance.

So, I recently acquired some updated imagery from Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan - China's primary shipyard for non-nuclear submarine construction.

It appears there may have been something...odd going on there in June. 🤔 First, an older image from 29 May shows nothing unusual - a presumably new-construction Yuan-class submarine (Type 039 variant) in the usual spot where newly-launched boats are fitted out.

[BTW the patchwork nature of the images is because I buy my own and pay by the area, so..]

Last week saw the publication in @ForeignAffairs of this article by Zhou Bo, a Senior Fellow at a Tsinghua University think tank and a retired Senior Colonel in the Chinese PLA.

A few thoughts on the article and its publication by FA: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… The gist is that mostly due to US pushback at the rise of the PRC, the US-PRC relationship has deteriorated. But the two nations should talk more & work together where they can.

IMO the article has many misleading statements and half-truths, and serves as propaganda.

Anyone know what this NOTAM off of Baja California is about?
Is the Russian Federation firing rockets to impact off the west coast of N America? If so, what rockets? Ok, did a bit more looking into this this morning - bottom line, I think it's an impact area for a humdrum Russian space launch.

There's another NOTAM impact area at the same times in the Barents for Russian space launch activities.

PRC FERRY UPDATE: the Bohai Ferry BO HAI BAO ZHU has deviated from its normal route across the Yellow Sea, and appears headed south.
Of note, it's transmitting a false AIS destination - that it's operating from Dalian to Yantai - when it's clearly not headed to Yantai. At the same time, its sister ship Bo Hai Zhen Zhu now appears headed to Xiamen, after loading near Nanjing and then heading up to Ningbo, though it doesn't appear it moored at Ningbo.

Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1645174487028056067

These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.

UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1672375991036006400

So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯

This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my… That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them.

Ok, moving on to Part 2 of my thoughts on the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR).

We’ll jump straight into the PLA Rocket Force, which I think has some of the biggest news in this year’s report.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1716259376183361842

Let’s get straight into the top-line numbers. The report shows major increases in every category of China’s long range missiles.
Fielded ICBM launchers jump from 300 to 500, and the number of missiles goes up from 300 to 350 (I guess they haven’t filled all those silos yet).

This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report: Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).

While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.

UPDATE: three of the Bo Hai ferries: Bo Hai Cui Zhu, Heng Da, and Bao Zhu; are now at what appears to be an industrial wharf in Xiamen, across the Strait from Taiwan. My guess is they're doing on-load/off-load ops for a PLA operation/exercise of some sort.

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1704947887472287985

Bo Hai Fei Zhu appears to be at anchor off a beach just southwest of Xiamen. This is consistent with previous exercises that practiced amphibious landing operations at similar beaches nearby.

Facts:
- both the USN sailors indicted for passing sensitive national security information to PRC intelligence services were naturalized US citizens.
- at the time one of them started passing such information, he was a PRC national serving on a USN warship.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-us-… - he subsequently gained his US citizenship, as well as a SECRET-level security clearance, while active as an agent of PRC intelligence agencies.
- I don't know when the other sailor gained his citizenship (or clearance), or if he served for a time before gaining citizenship.