1/ The Brookings #GlobalChina initiative is rolling out its latest round of research, this one on China’s efforts to adapt global governance to suit its aims. The following thread provides a brief summary of the research findings. brook.gs/2RfI5Gu
2/ Although China traditionally focused on the U.N.’s development activities, Beijing now flexes its muscles in the heart of the U.N. — its peace and security work. Reflections and analysis from Jeffrey Feltman via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/2GeFAC7#UNGA75
3/ At times, Beijing has promoted women’s equality; at others, it has undermined civil society and human rights defenders, critical actors for advancing gender equality. @DariusLongarino explores the record: brook.gs/2Z27iIO#GlobalChina
5/ The dangers of failing to revive climate cooperation between the U.S. and China are “unacceptably high,” writes @tsterndc via our latest #GlobalChina installment: brook.gs/3hVEZn3
6/ China is now the center of gravity for global energy markets. Will its demand continue to grow? How will China’s energy system respond to the challenges of climate change and local pollution? @samanthaenergy explains: brook.gs/3i3dveO#GlobalChina
7/ The trajectory of climate change depends on decisions about the infrastructure that Chinese entities fund abroad — decisions that result not from fiats in Beijing but from complex debates in China and beyond. New from @jeff_ball: brook.gs/2YGTuU6#GlobalChina
8/ Much of Washington’s concern with China’s role in the global economy has to do with China’s only partial integration into global institutions, contends @davidrdollar via our #GlobalChina project. Learn what can be done: brook.gs/30WCquT
9/ Taking a page from America’s playbook, China is seeking to build a multilayered network of security institutions, partnerships, and cooperative activities that enhance its influence in Asia, writes @lindseywford: brook.gs/2DQj5me#GlobalChina
10/ Beijing is engaging more with international institutions. Is this a gain for the global human rights system? No, writes @SophieHRW in an analysis via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/3k5Lgx8
12/ While Beijing may dislike some aspects of U.N. peacekeeping, it appears to see greater strategic advantage in cooperating with the U.S. and other Western powers in this field, @RichardGowan1 argues. brook.gs/3mccXGr#GlobalChina
13/ China has emerged as a truly global actor, impacting every region and every major issue area. For an overview of the entire #GlobalChina project, check out: brook.gs/2l2vLNo
1/ Chinese officials seem to be taking a fairly measured approach to results of the US-China trade talks in Geneva this past weekend, but Chinese state media and influential commentators appear to be taking more of a victory lap. They feel China's "resolute stance" worked. (🧵).
2/ Beijing's theory of the case was that US political feedback loop would be faster and stronger than in China. Beijing judged time and patience were to their advantage, even as they were feeling economic pain themselves. They held firm in expectation that Trump would pull back.
3/ Beijing sought to present itself globally as being strong enough to stand up to a bully to shield others from being harmed. This was the theme of PRC MFA's widely circulated video. PRC leaders sought to portray themselves internationally as principled and Trump as reckless.
1/ I've seen a wave of videos and memes from China on America's mounting challenges under Trump, some coming from Chinese officials. I understand the blend of anger, nationalism, and schadenfreude that is animating these efforts, but I would counsel a bit of caution (🧵).
2/ I recognize the self-harm and global volatility Trump's trade war is causing. The loss of confidence resulting from Trump's actions has vaporized trillions of dollars in market value, will push up inflation and unemployment, and could tip US economy toward recession.
3/ I understand why Chinese officials want to spotlight the costs that Trump's trade war is creating in the US. I would caution, though, that few things would be more poisonous for perceptions of China in US than an appearance of efforts to manipulate US public opinion.
1/ Following 10 days of travel in China, I feel China's plan for the US-China trade war is coming into focus around three central planks:
- Maintain composure and resolve;
- Avoid being isolated;
- Hit America where it hurts.
Beijing assumes no near-term resolution. (Short 🧵).
2/ Maintain composure and resolve:
- Present Chinese leadership as calm and confident;
- Condition Chinese public for economic turbulence;
- Divert frustration to US as source of problems;
- Stoke nationalism by invoking China's history of holding firm against external bullying.
3/ Avoid being isolated:
- Beijing expects US will seek to form global coalition to isolate and pressure China;
- To counter this approach, Beijing is working to find common cause with Asian and EU countries, as well as developing world, in insulating against US pressure.
1/ Secretary Lutnick’s message is important for setting expectations. Chinese President Jiang Zemin sent a telegram of condolence to George W Bush on September 11, 2001, but beyond that, it is exceedingly rare for a PRC leader to initiate outreach to a US president. (🧵)
2/ I’ve been told repeatedly that no advisor to Xi would recommend that Xi initiate a call to Trump now. For PRC, leader-level talks are by definition successful. Extensive preparations are made to guard against surprise or failure. That option is not available to Beijing now.
3/ In the absence of a preparatory process to tee up a leader-level call, PRC officials are unsure what Trump might say. They don’t want to own responsibility for setting Xi up to be humiliated by Trump on world stage. PRC leaders do not typically wade into detailed negotiations.
1/ Based on ongoing discussions in China, I am skeptical Beijing will blink on Pres. Trump’s recent tariff escalation threats. Chinese leaders understand holding firm will be economically costly. They’re preparing public to tolerate pain. Politics may drive decisions. (🧵).
2/ Beijing doesn’t expect any breakthroughs or negotiations with Trump administration on horizon. They are digging in. They do not have clarity on what Trump is trying to achieve and are filling the vacuum with their own assumption, i.e., Trump’s goal is to undermine PRC economy.
3/ PRC leaders are skeptical that capitulating to Trump’s latest demands would resolve underlying challenge from the United States, which they judge is to undermine PRC economic strength. From this vantage, they assume there is little incentive to make concessions now.
1/ The past several days have been an interesting time to visit China for meetings with government officials, scholars, business leaders, etc. A few brief reflections: counterparts have emphasized China’s leaders will not countenance being seen as passive in response to US (🧵).
2/ Beijing’s response to US tariff announcement on April 2 was on more robust end of their menu. Beijing’s countermeasures included reciprocal tariff hike of 34%; tighter export controls, including on rare earths; etc. Beijing targeted Trump supporters and sensitive sectors.
3/ There appears to be a widely held view among China’s policy community that Trump’s announcement is designed to undermine China’s economic competitiveness, rather than as a source of leverage for negotiations to resolve specific trade irritants. This colored PRC response.