The decision is hardly surprising, but there are two interesting points in the panel report: 1. Whether the Phase 1 deal constitutes a mutually agreed solution; 2. whether the US tariffs could be justified under the public morals exception.
The first one was easy, while the second one is more tricky, as the US measures were allegedly taken against IP theft, misappropriation and unfair competition by China. The Panel ruled against the US, not because the US couldn't do so, but due to the lack of nexus and necessity.
I'm most amused by the argument by China that the criminalization of a conduct under domestic law doesn't really provide sufficient justification for invoking public morals exception. I wonder if its lawyers ever realized that this argu could be used against China in another case
But I guess China is not alone in that regard, as the other WTO Members, who joined as 3rd Parties, also seemed to be confused, at least judged from their submissions in the case.
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Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
The new tariff numbers confirm what I wrote 4 months ago in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal”:
1. I stressed that these negotiations aren’t just about trade-security alignment would be a key factor. This is now explicit in the executive order, which repeatedly cites
security considerations in setting final tariff rates.
2. I predicted countries would be grouped based on key criteria. That’s exactly what we see: broadly speaking, there are three groups—friends (10–15%), enemies (30%+), and frenemies (19–25%).
3. I anticipated aggressive transshipment controls targeting China. The executive order includes just that.
4. Perhaps most tellingly, the order hints what China—the last holdout from the Liberation Day Tariffs—is likely to face: at least 40%, matching the rate applied to
The US-UK trade deal is out—and it confirms most of my predictions in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal” 4 weeks ago:
1. Tariffs: The 10% tariff remains in place for now, but contrary to some interpretations, this doesn’t mean the UK failed to negotiate it down. The
Agreement explicitly states that both sides will enter negotiations to reduce tariff rates. As I noted, the likely landing point is around the US’s 3.4% rate-if the UK is willing to match it.
2. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Just as I anticipated, NTBs is central to the next phase
For a developed country like the UK, the focus is on overregulation—technical barriers to trade, SPS measures, and similar restrictions—all explicitly referenced in the Agreement.
3. Supply Chains: I flagged this as a key issue, and the Agreement confirms it. It addresses supply
Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.
China today released a white paper titled “China's Position on Some Issues Concerning China-US Economic, Trade Relations.”
No, it’s not about setting the record straight as it claims.
It’s a retaliation wishlist—and a catalog of Beijing’s deepest trade fears.
1. Retaliation List:
• Banning U.S. services exports
• Halting IP protection for U.S. companies
• Imposing forced tech transfers
• Banning U.S. food and agricultural products
• Limiting access to China’s financial markets
• Devaluing the RMB
2. Fear List:
• Repeal of PNTR status
• Trade and investment restrictions on national security grounds
• Expanded export controls
• Section 301 tariffs
• Section 232 investigations
• Use of trade remedy tools (AD/CVD)
• Ending the de minimis exemption
• Reciprocal tariffs