Both the Advocate General for Scotland and the Attorney General have argued in recent days, that section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides a precedent for the UK legislating contrary to its international obligations.
[THREAD] [1/15]
The Government's argument seems to be that this illustrates both how:
(a) domestic law and international law sometimes come into conflict; and
(b) this sometimes justifies Ministers acting contrary to international law and/or Parliament legislating contrary to it. [2/15]
Specifically, they point to section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This provision imposed a new obligation on Ministers when introducing a Bill before Parliament.
A Minister has to make one of two statements, in writing, when they are introducing a Bill. [3/15]
The first type of statement is what happens almost all the time: one "to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights".
This statement is made after an internal vetting exercise by the relevant Government department [4/15]
The expectation is the Government will, if possible, seek to legislate compatibly with the ECHR, and to make sure legislation is compatible *before* introducing a Bill.
The purpose of section 19 was to "ensure that all Ministers, their departments and officials are fully seized of the gravity of the Convention's obligations in respect of human rights."
Far from justifying breaking international law, it was intended to improve compliance. [6/15]
The same 1997 white paper acknowledged that sometimes a "statement of compatibility" couldn't/shouldn't be made.
This happens where there is a "risk" of non-compliance with the ECHR or "the arguments raised [about whether proposed legislation complies] are not clear cut". [7/15]
The then Lord Chancellor (Derry Irvine) was clear at Lords 2nd reading:
"Ministers will obviously want to make a positive statement whenever possible. That requirement should therefore have a significant impact on the scrutiny of draft legislation within government." [8/15]
He was also of the view that:
"If a Minister's prior assessment of compatibility (under Clause 19) is subsequently found by declaration of incompatibility by the courts to have been mistaken, it is hard to see how a Minister could withhold remedial action." [9/15]
So let's go to specific examples. Lord Keen drew to the House of Lords' attention the Communications Bill in 2002. The Labour Government said it couldn't issue a statement of compatibility.
But what was this actually about? [10/15]
The Gov't was concerned that, in retaining an *existing* ban on political advertising in broadcast media, the UK *might* be vulnerable to litigation. There had been an adverse ECtHR ruling about a similar ban in Switzerland. The relevant Minister (Tessa Jowell) said this [11/15]
Key differences between that situation and the current one:
(a) the Government wasn't admitting its proposed legislation violated international law
(b) it maintained there were "very strong arguments" that they were HRA/ECHR compliant
(c) they were later proved right.
[12/15]
In Animal Defenders International v UK (2013, hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1192…) the European Court of Human Rights affirmed that the ban on political advertising in broadcast media was not a violation of Article 10 after all.
In short: the Act didn't violate international law. [13/15]
There was never a suggestion that, if the ECtHR found the other way, the UK Gov't would have simply ignored the ruling. Whenever an adverse ruling has come, the UK Gov't of the day has *always* considered and attempted remedial action (including on prisoner voting). [14/15]
The purpose of the "cannot make a statement of compatibility" statement in 2002 was to draw Parliament's attention to a litigation risk associated with what was in any case an existing UK law being restated.
This is clearly not the same as the current situation. [15/15]
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Something worth bearing in mind. The Supreme Court, last year, gave a judgment on a double Bill reference, on the UNCRC and ECLSG Bills.
It rejected a @scotgov argument that Holyrood could legislate with words clearly beyond competence, then ask the courts to "read it down". 🧵
In the judgment, Lord Reed placed great weight on the fact that the Scotland Act has an established set of mechanisms for "vetting" Bills for legislative competence, including the promoter's and the Presiding Officers' competence statements on introduction.
An attempt to refer a potential, but unintroduced, Bill might face obstacles based on a similar line of reasoning: that the Scotland Act provides a specific mechanism (a bill reference before Royal Assent under s33) and that informs the scope of Schedule 6 "devolution issues".
This is an important thread, not just for #indyref2 but also for the wider role of the UK Supreme Court in accepting and determining references on disputes about devolution and devolved competence.
Normally, the UK Supreme Court operates as an appellate court. Parties appeal against decisions taken by lower courts, and they uphold or overturn them.
The devolution settlements slightly broaden this role, to allow both "bill references" and "devolution issue references". 2/x
Bill references allow legislation agreed by the devolved legislature to be vetted by the UKSC for "competence" issues.
Devolution issue references normally allow disputed points about devolved competence, forming part of another dispute, to be preliminarily settled. 3/x
It is often claimed, wrongly, that "the constitution" is a reserved matter (i.e. something that only the UK Parliament can pass legislation about).
This has never been the case.
Even to try to do that would make no sense. (1/x)
Why? Because then you'd have to define or describe the extent and limits of what the UK constitution is.
Why's that a problem? Because it isn't codified!
Such a situation would be fraught with ambiguities. What counts as constitutional and what doesn't? (2/x)
When the Labour Government in 1997-98 first introduced the Scotland Bill, they did actually propose to reserve "the constitution" (see the original Schedule 5 below).
They quickly realised this was (as a matter of clarity) a dreadful way to frame the devolution statute. (3/x)
Today the Government introduced a bill to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. This bill differs from the draft bill published in December 2020 in several important respects.
Be warned, this is a mega🧵but for the geeks, hopefully a useful summary of where we are.
The first most visible change is to the bill's title. It no longer refers to repealing the 2011 Act. This responds to an accessibility point raised by the @JointCtteeFTPA.
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill is more RONSEAL. It make laws about what it says on the tin.
The second notable change is on election timetabling.
Under the FtPA, dissolution triggers an election.
Under the draft bill, it wouldn't have (on its own).
Witnesses to @JointCtteeFTPA observed this left open a theoretical risk of Governments "governing without Parliament".
Ratification of a Future Relationship Treaty by the UK [THREAD]
The UK Government cannot ratify a treaty with the EU unless and until it has complied with, or disapplied, Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act [1/x]
The default rule is that the Government has to lay a copy of any treaty it reaches with an international organisation. It then has to give Parliament 21 joint sitting days to scrutinise the treaty.
That means both Commons and Lords must be sitting for each of those 21 days [2/x]
How long is 21 joint sitting days? The Commons is only expected to sit Monday-Thursday each week for the rest of 2020.
Parliament usually is in recess (at least) between Christmas and New Year.
This leaves only 15 Commons sitting days in December (1-3, 7-10, 14-17, 21-24) [3/x]
The default rule about "commencement regulations" is that they are made by a Minister without any form of Parliamentary approval. By default, that is what would happen with clauses 42, 43 and 45 (the ones that break, and enable the Government further to break, international law).
This amendment would mean that the commencement regulations for each of those sections is subject to a further vote by the @HouseofCommons. A motion would have to specify which sections were coming into force and on what date.