1/ The Brookings #GlobalChina initiative is rolling out its latest round of research, this one on China’s efforts to adapt global governance to suit its aims. The following thread provides a brief summary of the research findings. brook.gs/2RfI5Gu
2/ Although China traditionally focused on the U.N.’s development activities, Beijing now flexes its muscles in the heart of the U.N. — its peace and security work. Reflections and analysis from Jeffrey Feltman via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/2GeFAC7#UNGA75
3/ At times, Beijing has promoted women’s equality; at others, it has undermined civil society and human rights defenders, critical actors for advancing gender equality. @DariusLongarino explores the record: brook.gs/2Z27iIO#GlobalChina
5/ The dangers of failing to revive climate cooperation between the U.S. and China are “unacceptably high,” writes @tsterndc via our latest #GlobalChina installment: brook.gs/3hVEZn3
6/ China is now the center of gravity for global energy markets. Will its demand continue to grow? How will China’s energy system respond to the challenges of climate change and local pollution? @samanthaenergy explains: brook.gs/3i3dveO#GlobalChina
7/ The trajectory of climate change depends on decisions about the infrastructure that Chinese entities fund abroad — decisions that result not from fiats in Beijing but from complex debates in China and beyond. New from @jeff_ball: brook.gs/2YGTuU6#GlobalChina
8/ Much of Washington’s concern with China’s role in the global economy has to do with China’s only partial integration into global institutions, contends @davidrdollar via our #GlobalChina project. Learn what can be done: brook.gs/30WCquT
9/ Taking a page from America’s playbook, China is seeking to build a multilayered network of security institutions, partnerships, and cooperative activities that enhance its influence in Asia, writes @lindseywford: brook.gs/2DQj5me#GlobalChina
10/ Beijing is engaging more with international institutions. Is this a gain for the global human rights system? No, writes @SophieHRW in an analysis via our #GlobalChina project: brook.gs/3k5Lgx8
12/ While Beijing may dislike some aspects of U.N. peacekeeping, it appears to see greater strategic advantage in cooperating with the U.S. and other Western powers in this field, @RichardGowan1 argues. brook.gs/3mccXGr#GlobalChina
13/ China has emerged as a truly global actor, impacting every region and every major issue area. For an overview of the entire #GlobalChina project, check out: brook.gs/2l2vLNo
1/ I'm glad Bill (@niubi) is exploring this question. It's important and often misunderstood. The US has refrained from opposing Taiwan independence (or unification) out of deference to the principle that the US isn't the arbiter of Taiwan's future political status. (short 🧵).
2/ Instead, the US traditionally has maintained a posture of opposing unilateral changes to status quo and supporting any peaceful resolution of cross-Strait disputes that enjoys support of people on both sides of Strait. (At times, the US has said "...support of Taiwan people.")
3/ Historically, US policy has insisted on non-violent, non-coerced outcome to cross-Strait disputes while leaving it to leaders in Taipei and Beijing to determine formula. If US moves to opposing TW independence, it would begin deciding what outcomes it would/wouldn't accept.
1/ I've noticed a fair bit of commentary and discussion in PRC and Taiwan media recently around whether views in the US policy community are shifting on America's support for Taiwan. As someone who lives in this community and its debates, here are a few quick reflections (🧵):
2/ I think it's fair to observe that US-Taiwan relations are evolving under Trump. The same could be said about America's relationships with virtually all its partners. Trump is de-prioritizing shared values and demanding partners contribute more to security, including Taiwan.
3/ I also think it's fair to observe that Trump's iconoclastic approach to foreign relations has opened space for debate in the US about America's role in the world. For some, Trump's approach will prod allies to become more capable and thus will strengthen US partnerships.
1/ The Chicago Council published new findings on American attitudes toward China and US-China relations. The results are notable, showing that America's broader social and political divisions are now also being reflected in sentiment toward China. (🧵). globalaffairs.org/research/publi…
2/ The findings show the bipartisan consensus (on China) "no longer seems to hold among the American public. Republicans and Democrats now hold distinctly different views on a range of China-related questions. Republicans are more confident in US power...Democrats less so."
3/ Republicans "favor decoupling from China, and favor containment over cooperation. By contrast, Democrats don’t see China as a top threat, oppose decoupling, and favor cooperation over containment, especially on issues of common concern like arms control and climate change."
1/ There is truth in the arguments that Bessent, Greer, Hassett and others are making. China's economy is unbalanced and export dependent. Deflation and debt are major challenges for Beijing. These issues are not going to compel Chinese capitulation, though. Here's why (🧵).
2/ China's leaders are confident in their negotiating position. PRC overall exports are up, they're on track to hit 5% growth target, and they have coalesced around a 5-year plan. They believe they're closer to parity with US and that rare earths provide them powerful leverage.
3/ As Beijing looks at US, it sees a country divided, a government shut down, a leadership that wants to avoid market disruptions, and an economy heavily reliant on its AI sector. Rightly or not, they judge Trump wants to avoid escalation and will make concessions to avoid it.
1/ I think this thread by @fengchucheng captures the logic and motive for Beijing's approach to the latest spike in US-China trade war escalation. Both sides are playing a high-stakes game. It's not entirely clear that both sides are playing the same game, though. (short 🧵)
2/ Both sides blame the other for breaking their tacit understanding against escalatory actions before the two leaders meet. A key question is whether both sides are taking actions now to generate leverage for bilateral negotiations. I think the verdict is out.
3/ China's Ministry of Commerce was direct in its explanation for its global rare earths export control decision. Their message to the US seemed to boil down to, "If you want to talk, let's talk. If you want to fight, let's fight." mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/a…
1/ On the surface, there has been a fair amount of US-China activity and market signaling, but under the surface, the mega-trend of the relationship is that both countries are pursuing strategies to reduce dependence and insulate themselves from each other. (short 🧵)
2/ China's leaders believe they are making progress in reducing dependence on US and West and finding ways to weaponize chokepoints for their own advantage. China's exports to US as percentage of overall exports have been shrinking and now are below 15%.
3/ Xi has made self-reliance a central feature of his national agenda. China's success in weaponizing rare earths and magnets earlier this year to compel Trump to retreat on trade war may have led PRC to grow overconfident in its leverage in relationship.