In today's @nytopinion, I argue that there is a bipartisan consensus on China but that Trump is outside it.

If he returns, he will again undermine it by putting self-interest first.

That could cost the US the decisive decade in the competition.

Thread and link below: 1/ At the beginning of the Biden Administration, many of us recognized this as the "decisive decade" in the competition.

Absent corrective action, the US risked being surpassed by China technologically, dependent on it economically, or defeated by it militarily.

PRC Eastern Theater Command just announced exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

Lai dialed back his 10/10 speech from his inaugural.

So China is validating those who say no matter what Taiwan does, no matter what Lai does, they will escalate.

Not a wise policy.

https://twitter.com/xhnews/status/1845572015664791809

Here’s what they say they will do.

Still remains to be seen *what* they actually do, of course, and how it compares to last exercises.

Link to the notification here: weibo.com/7483054836/508…

Link to the Eastern Theater Command map here: weibo.com/7483054836/508…

I testified today before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee.

I covered PRC national security laws and the conflicts of interest they can create for US companies, particularly in consulting and tech.

Testimony below and a quick thread to follow. 2/ Unlike the Cold War, US companies are deeply involved in the PRC in ways that sometimes create conflicts of interest.

One source is that the PRC might threaten market access if companies don't transfer IP, form JVs, censor speech, or refrain from taking the PRC to court.

Big deal today. The US, Canada, and Finland just launched an allied industrial policy effort on icebreakers: "ICE Pact"

The US needs icebreakers.
- Russia has 30+.
- China has 3 and is building more.
- The US basically has 1.

ICE Pact aims to fix that.

A few details:

Done right, the ICE Pact consortium can:

- increase US shipyard capacity
- increase interoperability
- bring Finnish and Canadian know-how & equipment to the US
- preempt PRC efforts to corner the global market (70-90 ships) in favor of the ICE Pact consortium

Excited to share my response to Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher's good faith critique of Biden China policy.

It's now out in @ForeignAffairs.

You can also read their reply to me and other critics.

A few thoughts on where we disagree, and more importantly, where we agree:

https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1796180915279843692

I have enormous respect for these two public servants. They turned the ship on China policy.

Members of Pottinger's team stayed on in the Biden NSC. Members of Gallagher's worked with the Biden team on big moves.

Matt even favorably reviewed my book.

After 3+ years at the NSC, it's hard to believe that Monday was my last day.

It was the privilege of a lifetime to serve there - at this time, for this president, and under this NSA - and to do so alongside the most dedicated public servants I've met.

A little on my next steps I’ll be joining the Security Studies Program at Georgetown SFS as an assistant professor. I want to thank @joelhellman_SFS, faculty chair Donato, and @dbyman for the opportunity and for a generous deferral so I could serve at the NSC an additional year.

css.georgetown.edu/2024/03/20/sec…

Today is the launch date for my first book, The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order!

The book covers the evolution of China’s grand strategy from the end of the Cold War to the present.

It's also number 1 in IR new releases!

amazon.com/Long-Game-Stra… The book features
- 5 years of research
- 400 pages
- 1500 footnotes
- Countless Chinese texts
- Lots of anecdotes drawn from memoirs, compendiums, and other Chinese sources.

Beijing sent a list of 14 grievances to Australia supposedly justifying its economic coercion against it.

The list is revealing.

It shows the PRC holds countries responsible for their free *civil societies* & serves as a template for illiberal order-building.

Some thoughts: 1/

https://twitter.com/smh/status/1328959892435197954

The list is long:

- Investment scrutiny
- Huawei
- Interference legislation
- Visas
- COVID inquiry
- HR criticism
- SCS stance
- Spreading US "disinformation"
- BRI disinterest
- Think tanks
- PRC journalists
- Reporting cyber attacks
- CCP criticism
- Media

2/

These are great points, @ElbridgeColby - and I would agree in various places!

But my article and thread are not arguing that Beijing is "right" but rather that their assessment of US decline is shaping strategy and has for 3-4 years.

https://twitter.com/ElbridgeColby/status/1315758456075366404

Each of your excellent questions warrants a longer discussion! I'd be happy to chat at some point.

But in the interest of being useful, here are a few quick thoughts:

Excited to share a new piece in FP!

I argue ODNI's claim that China prefers Trump "not win reelection" tells only half the story.

Party texts show China believes Trump is accelerating US decline.

This has triggered a new phase in PRC grand strategy.

1/
foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/chi… 2. US POWER AT THE CENTER

As I argue in my forthcoming book, The Long Game, every PRC leader in the last 30 years has publicly anchored grand strategy to assessments of US power.

This is captured in euphemisms like "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."

Excited to announce that the @BrookingsInst Global China project is publishing 11 papers today on China's role in global governance and norms.

The papers span human rights, democracy, climate, energy, gender, and regional & global multilateralism.

