I had experience with a journal, which took the trouble to update me on their waiting for 2nd review. They promised 'as soon as we get the full reviews in we will proceed to decision'. I thought it's very nice of them because it's rare to receive unsolicited update from editors.
Two months later they sent 2 reports with R1 saying 'This is an exceptionally well written article...[R1's suggestions are] not essential prior to publication'. R2, however, believes 'the manuscript does not seem to fit very well with the journal'. The editors rejected the paper.
The letter says "this decision is much more about 'fit' than it is about quality". Nice cold comfort, though I thought it's poor form from them who should've desk-rejected it if it's about 'fit', rather than outsourcing such judgment to R2 & wasting everyone's time. Given that...
they sent it out for review, presumably 'fit' wasn't initially an issue, unless the paper somehow slipped through their screening. In any case, with the unequal power relationship between gatekeepers & authors, unfortunately most authors would probably just have to deal with it.
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If my English comprehension is correct, here actually the UNCLOS literally defines 'high seas' as 'all parts of the sea that are NOT included in the exclusive economic zone' (EEZ), while the entire Taiwan Strait is clearly in an EEZ (200 nautical miles from the baseline).
Therefore, there is no such thing as 'considerable high seas corridor' in the Taiwan Strait. In the past, part of the EEZ might have been considered 'high seas', but not any more under the UNCLOS (perhaps one of the reasons why the US refuses to ratify it).
The US uses the vague term "international waters" (IW) to muddy the high seas water, but IW is not a defined term in international law. The lawfulness of military activities in other countries' EEZ is not clearly defined by UNCLOS, which leaves much room for contestation.
This 'leaked' document features prominently in BBC reporting of the alleged 'shoot to kill' policy in Xinjiang. It has no doubt shocked millions of people already given the coordinated coverage in Western MSM.
Moreover, when I downloaded the 'leaked file' from xinjiangpolicefiles.org/key-documents/
the version has been changed: instead of having 11 main points, it now has 9 main points.
In this article published 6 years ago, @OliverDTurner and I argue that the American discourses of 'virtue' and 'power', shared by most Americans, are productive of the subjectivity of neoconservatism, which, despite its widely abhorred manifestation in the Bush Doctrine, is thus
more normatively appealing and more enduring than commonly understood. In fact, it could be argued that there has been a quiet neocon-ization of the West over the past two decades, with many Western countries appropriating American 'virtue' and identifying with US power.
The fact that no one talks about neoconservatism anymore today is not because it's gone, but because it's gone capillary. The deep faith in US-led virtue and power is such that the neoconservative motto of 'moral clarity' and 'military strength' has replaced good old-fashioned
The Ukraine war signals that after 20+ years of failed intervention wars in Afghanistan & Iraq, the US and its allies have now rediscovered the 'winning formula' of proxy wars after the 2018 US national defense strategy identified China+Russia, not terrorism, as main threats.
To fight such wars against their designated geopolitical threats, they deploy identity narratives such as 'values', 'freedom' vs 'repression', 'democracy' vs 'autocracy' to sow & exploit divisions between rivals and their neighbors which are primed to distrust & hate each other.
Distrust opens up room for building and/or expanding alliances & strategic groupings (Quad, AUKUS and NATO) among 'like-minded democracies' right to the borders of their geopolitical rivals. Such buildup and expansion in turn exacerbate distrust & increase the chance for war.
One of the US's earliest concerns about China's human rights violations dates back to the Opium War; one of the earliest UK overseas humanitarian missions also had something to do with its opium trade monopoly. Like-minded democracies have come a long way. books.google.com.au/books?id=OzsxE…
In the lead up to the Opium War, one side was appealing to 'universal values', and the other was determined not to let such 'fine things' get in the way of a big bucket of money, legal or not, and was prepared to use fake news to justify a war for it. Guess which is which?
Speaking of power transition in international relations, this was part of the original process of power transition from China to the US, 19th-century style.
Australia 'blindsided' & 'ambushed' by a 'China-led' UN committee where China has a 'stranglehold'... nice media word play sufficient to turn a case of climate emergency facing Australia into the latest episode of China threat emergency for the public. theaustralian.com.au/nation/chinale…
So it comes as no surprise when the latest Lowy poll shows 63% in Australia believe China is more of a security threat to Australia than of an economic partner, a 22-point increase since last year’s poll. You wonder why public opinion has changed so much. theguardian.com/australia-news…
Most would say this reflects changing reality in China itself. Perhaps, but has that reality indeed changed so dramatically? Maybe so, but then how do we know? How many people can directly see the reality as it actually is, without relying on the interpreting filter of the media?