We owe a special thanks to @AnnaBNewby, @tedreinert, @RachelASlattery, and many others for their help bringing these papers all the way across the finish line.
4/
And grateful to have had the opportunity to once again work alongside my Global China co-leads @ChhabraT, @ryanl_hass, and Emilie Kimball on yet another batch of terrific papers!
5/
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NEW in @ForeignAffairs: Kurt Campbell and I argue that any serious China strategy must start with an old truth: “Quantity is a quality all its own.”
• Scale matters
• China has it
• We get it only through a new grand strategy of allied scale
We hang together—or separately.
1. UNDERESTIMATING CHINA
China is slowing, greying, & indebted. But macroeconomic challenges do not neatly translate to strategic disadvantage on the metrics and timeframe that matter in great power competition.
Scale matters, and we risk overestimating our unilateral power
2. SCALE AND GREAT POWER DECLINE
The UK had a first-mover advantage. But once larger countries industrialized too - Germany, US, Russia - they "outscaled" it.
From 1870-1910, its share of global manufacturing fell 50%. Germany and the US rose to 2x and 4x UK steel production.
In today's @nytopinion, I argue that there is a bipartisan consensus on China but that Trump is outside it.
If he returns, he will again undermine it by putting self-interest first.
That could cost the US the decisive decade in the competition.
Thread and link below:
1/ At the beginning of the Biden Administration, many of us recognized this as the "decisive decade" in the competition.
Absent corrective action, the US risked being surpassed by China technologically, dependent on it economically, or defeated by it militarily.
2/ That recognition led to bipartisan legislative pushes on technology, reindustrialization, human rights, deterrence, alliances, etc. That is remarkable at a time of division.
But on each of these issues, Trump is outside the bipartisan norm.
I testified today before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee.
I covered PRC national security laws and the conflicts of interest they can create for US companies, particularly in consulting and tech.
Testimony below and a quick thread to follow.
2/ Unlike the Cold War, US companies are deeply involved in the PRC in ways that sometimes create conflicts of interest.
One source is that the PRC might threaten market access if companies don't transfer IP, form JVs, censor speech, or refrain from taking the PRC to court.
3/ But another critical source is a suite of PRC national security laws enacted over the last 7 years.
2017 National Intelligence Law
2017 Cybersecurity Law
2020 Encryption Law
2021 Data Security Law
2021 Counterespionage Law
2024 State Secrets Law update
Big deal today. The US, Canada, and Finland just launched an allied industrial policy effort on icebreakers: "ICE Pact"
The US needs icebreakers.
- Russia has 30+.
- China has 3 and is building more.
- The US basically has 1.
ICE Pact aims to fix that.
A few details:
Done right, the ICE Pact consortium can:
- increase US shipyard capacity
- increase interoperability
- bring Finnish and Canadian know-how & equipment to the US
- preempt PRC efforts to corner the global market (70-90 ships) in favor of the ICE Pact consortium
Previously, US demand came from the Coast Guard, which is too low to scale.
Now, a consortium of shipyards across ICE Pact will coordinate to meet not just domestic but *global* demand for icebreakers.
That global order book creates scale, lowers costs, and increases capacity.
I have enormous respect for these two public servants. They turned the ship on China policy.
Members of Pottinger's team stayed on in the Biden NSC. Members of Gallagher's worked with the Biden team on big moves.
Matt even favorably reviewed my book.
1) THEIR TAKE
I read Pottinger and Gallagher as saying to forget about managing competition, embrace confrontation without limits, and then wait for the CCP to collapse.
I worry their approach discounts escalation risk and could force a moment of reckoning before the US is ready. They assume their approach will work because it worked in the Cold War, but this contest is different.
*** But Despite our differences on some strategic questions, we share a lot of common ground on the steps to improve the US competitive position.
That proves no matter where one starts in the debate, most end up at the same common-sense prescriptions.