1/ PRC diplomacy often is very active during periods when Beijing judges the US is distracted or consumed by its own issues. This current moment may offer another data point, while US confronts conflicts in Europe and Middle East amid an intense election period (short 🪡🧵). 2/ In reviewing recent PRC statecraft, a few themes stand out:
-> Active efforts to stabilize relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and the UK;
-> Stalled progress with EU;
-> Xi's involvement in diplomacy with Russia, Iran;
-> Premier Li Qiang's busy diplomacy.

1/ I highly recommend this book review by @CSISFreeman Jude Blanchette. Jude uses two recent books on Xi Jinping to explore what makes Xi tick, whether Xi is a true Marxist, and the ambitions that animate how Xi wields power. A few highlights (🧵). thewirechina.com/2024/10/17/is-… 2/ Jude cautions that "labeling Xi Jinping as a “Marxist” should come with deep qualifications, as his governance agenda shows little commitment to the kind of radical economic and social transformation that Marx originally envisioned."

1/ I have spoken with experts from both sides of the Taiwan Strait in recent days. I have been struck from these conversations by the gap between how each side viewed President Lai's 10/10 national day speech and the PRC military exercise that followed. (short 🧵) 2/ PRC experts focused their frustration on President Lai's characterization of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as separate, sovereign entities. They took exception with Lai's framing of the ROC constitution as only covering the territory under jurisdiction of Taipei.

1/ This is an interesting scoop by @dimi, @leahyjoseph. My experiences from being in meetings with Xi is that he rarely is casual with comments. They're usually calculated for effect. The desired effect often is open to interpretation. Here's how I read the comments (short 🧵).

https://twitter.com/Dimi/status/1802075401822294345

2/ Xi's reported message seems to carry mix of threat + reassurance. On reassurance side, Xi seems to be signaling that he does not presently prefer to use force to achieve PRC goals on Taiwan. He blames the US for trying to draw him into a trap and suggests he won't fall for it.

1/ While many experts in Washington debate whether China's power is peaking, there appears to be a bit of a mirror conversation in Beijing about the United States. This is one of several gaps that have emerged in perceptions of each other in recent years. Short thread 🧵... 2/ During a recent trip to Beijing and exchanges in DC with visiting PRC officials and experts, I've been struck by repetition of discussions around "rise of the east and decline of the west." A former Chinese official said this framing is consensus view of PRC leaders.

1/ After having had an opportunity to privately compare notes with counterparts on both sides of Taiwan Strait in recent days on President Lai's inaugural address, I am struck by the scale of the disconnect that exists between both sides. A few brief observations (🧵)... 2/ PRC counterparts I have been in touch with acknowledged being surprised by the tone and content of Lai's speech. They indicated Beijing felt it needed to dial up its response to set down a marker with Taipei and Washington, including via sharp rhetoric and military exercises.

1/ President Lai delivered his inaugural address on May 20. It's worth reading. A few highlights:

Taiwan's voters voted for preserving the status quo on cross-Strait issues. Lai's speech suggests he understands his mandate. (short thread 🧵)...

english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6726 2/ On cross-Strait issues, Lai called for dialogue and exchange over confrontation and containment. He vowed neither to yield nor provoke and pledged to maintain the status quo. He invoked the ROC constitution. These gestures seemed intended to signal continuity in approach.

1/ America's partners and adversaries are closely following the House of Representatives decision not to act on the $95 foreign aid bill, which includes $5B to support Taiwan. It must feel like Christmas came early this year for China's leaders. Here's why (short 🧵): 2/ Taiwan's voters just chose William Lai as president-elect. During the campaign, Lai argued that closer US-Taiwan relationship is essential for Taiwan's security. Beijing chafes at closer US-Taiwan ties and would prefer for Taiwan to refocus on its relationship with the PRC.

1/ Whether you are a Cold War historian or a casual observer of the news, I commend this written debate to you. In a series of crisp exchanges, four leading experts make their case for whether the US and China are in a cold war. (Short thread) brookings.edu/articles/shoul… 2/ @patricia_m_kim observes that China's growth and prosperity hangs on its continued engagement with the outside world. She challenges the notion that China's leaders view the US as an existential threat and urges greater precision in textual analysis of PRC leaders' speeches.

1/ It has been striking to observe the amount of Kremlinology that has gone into decoding the protocol arrangements for @SecBlinken's visit to Beijing, and also how much of it has lacked context or accuracy. nytimes.com/2023/06/20/wor… 2/ At the start of the visit, the operative question was whether Blinken would meet with President Xi. Then, when Blinken met Xi, the focus shifted toward the room layout for the meeting with Xi, the lack of red carpet on the airport tarmac for Blinken's arrival, etc.

