Tom Shugart Profile picture
Defense analyst, former submariner, bugsmasher pilot/flight instructor. Founder, Archer Strategic Consulting. @cnasdc Adjunct Senior Fellow. Opinions my own.
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Oct 8 16 tweets 5 min read
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.

However...
usni.org/magazines/proc… ...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
Oct 6 18 tweets 6 min read
It's taken me a bit of time to get around to addressing this article by Jennifer Kavanagh about US-PRC-Taiwan relations in the NYT, but here we go. She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan. Image
Sep 5 13 tweets 6 min read
Ok, a few more thoughts on some of the things we saw in this week’s PLA parade. I’ll start in the undersea domain, with this large UUV.

Going back and looking at the footage, you can see in this shot that it appears to have a couple of sonar arrays. Image My guess is that those are a flank array and a bow array.

We can also see 4 masts/antennas: 3 appear to be retractable with a closure panel and one fixed on a short mast near the stern (see above). Image
Sep 3 26 tweets 10 min read
China’s parade is about to get started. Xi is making a speech where he says China is a force for peace, development, etc. Anyway…time to roll those new missiles, UxVs, armored vehicles, etc.

(I’ll be posting any stuff that I see that’s particularly interesting. Here we go…) Image Right now it’s just Xi driving by - wondering now if they’re going to roll this stuff past like in the past or if this is it? Image
Aug 5 14 tweets 5 min read
Image hooboy, that's a lot of doing things the wrong way...😬 Image
Apr 20 8 tweets 3 min read
In the "you can't make this stuff up" category, in this 16 Apr image of COMEC's Longxue shipyard in Guangzhou you can see 5 of China's new Shuiqiao-class "invasion barges", whose only apparent purpose is to invade Taiwan, as well as... Image ...based on AIS data, what also appears to be a container ship under construction for a TAIWANESE Company, Evergreen Lines.

(and a couple of Zubr-class assault hovercraft, PLA Navy auxiliaries, and more.) Image
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Apr 18 13 tweets 4 min read
A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1. Image This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.
Mar 20 9 tweets 5 min read
Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/ @ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways. Image
Mar 13 10 tweets 4 min read
UPDATE: three of the PRC's new landing ships (I called them T-LPTs) have left the GSI Longxue shipyard. 🚨🚨🚨 In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).

As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction. Image
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Feb 13 40 tweets 16 min read
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: Image NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Feb 12 37 tweets 14 min read
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti… First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with ChinaImage
Feb 1 7 tweets 2 min read
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2… Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
Jan 20 22 tweets 8 min read
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

What follows is an update, based on high-res imagery I've acquired:
navalnews.com/naval-news/202… Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".

I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024: Image
Jan 7 13 tweets 5 min read
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific. Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
Dec 20, 2024 4 tweets 2 min read
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi… ...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
Dec 19, 2024 6 tweets 2 min read
A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t… As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time: Image
Dec 19, 2024 16 tweets 6 min read
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ Image We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization). Image
Dec 19, 2024 17 tweets 6 min read
Moving on, here's part 2 of this thread on the 2024 China Military Power report.

First up, the PLA Rocket Force, which is where IMO biggest news resides.
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.

Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK. Image
Dec 19, 2024 20 tweets 7 min read
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).

I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.

(part 1) Image In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).

The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
Sep 27, 2024 7 tweets 3 min read
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao. 1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
Aug 22, 2024 25 tweets 8 min read
What if I told you that as I type this there was a vessel, associated with the Chinese PLA, that *could* be equipped with many dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles—and was parked less than 4 miles from the bulk of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Well guess what: it's happening—for real. Image The vessel in question is a container ship named COSCO Shipping Sakura. It's a massive ship, more than 360m long (~1200 ft), and weighing far more than a U.S. aircraft carrier. Built in 2018, It can carry more than 14000 shipping containers. Image