1/

brookings.edu/product/global… The series includes rich papers on:

1. The UN by Jeff Feltman
2. Peacekeeping by @RichardGowan1
3. Human rights by @SophieHRW
4. Xinjiang by @dahlialpeterson and @JimMillward
5. Gender and LGBT issues by @DariusLongarino
6. Regional architecture by @lindseywford

2/

Extraordinarily grateful to have had the opportunity to testify on the China challenge before the @SenateCommerce Subcommittee on Security this morning.

My written submission was on "The US, China, & the Fourth Industrial Revolution" - bit.ly/339LRIX

A few points: 1/ 1. GLOBAL TECH LEADERSHIP: It's increasingly understood that Beijing is pursuing a robust, state-backed effort to displace the US from global technology leadership not only for commercial and developmental reasons but - just as importantly - for *geopolitical* ones too.

Excited to have our paper "Beijing's Bismarckian Ghosts" generously referenced in @martinwolf_'s column!

We argued that the Anglo-German great power economic rivalry a century ago holds eerie parallels to today’s US-China contest.

Some takeaways:

ft.com/content/5887ec… 1) ON PARALLELS: My coauthors, historian Harold James and economist Markus Brunnermeier, and I recognize that no historical analogy is perfect.

But we believed the Anglo-German rivalry is clearly a useful reference point for US-China economic rivalry.

This piece by Zhou Bo reads like propaganda intended to depress Western morale, split the EU and US, and herald China unceasing rise.

Many of these themes occur in China’s domestic discourse, suggesting there’s also a domestic propaganda purpose too. scmp.com/comment/opinio… To what degree do Party elites share this worldview?

Is this the “we will bury you” confidence of Khrushchev, and are some elites just getting high on their own supply of propaganda?

Or is this a considered view and Party judgment? If so, it could be consequential.

Grateful that the Director of National Intelligence engaged with the piece Kurt and I wrote for @ForeignAffairs

I agree - but whether China "should" be allowed to turn the narrative (it shouldn't!) is different from whether it *will* be able to do.

That should concern us.

1/

https://twitter.com/RichardGrenell/status/1241116539501371393

I appreciate the DNI's perspective here, but respectfully, if China is seen as leading - and the US is seen as incompetent at home and absent abroad - I'm concerned it'll have major geopolitical implications.

And they're making progress as we falter.

2/

https://twitter.com/RichardGrenell/status/1241117597359317007?s=20

Excited to share a new piece with Kurt Campbell in @ForeignAffairs!

It argues that China is racing to be seen as the global leader of the coronavirus response as the US falters.

China knows that orders can change gradually at first, then all at once.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-… 1. HEALTH FIRST: The virus's geopolitical implications should be considered secondary to matters of health and safety, but they are not being forgotten in Beijing nor should they be ignored in Washington - and they have implications for the US position.

Serbian President: "The only country that can help us is China."

“By now, you all understood that European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper. I believe in my brother and friend Xi Jinping, and I believe in Chinese help."

1/

Seems a lot of this is based on China’s ability to provide the material goods needed to fight the crisis. 2/

China is emerging as a global public goods provider as the US proves unable and unwilling to lead.

This is an important development, and if the trend continues, it’s one with potentially serious consequences for the US role in the world.

https://twitter.com/vkjudit/status/1237448125800988675

Yes, Italy will pay China for these supplies, but the fact China can uniquely provide them and is willing to do so during a time of scarcity has political implications as well.

I enjoyed this thoughtful piece by @stephenwertheim, but I might push back on (1) the idea that the great power competition [GPC] discourse is in service of US mil hegemony and on (2) some contradictory prescriptions for China policy.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/afgha…

A few thoughts: @stephenwertheim 1. The piece says "a flotilla of defense analysts have proposed a strategy of 'great-power competition," largely "in the service of maximizing Washington’s military power."

First, GPC is a fact of politics. No one wants GPC; they want strategies to cope with it.

Today's trade deal won't alleviate PRC fears of US financial statecraft.

So I'm excited to share a new piece with @NBRnews on Beijing's 10-year struggle against US financial power and its spread into state-backed digital currencies.

A few thoughts:

nbr.org/publication/ch… But first, the piece is adapted from a longer book chapter published by @NBRnews last year.

It also makes up one-half of a two-part series with Fed EVP Richard Dzina on financial statecraft and multipolarity.

Grateful to share this piece on China's info ops in Taiwan.

What happens in Taiwan matters, and I argue PRC efforts there are now going global.

The piece draws from a forthcoming Brookings report on China's worldwide info efforts.

A few key points:

foreignaffairs.com/articles/china… 1) SOPHISTICATED EFFORTS: PRC propaganda evokes block print posters and stilted jargon. It's much more serious, increasingly involving an elaborate campaign to shape information flows in ways both direct and covert, influencing not just the message but the medium itself.