NYTimes has a 50y retrospective on Milton Friedman's popularizing of shareholder primacy, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” with line-by-line commentary from smart folks.
They skip what I take to be the most interesting and aggressive part: that a majority of shareholders must not be allowed to vote to adopt "social responsibility."
So it's not really about who gets to make decisions, but about imposing a specific notion of what firms are. /2
Even a critical response here assumes shareholder primacy is historically dominant and "practical."
But as Berle and Means noted, for decades before the New Deal shareholders were shedding legal powers as it was impractical for them to execute it under industrial capitalism. /3
That shareholders were in retreat for 70 years on purely practical, everyday-evolutionary grounds, and that they were quickly remade on an ideological notion of freedom as property
makes the creation of shareholder primacy a perfect example of "roll-out neoliberalism" to use. /4
Last, not many engage it (@oren_cass notably does) but the responsibility debate flows from a question-beg: whether shareholders "own" the firm and CEOs "work" for them. Both wrong.
Even in a book on decommodification as freedom you know I'm going to go there. (Pre-order!) /fin
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Solid jobs numbers today. Headline unemployment unchanged, and 139,000 new jobs.
But a few things I'd flag for underlying cooling: (1) Last two months revised down -95K. 2-month monthly revisions have averaged -63K in 2025. So reasonable chance this ends up under 100K. /1
The rounding gods were kind this month, with unemployment ticking up to 4.24 percent. You can see the slow increase over the past few months.
At that slow but steady pace you are at ~4.7 percent unemployment at the end of year, consistent with some forecasts on tariff impact. /2
More, the composition gods were very kind this month, with unemployment falling because people aren't leaving their jobs, which helped offset the new entrants who can't find work.
The last 2 recessions were crazy; but weakness leaving unemployment drives smaller recessions. /3
As we risk stagflation and chaos to bring back manufacturing jobs, I took a look at how manufacturing workers reacted to the hot labor market of 2022-2023.
A result that surprised me: it turns out they were the industry with the highest increases in their quits rate. 1/4
Link here, which builds off the recent manufacturing jobs polling and then NEC director Gary Cohn's 2018 (incorrect) dive into JOLTS data.
In terms of absolute increase in quits rate from an environment with some income security and plentiful job openings, manufacturing was only matched by low-wage work in leisure and hospitality. 3/4
Quits and hires rate are now a notable step below 2019 levels.
Quits does better predicting labor market conditions and there's an increasing trend in job openings across the 21C. So, at this critical moment, worth weighing quits more when we are watching labor market. /1
If the concern is in (wage-inertial?) services, hires and quits levels are also below there, and have been falling consistently.
There has been a lot of shifting and upgrading in the labor market during the recovery, and that process has played itself out. Time to reassess. /2
If you are still focused on job openings because you think 'openings over vacancies' is a proxy for output deviations that gives a nonlinear Phillips Curve that fits this recovery, well, sorry bub, that's over. It fell off months ago.
A year ago these numbers were above 4 percent. I understand the yawns and the sense it's old news, but this is just a massive and wild achievement. Let's dig in and discuss the last mile and what just happened. /1
Last mile: weighted contribution to overall inflation by major categories over past 6 months.
We are at 2%. Core goods pull that down about -0.5%; easy to see how to replace that. For all the fears on non-housing inflation, it's only pulling up 0.2% compared to 2018-2019. /2
Here's a different version of approaching that chart. Non-housing services is volatile month-to-month, both now and before 2020.
We can debate where underlying is between 2 and 2.5 percent right now, but rates are set as if underlying is between 4 and 5 percent. Or: too high. /3
Just to go back to this for a minute, worth flagging that in the current New Keynesian grad textbook:
whether end of a transitory cost-push shock causes the price level to go back to previous trend (i.e. negative inflation) is a policy choice by the Fed; it’s not inevitable. /1
That model isn’t ideal - there’s no long-term costs to recessions - but it gives a sense. And given that we didn’t force a recession in response to reopening while long-term inflation expectations remained anchored, the choice looks like the right one. /2
Before we dig into an interesting upside CPI report, we now have the full 2023 data now.
And we can see, using the best proxy we have for core inflation going back to the 1940s, that 2023's disinflation looked like the post-WWII period, not the 1970-80s one. Remarkable story.
/1
Big story is leveling out of core CPI inflation over the past 5 months in the low 3 percent range. I'm curious how next month's retroactive seasonal adjustment impacts this, and throughout the past years we've seen these leveling out then down shifts during the disinflation. /2
We'll probably get a big round of discussion on is housing following this. There's ~4 months of housing clocking in a bit higher than the downward trajectory people had been expecting. After next month's seasonal readjustment, probably a time to dust off those models again. /3