(1/x) The General Office of the CCP released a new central opinion on ramping up united front (统战工作) work aimed at the private sector - i.e., clearly marking private business as a major political target for Party ideological work.
(2/x) First, the thrust of this is utterly clear: the private sector needs to toe the Party line, period.
教育引导民营经济人士用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑、指导实践,在政治立场、政治方向、政治原则、政治道路上同党中央保持高度一致,始终做政治上的明白人
(3/x) Ideologically, that feels like we're clearly back in the early 1950s. Private enterprise exists, but only so far as they can paint themselves as loyalists.
Next Q: Might Beijing at some point take the next (i.e. late 1950s) step of tightening controls yet *further*?
(4/x) Second, note that this opinion came out 2 months after Xi Jinping's symposium with a slate of private +SOE entrepreneurs - where it appears that the same talking points were delivered (see @niubi below).
1) This clip from China's 8/30 evening news is worth watching for anyone following elite Chinese politics.
A thread on how:
a) it indicates the extent of Xi’s power, and
b) suggests who may be raised up to the Politburo Standing Committee in October. tv.cctv.com/2022/08/30/VID…
2) As everyone now knows – China’s leaders have selected October 16th as the date for the 20th Party Congress [at which Xi will - virtually certainly - receive a third term as China’s top leader.]
News of the selection of that date was the lead item on tonight's evening news.
3) The clip above is the *second* item from tonight's evening news, at which Xi Jinping appeared at an awards ceremony for model civil servants.
(1/x) Totally agree on upholding the continued openness of America to the rest of the world.
But I don't agree that: "China has the world’s fastest growing higher education system in quality as well as quantity." thewirechina.com/2022/08/28/on-…
(2/x) Beijing itself recognizes the deep problems resulting from crash programs to massively expand 4-year colleges since the late 1990s: low quality programs + high youth unemployment.
(3/x) Political trends in China are steadily crushing the post-1978 openness that had marked higher education there. It's not just zero-covid. It's not just heightened political sensitivity to foreign exchanges and textbooks.
(2) Until recently, China's state media *had* been pretty careful about separating Xi personally from current (i.e. 2022) covid-zero restrictions and the effect on people's lives.
But the statement yesterday was crystal-clear - covid-zero is Xi's baby, we will win. No dissent.
(3) So - one way or another - there's got to be a "victory." But what will it look like? How will it be commemorated?
It's kind of like the question that Russia Twitter is debating re: what Putin does on May 9.
Top leader launches battle. Victory must be announced. But how?
(2) How far could this run? Well, at the peak of *their* omicron waves in March, South Korea and Hong Kong each had about 1% of their population contracting the virus per day.
For Taiwan, that = 235,000 new cases/day.
For China, that = 14 million new cases/day.
(3) South Korea did a great job vaccinating the elderly. So, total deaths (so far): 17,235.
Hong Kong did an awful job. So, cataclysmic scenes, mass disruption. Total deaths (in a population eight times smaller than South Korea): 8,061.
(1/x) Given that a US-China financial decoupling is underway (i.e. de-listing of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges, US tech firms potentially withdrawing from Hong Kong) it might be worthwhile to think through what a parallel academic decoupling might look like.
(2/x) So far much of the discussion has focused on discrete actions taken by Beijing and Washington - denying visas to specific scholars and students, restrictions or closure of Confucius Institutes in US schools and American Culture Centers in PRC ones.
(3/x) Those are important, but they still affect a relatively narrow slice of students and institutions.
(2/x) Based on a rough scan, direct mentions of top Chinese leaders haven't been that common. So Hu Jintao received three mentions in 2010. Xi himself only one in 2012.
Standard references indicating Hu/Xi as top dog - that kind of stuff.
(3/x) Decisively different now.
Last year (2020) - 15 references to Xi. In addition to the callouts to his pre-eminent position, you also saw:
a) 亲自指挥、亲自部署 - i.e. - giving him personal credit re/coronavirus response
b) 习近平外交思想 Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy