Tonight I'll be presenting my #APSA2020 paper, "The voting power of demographic groups". You can find the paper at drive.google.com/file/d/1G-SHiy… and a video presentation at (1/n)
The idea behind the paper is simple: the power of a voter group is the number of seats where the result would have been different had that voter group not voted—or alternately, the number of seats in which that voter group was pivotal (2/n)
The implementation is also simple, in a sense, and relies on multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) plus some post-hoc adjustments (3/n)
The first stage in doing MRP is to estimate a model which links voter (and area) characteristics to predicted probabilities of voting in different ways. Once you've got that, all that's left is to add up rows of data in a post-stratification frame (4/n)
So why can't we add up those rows in different ways to get counterfactual outcomes? That's what my paper does (5/n)
Here are pivotality scores for level 1 voter groups (grps defined by a single demographic attr) in #GE2010. Ethnic minority voters (f.ex.) were pivotal in 25 seats, & more pivotal on a pop'n adj. basis than white voters, largely because they're fairly compact behind Labour (6/n)
Pivotality is different from being a swing voter. There's no relationship between how pivotal a group is and how "available" it is. F.ex., older voter grps can be pivotal, but they're generally not "available" because they've built up a habit of voting in a particular way. (7/n)
Surprisingly, group turnout isn't a predictor of how pivotal a group will be. It's how homogeneous the group is, and whether or not it supports parties which win seats ("expensive tastes", in my language) (8/n)
More details in the paper, and thoughts and comments welcome. The idea seems obvious in retrospect, so I'm worried someone else has already done it (tho I realize ppl have already produced estimates of pivotality of particular grps) (9/n)
Thanks go to the @LeverhulmeTrust for giving me money to do research like this (10/10)
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In response to UCU's Marking and Assessment Boycott (MAB), my employer @RoyalHolloway has decided to implement emergency regulations which in my view seriously call into question the rigour of degrees awarded (1/7)
The regulations include allowing marks for a module to be scaled proportionately (you did 50% of the coursework; that counts for 100%) (2/7)
(cont.) to permit an unlimited number of "allow" outcomes for modules (previously used where sickness or other extenuating circumstances affected students' performance) (3/7)
Everyone knows the most fun way to watch the World Cup is to support the more democratic nation in each game. So here, thanks to @vdeminstitute data, is your group-by-group rundown! (1/n)
We start in Group A, where the Netherlands is clearly in pole position, and Qatar clearly in last place (2/n)
In Group B, England and Wales are in a dead heat (until and unless V-Dem produces estimates of sub-state democracy), with Iran placing last. (3/n)
MRP works by modelling responses as a function of different demographic and political characteristics, and then making predictions for different voter types (2/15)
It works well when responses can be accurately predicted by these characteristics, or when you have a stupidly large sample size (3/15)
Jeremy Pocklington said that ministers had ignored civil service advice concerning the £3.9bn Towns Fund, and had instead applied [ahem!] "their own qualitative assessment" (3/n)
The basis for the claim is that the proportion of mask-wearers who hate, resent or think badly of non-mask wearers (58%) is greater than the proportion of Remainers who think badly of Leavers (33%) (p. 11 of report) (2/n)
First problem with this: in order for something to be divisive, it's got to divide society, and the more evenly it divides society, the more divisive it is. But the (short) report doesn't show what % of the population wear a mask. (3/n)