We owe a special thanks to @AnnaBNewby, @tedreinert, @RachelASlattery, and many others for their help bringing these papers all the way across the finish line.
4/
And grateful to have had the opportunity to once again work alongside my Global China co-leads @ChhabraT, @ryanl_hass, and Emilie Kimball on yet another batch of terrific papers!
5/
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After 3+ years at the NSC, it's hard to believe that Monday was my last day.
It was the privilege of a lifetime to serve there - at this time, for this president, and under this NSA - and to do so alongside the most dedicated public servants I've met.
A little on my next steps
I’ll be joining the Security Studies Program at Georgetown SFS as an assistant professor. I want to thank @joelhellman_SFS, faculty chair Donato, and @dbyman for the opportunity and for a generous deferral so I could serve at the NSC an additional year.
The book features
- 5 years of research
- 400 pages
- 1500 footnotes
- Countless Chinese texts
- Lots of anecdotes drawn from memoirs, compendiums, and other Chinese sources.
I'm also excited to share some advance praise for the book.
These reviews come from so many I've looked up to for so long, many of whom have different views on China policy. It’s hard to put into words just how much these reviews mean to me, so I thought I'd share them here.
These are great points, @ElbridgeColby - and I would agree in various places!
But my article and thread are not arguing that Beijing is "right" but rather that their assessment of US decline is shaping strategy and has for 3-4 years.
Each of your excellent questions warrants a longer discussion! I'd be happy to chat at some point.
But in the interest of being useful, here are a few quick thoughts:
1) POWER - it's unclear what inputs go into the assessment. We know what goes into CNP, and there are some indications soft factors (perceived resolve, pol stability) are part of the Party's equation in addition to hard ones.
As I argue in my forthcoming book, The Long Game, every PRC leader in the last 30 years has publicly anchored grand strategy to assessments of US power.
This is captured in euphemisms like "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."
3. STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT
When assessments of US power change, so does PRC grand strategy. This has happened twice in 30 years.
Once was after Tiananmen, which produced "hiding and biding."
The other was after the GFC, which led to "actively accomplishing something."
Extraordinarily grateful to have had the opportunity to testify on the China challenge before the @SenateCommerce Subcommittee on Security this morning.
My written submission was on "The US, China, & the Fourth Industrial Revolution" - bit.ly/339LRIX
A few points: 1/
1. GLOBAL TECH LEADERSHIP: It's increasingly understood that Beijing is pursuing a robust, state-backed effort to displace the US from global technology leadership not only for commercial and developmental reasons but - just as importantly - for *geopolitical* ones too.
2. AMBITION: Semi-authoritative PRC commentaries talk about the "Fourth Industrial Revolution" as the "main battlefield" of US-China competition - and the stakes are seen as geopolitical.
This is a materialist view of great power transition.