1/ The Brookings #GlobalChina initiative is rolling out its latest round of research, this one on China’s efforts to adapt global governance to suit its aims. The following thread provides a brief summary of the research findings. brook.gs/2RfI5Gu
2/ Although China traditionally focused on the U.N.’s development activities, Beijing now flexes its muscles in the heart of the U.N. — its peace and security work. Reflections and analysis from Jeffrey Feltman via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/2GeFAC7#UNGA75
3/ At times, Beijing has promoted women’s equality; at others, it has undermined civil society and human rights defenders, critical actors for advancing gender equality. @DariusLongarino explores the record: brook.gs/2Z27iIO#GlobalChina
5/ The dangers of failing to revive climate cooperation between the U.S. and China are “unacceptably high,” writes @tsterndc via our latest #GlobalChina installment: brook.gs/3hVEZn3
6/ China is now the center of gravity for global energy markets. Will its demand continue to grow? How will China’s energy system respond to the challenges of climate change and local pollution? @samanthaenergy explains: brook.gs/3i3dveO#GlobalChina
7/ The trajectory of climate change depends on decisions about the infrastructure that Chinese entities fund abroad — decisions that result not from fiats in Beijing but from complex debates in China and beyond. New from @jeff_ball: brook.gs/2YGTuU6#GlobalChina
8/ Much of Washington’s concern with China’s role in the global economy has to do with China’s only partial integration into global institutions, contends @davidrdollar via our #GlobalChina project. Learn what can be done: brook.gs/30WCquT
9/ Taking a page from America’s playbook, China is seeking to build a multilayered network of security institutions, partnerships, and cooperative activities that enhance its influence in Asia, writes @lindseywford: brook.gs/2DQj5me#GlobalChina
10/ Beijing is engaging more with international institutions. Is this a gain for the global human rights system? No, writes @SophieHRW in an analysis via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/3k5Lgx8
12/ While Beijing may dislike some aspects of U.N. peacekeeping, it appears to see greater strategic advantage in cooperating with the U.S. and other Western powers in this field, @RichardGowan1 argues. brook.gs/3mccXGr#GlobalChina
13/ China has emerged as a truly global actor, impacting every region and every major issue area. For an overview of the entire #GlobalChina project, check out: brook.gs/2l2vLNo
1/ PRC diplomacy often is very active during periods when Beijing judges the US is distracted or consumed by its own issues. This current moment may offer another data point, while US confronts conflicts in Europe and Middle East amid an intense election period (short 🪡🧵).
2/ In reviewing recent PRC statecraft, a few themes stand out:
-> Active efforts to stabilize relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and the UK;
-> Stalled progress with EU;
-> Xi's involvement in diplomacy with Russia, Iran;
-> Premier Li Qiang's busy diplomacy.
3/ On US, Beijing has largely played for time as it awaits outcome of election. For example, the presidential phone call Jake Sullivan previewed during his trip to Beijing never materialized. PRC seems content to defer leader-level contact until after US election, perhaps G-20.
1/ I highly recommend this book review by @CSISFreeman Jude Blanchette. Jude uses two recent books on Xi Jinping to explore what makes Xi tick, whether Xi is a true Marxist, and the ambitions that animate how Xi wields power. A few highlights (🧵). thewirechina.com/2024/10/17/is-…
2/ Jude cautions that "labeling Xi Jinping as a “Marxist” should come with deep qualifications, as his governance agenda shows little commitment to the kind of radical economic and social transformation that Marx originally envisioned."
3/ Jude observes that Xi's pronouncements on Marxism are fairly vapid and lack any advancement in theoretical thought. Xi's governance agenda has not prioritized Marxist ideals, instead privileging themes like anti-corruption, military modernization, and domestic strengthening.
1/ I have spoken with experts from both sides of the Taiwan Strait in recent days. I have been struck from these conversations by the gap between how each side viewed President Lai's 10/10 national day speech and the PRC military exercise that followed. (short 🧵)
2/ PRC experts focused their frustration on President Lai's characterization of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as separate, sovereign entities. They took exception with Lai's framing of the ROC constitution as only covering the territory under jurisdiction of Taipei.
3/ Taiwan experts, by contrast, noted Lai's speech was largely focused on domestic issues, with an emphasis on winning support from Taiwan's youth for Lai's agenda. They highlighted Lai's comments about Taiwan becoming more calm and confident in face of international instability.
1/ This is an interesting scoop by @dimi, @leahyjoseph. My experiences from being in meetings with Xi is that he rarely is casual with comments. They're usually calculated for effect. The desired effect often is open to interpretation. Here's how I read the comments (short 🧵).
2/ Xi's reported message seems to carry mix of threat + reassurance. On reassurance side, Xi seems to be signaling that he does not presently prefer to use force to achieve PRC goals on Taiwan. He blames the US for trying to draw him into a trap and suggests he won't fall for it.
3/ Blaming America for having a nefarious plot and vowing to resist it is a pretty safe way for China's leaders to inoculate themselves internally and justify why they will not take an action that some inside the system might be agitating for.
1/ While many experts in Washington debate whether China's power is peaking, there appears to be a bit of a mirror conversation in Beijing about the United States. This is one of several gaps that have emerged in perceptions of each other in recent years. Short thread 🧵...
2/ During a recent trip to Beijing and exchanges in DC with visiting PRC officials and experts, I've been struck by repetition of discussions around "rise of the east and decline of the west." A former Chinese official said this framing is consensus view of PRC leaders.
3/ As always, there is more art than science involved in determining how much these efforts are designed to inform vs influence. I suspect there would be less effort made to stress "rise of the east and decline of the west" if it already was broadly accepted, including in China.
1/ After having had an opportunity to privately compare notes with counterparts on both sides of Taiwan Strait in recent days on President Lai's inaugural address, I am struck by the scale of the disconnect that exists between both sides. A few brief observations (🧵)...
2/ PRC counterparts I have been in touch with acknowledged being surprised by the tone and content of Lai's speech. They indicated Beijing felt it needed to dial up its response to set down a marker with Taipei and Washington, including via sharp rhetoric and military exercises.
3/ Many Taiwan counterparts I have spoken with hoped Beijing would register Lai's goodwill gestures in his speech and not overreact. All Taiwan counterparts I have spoken with expected Beijing to react ("that's what the PRC does," one said), but hoped it wouldn't be too dramatic.