Germany feels more uncomfortable with NS2 more than ever, but it feels equally uncomfortable with abandoning the project. And the reason for this is geopolitical.
It feels uncomfortable because it is concerned about Navalny and about Belarus, which are seen just the last points in a long list of aggressive acts by Russia. Ukraine was the wake-up call, the gamer-changer, 2020 is the confirmation that Russia is not really a partner.
Yet it's difficult to change course after years of pushing NS2 through against the will and views of EU neighbors. And US pressure doesn't help, as bowing to it would look as if Germany had become a vassal of Trump.
But the biggest problem for Germany is that skipping NS2 would change the country's relationship with Russia — something some commentators from Moscow are busy to emphasize (with warning undertones).
Germany's current relation with Russia has been defined by 1989/91. Moscow agreed to German unification, and it removed its troops from German soil. Helmut Kohl was very keen to keep this new friendship on track — a key plank of Germany's post-Cold War geopolitics.
And Schröder took it to the extreme, in his second term and certainly afterwards. But Merkel who took over 2005 left this track largely untouched — even if she has built a second confrontational track of German Russia policy, namely since Russia's attack on Ukraine 2014.
Yet while Germany pushed for tough economic sanctions, it was keen to provide Russia with an off-ramp: a path back towards cooperation. The energy relationship embodied by NS2 served as an important signal to Russia that Germany remains a friend (somehow) despite disagreements.
Cancelling NS2 would signal to Russia that this cozy partnership is finally over, that there is only one track left: tension and confrontation. Yet Germany doesn't want to send this signal — it certainly doesn't want to confront Russia alone (and somehow reverse 1989/91).
But Germany on Russia has no back-up. The US is, unlike in 2014, when Obama and Merkel worked hand in hand, currently not a partner on Russia. And Merkel's attempt to Europeanize the issue (share responsibility) has apparently failed.
If change is not being pushed, the status quo will prevail. At least at this point it seems highly unlikely that Germany will take bold steps to cancel NS2.
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Iran has built his bet to dominate the region as the new hegemon in a "post-American world" on its ally-proxies (Hamas, Hisbollah, Houthis, militias in Syria and Irak), on its missiles and its nuclear program.
After the attack by Iran's ally-proxy Hamas in October 2023, Israel has decided that it has to act to stop Iran's aggressive expansion -- and diminished all three pillars of Iranian power.
Deutschland kann recht leicht zurück auf den Erfolgskurs gebracht werden. Das Potenzial des Landes ist immens. Es müssen nur ein paar Dinge getan werden:
1) Die Migrationsfrage muss der radikalen Rechten entwunden werden, um diese wieder auf Normalmaß zu stutzen. Wichtig ist, dass sich die AfD nicht als Milieu großflächig etabliert, damit vernünftiges Regieren möglich bleibt.
2) Deutschland muss erheblich mehr in Verteidigung investieren. Hauptaufgabe ist die Verteidigung unserer Partner von Baltikum bis Rumänien. Deutschland muss dafür seine industriellen Kapazitäten endlich anwerfen. Nur dann gibt es Frieden und Stabilität in Europa.
Trump's ways to end /prevent war: give Russia and China what they want?
The current order is post-imperial, based on the principle of safe borders also for smaller and weaker countries.
But Russia and China want to change that: subjugate smaller countries in their neighborhood.
There is a "liberal international order"-case against Russian, Chinese and Iranian neo-imperialism; but also an "America first"-case, as all three are eager to diminish American power and influence, and want to put themselves (and their type of order) globally on top.
To give up support for "frontline states" -- countries in the vicinity of these autocratic power supported in their sovereignty by the US -- would mean to bring namely Russia and China in a better position, which would increase their appetite and belligerence.
Europeans have opportunities to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia but they fail to grasp them: Armenia, Georgia, Syria, also Libya.
Without the will to win battles over influence against Russia, Europeans will be on the loosing side in the ne geopolitical world.
Those opportunities may not come back. Capitals of big European countries -- Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, others -- need to get together and devise a geopolitical strategy that they will role out individually, but also inside NATO and the EU.
So far what we see is no sense of urgency, a lack of strategic capacity to analyze and draw conclusions, a failure to invest in capabilities and a lack of will to fight for the "European way of life".
Die Prämisse der Russlandpolitik von Scholz ist: der Krieg ist ein Ausrutscher, eine Abweichung vom Normalzustand, und die Aufgabe des Kanzlers besteht darin, Russland zu helfen, diesen Fehler einzusehen und zu korrigieren, um zum Normalzustand der Zusammenarbeit zurückzukehren.
Die Realität, die die große Mehrheit der Russlandkenner, die anderen Mitte-Parteien (Grüne, FDP, Union) ebenso erkannt haben wie die europäischen Partner Deutschlands, ist aber eine andere: Russlands Aggression gegen Europa ist der neue Normalzustand.
Aus der Diagnose folgt die Strategie. Scholz hat immer die Rückkehr zum vermeintlichen Normalzustand im Blick und arbeitet darauf hin, dass Russland wieder Partner wird.