Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/ @ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways.

UPDATE: three of the PRC's new landing ships (I called them T-LPTs) have left the GSI Longxue shipyard. 🚨🚨🚨

https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1881429087627137310

In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).

As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction.

@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…

@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti… First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China

One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2… Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.

Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

What follows is an update, based on high-res imagery I've acquired:
navalnews.com/naval-news/202… Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".

I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:

I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific. Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/1638995381236256768

"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi… ...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:

A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t… As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time:

Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).

Moving on, here's part 2 of this thread on the 2024 China Military Power report.

First up, the PLA Rocket Force, which is where IMO biggest news resides.

https://x.com/tshugart3/status/1869747458152284414

First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.

Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.

Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).

I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.

(part 1) In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).

The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.

1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.

https://twitter.com/AndyBxxx/status/1839664868703801582

1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…

What if I told you that as I type this there was a vessel, associated with the Chinese PLA, that *could* be equipped with many dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles—and was parked less than 4 miles from the bulk of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Well guess what: it's happening—for real. The vessel in question is a container ship named COSCO Shipping Sakura. It's a massive ship, more than 360m long (~1200 ft), and weighing far more than a U.S. aircraft carrier. Built in 2018, It can carry more than 14000 shipping containers.

This USNI Proceedings article advocates a "trade denial" strategy - though not a blockade - as a "low-cost option" for deterring PRC military aggression against Taiwan.

While I like the idea of finding new ways to deter China, I have some issues with this article, as follows:

https://twitter.com/USNIProceedings/status/1821879165349396669

My overarching concern is this: for years there's been a strain of thinking that China will never attack because the U.S. & allies could "just cut off their oil" or the like. That kind of thinking undercuts support for the necessary resources to actually deter the PRC militarily.

Imagery update: looking back at some commercial imagery at Wuchang Shipyard (one of China's conventional submarine builders), if I'm not mistaken I believe there may be a new class of Chinese submarine out there. I recently acquired this interesting image of the shipyard from 26 April 2024.

On the left, you can see what appears to be a freshly-launched Hangor II-class submarine, the 1st of 8 being built for Pakistan.

You can also see the other, possibly new class of boat.

Got some fresh @planet imagery of China's new base at Ream, Cambodia. Looks like they continue to be busy bees, constructing what looks to be a sizable naval base.

First, here's an overall comparo of where things are now-ish (6/2020) to before construction started (3/2020).

They've now completed enough of the drydock & wharf that we can now see their final dimensions: right at 140m from the back of the drydock to where the caisson would go, & a 270m wharf.

Also, there's what looks like a ramp to pull smaller vessels out for maintenance.

So, I recently acquired some updated imagery from Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan - China's primary shipyard for non-nuclear submarine construction.

It appears there may have been something...odd going on there in June. 🤔 First, an older image from 29 May shows nothing unusual - a presumably new-construction Yuan-class submarine (Type 039 variant) in the usual spot where newly-launched boats are fitted out.

[BTW the patchwork nature of the images is because I buy my own and pay by the area, so..]

Last week saw the publication in @ForeignAffairs of this article by Zhou Bo, a Senior Fellow at a Tsinghua University think tank and a retired Senior Colonel in the Chinese PLA.

A few thoughts on the article and its publication by FA: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… The gist is that mostly due to US pushback at the rise of the PRC, the US-PRC relationship has deteriorated. But the two nations should talk more & work together where they can.

IMO the article has many misleading statements and half-truths, and serves as propaganda.

Anyone know what this NOTAM off of Baja California is about?
Is the Russian Federation firing rockets to impact off the west coast of N America? If so, what rockets? Ok, did a bit more looking into this this morning - bottom line, I think it's an impact area for a humdrum Russian space launch.

There's another NOTAM impact area at the same times in the Barents for Russian space launch activities.

PRC FERRY UPDATE: the Bohai Ferry BO HAI BAO ZHU has deviated from its normal route across the Yellow Sea, and appears headed south.
Of note, it's transmitting a false AIS destination - that it's operating from Dalian to Yantai - when it's clearly not headed to Yantai. At the same time, its sister ship Bo Hai Zhen Zhu now appears headed to Xiamen, after loading near Nanjing and then heading up to Ningbo, though it doesn't appear it moored at Ningbo.