1/ Bilahari has delivered a thoughtful and thought-provoking essay on how ASEAN navigates great power rivalry and lessons that could be applied to the Middle East. His big idea - countries need to learn to simultaneously hedge, balance, and bandwagon. jstribune.com/kausikan-south… 2/ Unfortunately, though, Bilahari misrepresented my views, suggesting I have a "declinist" view of American competitiveness in the region. He overlooked my conclusion, "The United States and its partners still have a winning hand to play but they need to embrace competition."

1/ Given President Biden's statement on Taiwan yesterday, there seems to be interest today in what the "one-China policy" is, how it differs from China's "one-China principle," and why the distinction matters. In that spirit, here are a few useful resources (short thread). 2/ Richard Bush wrote this useful primer at the start of the Trump presidency: A One-China policy primer brookings.edu/research/a-one… via @BrookingsInst

1/ I am glad to see this narrative has been cleaned up. Public suggestions that US would unilaterally destroy TSMC in event of PRC invasion are unwise and unhelpful. Taiwan's elected leaders are responsible for protecting their people's interests... 🧵 taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4837391 2/ Public suggestions US would unilaterally destroy TSMC play into Beijing's narrative that US sees Taiwan as a strategic pawn, not as a genuine partner. Falling into this trap is ill-informed and shortsighted. There are better ways for US to identify its interests re: Taiwan.

1/ A few quick reflections on diplomacy around the Chinese spy balloon incident:

The US has done a good job raising intl awareness of the systemic nature of PRC balloon operations around the world and building support for the principle of protecting sovereign airspace. (thread) 2/ The US Government has been persistent in keeping open direct private channels of communication with Beijing, both to register the strength of US objections and to clarify the intentions of its actions and statements.

1/ Given the news of @SecBlinken's postponement of his trip to Beijing due to the PRC's spy satellite violating US airspace, a question now turns to what would be needed from Beijing in order to justify turning planning for the visit back on. A few quick thoughts -(short thread). 2/ The timing and audacity of this operation by China is stunning in its shortsightedness. PRC leaders wanted to use Blinken's visit to demonstrate directional progress toward stabilization of US-China ties. They still do. The US has a bit of leverage. How should it use it?

1/ I do not begrudge military leaders working internally to build urgency to bolster deterrence in Taiwan Strait. That is their contribution to US national strategy. I do have qualms about a deeper issue of undisciplined public messaging, though. Thread.
washingtonpost.com/national-secur… 2/ General Minihan's "gut" is in a different place than CJCS Milley, Secretary Austin, or President Biden. Biden said publicly at the G-20, "I do not think there’s any imminent attempt on the part of China to invade Taiwan." whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

1/ Thank you @Scholars_Stage for engaging so thoughtfully with Jude Blanchette's and my recent piece. Part of our motivation in writing the piece was to spur exactly this kind of discussion. I will offer a few quick responses to your critique. These are mine alone...(Thread)

https://twitter.com/Scholars_Stage/status/1608553208980570112

2/ Our piece centered on America's interests and how best to protect them. It was not an assertion that the US controls events in the Taiwan Strait. We seem to agree that the goal of US policy is to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

1/ As someone who has organized events and spoken publicly about the corrosive effects of anti-Asian racism on America's national fabric and national competitiveness, this news is not troubling to me. Short thread...
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… via @bpolitics 2/ It is not unreasonable to request that inbound travelers demonstrate they do not have COVID. Until fairly recently, everyone entering the US (including American citizens) had to do so. China similarly will require inbound travelers to provide proof upon entry.

1/ I'm unpersuaded Beijing is launching any charm offensive. It is not altering policy positions or increasing incentives to others. Xi is returning to the world stage after several years at home for COVID control and consolidation of power. (short thread) washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/… 2/ China's leaders are looking for opportunities to strengthen their position in competition with US and others. They would like key countries to respect their "core interests" and to refrain from joining coalitional efforts to challenge China's rise.

1/ There are times when the pendulum of national power swings decisively. The collapse of the Soviet Union would be the clearest example. As an analytic matter, I'm skeptical that China is experiencing - or soon will - a similarly dramatic pendulum swing. (brief thread)... 2/ I have detected hopefulness among some pundits that China has crossed Rubicon and everything will be downhill for them from here, e.g., China's power has peaked, the Party Congress exposed the CCP's brutality, China's growth model is exhausted, Xi is becoming isolated, etc.

1/ The Biden administration's announcement last Friday of new export controls on semiconductor chips and tools to China was a significant event and a calculated gamble. It reflected a judgment that US leverage is a depreciating asset and that bold action is needed now. (Thread) 2/ The new rules reflect the administration's view that certain civilian technologies have multiplier effects, and that China has used commercially available tech to modernize its military, pursue strategic economic dominance in key sectors, and commit human rights abuses.