The Bloomberg playbook in '18 often involved striking very late. Most of the time, they didn't show their hand until they played it. And why should they? There's plenty of evidence that late ads are most effective. Striking late means no opportunity to organize a counter.
That's quite different, of course, than the Bloomberg 20 primary: just blanket the ad for five months before Super Tuesday. And there's no reason they couldn't have done that in the general, and go on air in the big six in June or something
But there's also no reason they can't still do the 2018 move: identify the places where a) ad spending is most limited, b) where you think you think a push can get you over, and then strike overwhelmingly, as late as possible.
There's really no reason at this stage why Bloomberg couldn't do the 2020 equiv of 2018: pump 400m into TX/GA/OH/Miami media market or something over the final three weeks. And if he was going to do that, why would he say so now? That would be a colossal mistake
Anyway, I'm most certainly not saying he's going to do that. Who knows! But I do think it's quite keeping with what he's done in the past, and it wouldn't be ruled out by his inaction to this point--to the contrary, they'd have every reason not to move until the last second
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As you may have read, our colleagues in the Tech Guild are on strike. While they don't play a role in the model itself, they built and maintain the infrastructure that feeds us data and lets us publish on the internet
This is true of everything on the nyt (including our results pages), but the needle is a huge data load, it's more brittle, and we've only published it a handful of times (v 1000s of results pages). There will be bugs and it could be hard to debug
A final point that I *hope* is obvious from the whole of my work, but may not be obvious if you only read individual snippets: I have no idea whether our polls (or any polls) polls be "right", too good for Harris, or too good for Trump.
No one does.
This cycle, I've tried to offer real meat to these scenarios with evidence -- not just abstract "30% harris landslide, 30% trump landslide, 40% too close.
If you personally found some of that evidence more convincing than others, that's great. Me? I have no idea
A quick summation of some of those points
- There's no reason to believe pollsters 'fixed' what went wrong in 2020
- There's some evidence nonresponse bias may be better, but also evidence it's still there / no reason to assume it's gone. Unknown whether weighting fixes
The final Times/Siena polls of the campaign show a dead-heat, with Harris gaining along late deciders in the Sun Belt while the Rust Belt tightens nytimes.com/2024/11/03/us/…
Whatever happens on Tuesday, the polls suggest that Harris has mostly reassembled the Democratic coalition in the battlegrounds, with Harris still gaining among Black, Hispanic and younger voters It was just a few months ago that we had Trump 9 or 12 pts in GA/NV v. Biden!
At the same time, Trump ha consolidated white working class voters down the stretch -- including erasing Harris' lead in Michigan and Pennsylvania. Suddenly, it's a much more 2020-like battleground map
For real! There isn't any polling, there's a lot of evidence that nearby New York is going poorly for Democrats, it's a diverse state, and the New Jersey Democratic showing in 21/22 was not great either
Unfortunately, the NJ sample across our national polling isn't very large but... what we do have does suggest above-average Trump gains, even after being weighted statewide (whether you look at the Trump-Harris sample or the larger sample adding Biden-Trump)
A few comments on the Times/Siena polls, based on some replies I see
1. One thing worth keeping in mind in the great 'recall vote' debate is that the decision was made in late 21/early 22.
The reasons were straightforward: it made polls less accurate, including our 2020 polls. It was basically the only way to make them worse.
It was also an especially fraught moment for recall vote, IMO. At the time, it wasn't clear Trump would run; it was possible he would be in jail by now. Even if it helped in '22 (it didn't for us), the risk for '24 was obvious and extraordinary
Harris 78, Trump 15 in our Times/Siena oversample of Black voters.
In our 2020 national polls, Biden led 83-6 among Black voters. nytimes.com/2024/10/12/us/…
I'll have more on this soon, but if you're the sort of person squinting at whether Trump will win 13 or 16 percent of the Black vote, it's worth flagging the sensitivity of that kind of question to different definitions of "Black" and varying turnout
The poll result here takes a broadly inclusive definition of Black voters, including multiracial and Hispanic Black voters (Black alone or in combination, as the Census would put it).
Harris is up 80-13 with the narrower group of voters who are only Black, not multiracial