1) This clip from China's 8/30 evening news is worth watching for anyone following elite Chinese politics.

A thread on how:
a) it indicates the extent of Xi’s power, and
b) suggests who may be raised up to the Politburo Standing Committee in October.
tv.cctv.com/2022/08/30/VID… 2) As everyone now knows – China’s leaders have selected October 16th as the date for the 20th Party Congress [at which Xi will - virtually certainly - receive a third term as China’s top leader.]

News of the selection of that date was the lead item on tonight's evening news.

(1/x) Totally agree on upholding the continued openness of America to the rest of the world.

But I don't agree that: "China has the world’s fastest growing higher education system in quality as well as quantity."
thewirechina.com/2022/08/28/on-… (2/x) Beijing itself recognizes the deep problems resulting from crash programs to massively expand 4-year colleges since the late 1990s: low quality programs + high youth unemployment.

That's one key reason for China's pivot back to vocational education.
sixthtone.com/news/1010213/c…

(1) How - politically - does Xi Jinping "win the battle for Shanghai" (打赢大上海保卫战), and what does that look like?

On March 10, 2020, Xi personally visited Wuhan (when it was clear that the tide in the epidemic had turned), kind of as a victorious general.

https://twitter.com/CarlMinzner/status/1522549837249617921

(2) Until recently, China's state media *had* been pretty careful about separating Xi personally from current (i.e. 2022) covid-zero restrictions and the effect on people's lives.

But the statement yesterday was crystal-clear - covid-zero is Xi's baby, we will win. No dissent.

(1) In both China and Taiwan, the omicron wave is now entering the rapid, exponential growth stage.

New locally-transmitted cases (both symp + aysmp)
P.R.C. Taiwan
4/3 13146 183
4/2 9875 160
4/1 7229 104
3/31 8454 87
3/30 8655 56
3/29 6886 33 (2) How far could this run? Well, at the peak of *their* omicron waves in March, South Korea and Hong Kong each had about 1% of their population contracting the virus per day.

For Taiwan, that = 235,000 new cases/day.
For China, that = 14 million new cases/day.

(1/x) Given that a US-China financial decoupling is underway (i.e. de-listing of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges, US tech firms potentially withdrawing from Hong Kong) it might be worthwhile to think through what a parallel academic decoupling might look like. (2/x) So far much of the discussion has focused on discrete actions taken by Beijing and Washington - denying visas to specific scholars and students, restrictions or closure of Confucius Institutes in US schools and American Culture Centers in PRC ones.

(1/x) Mentions of Xi Jinping in the annual report of the standing committee of China's national legislature doubled this year compared w/2020.

But the context that is even more interesting...

(Tagging @cnmediaproject & @dbandurski - they're the experts at watching this stuff) (2/x) Based on a rough scan, direct mentions of top Chinese leaders haven't been that common. So Hu Jintao received three mentions in 2010. Xi himself only one in 2012.

Standard references indicating Hu/Xi as top dog - that kind of stuff.

(1/x) China's flagship Party paper @PDChina steadily ramping up singular focus on Xi Jinping. Two more lengthy articles in today's paper.

Building on points made by @cnmediaproject and @niubi, let me point out two specific trends I see. (2/x) First, note that @cnmediaproject and @niubi are cooperating on a regular monthly project examining China media trends. Make sure to follow that.

That sets out the big big picture - references to Xi are going way, way up. See here. sinocism.com/p/chinas-polit…

(1/x) Page 2 of @PDChina today is a full page paen on Xi Jinping's anti-poverty exploits. A few thoughts on what it might mean.

paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2021… (2/x) Recognize how unusual the format is. Page 2 - single article, entire page of text (no photos). Sure, you sometimes see that for full page releases of Party documents, or reprints of high level speeches. But not usually for single articles.

(1/x) I don't think people outside China fully appreciate the scale of centralized quarantine that officials are using to combat the new wave of virus cases that has broken out in the last month or so. (2/x) Here's language from the Jan. 18 State Council notice issued (h/t @HollySnapeWang).
"各地要按照密切接触者和密切接触者的密切接触者（以下称次密切接触者）“应隔尽隔、一人一间、集中隔离”的要求"
gov.cn/zhengce/conten…

In 2000s, scholars searched for signs that sweeping language in China's constitution might be coming to life. (anyone remember 2001 "right to education" case?)

In 2020s, it is.

*BUT* it is art. 19 (state duty to promote Mandarin), invoked to curb minority language education.

https://twitter.com/NPC_Observer/status/1351929168758501389

Two key people to follow on P.R.C. constitutional law issues:
Keith Hand (U.C. Hastings) and Tom Kellogg (Georgetown Law). See their earlier work (including discussion of Qi Yuling case) here:

1) jamestown.org/program/npcsc-…

2) jamestown.org/program/the-de…

3) scholarship.law.upenn.edu/ealr/vol7/iss1…

(1/x) Starting to suspect that the rectification campaign that will sweep through China's political-legal bureaucracy in 2021 might be a major vector for trying to raise Xi Jinping's ideological place in the CCP political pantheon yet closer to Mao Zedong. (2/x) Naturally, the addition of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" to the Party charter in 2018 vaulted Xi over Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin in importance, both of whom did *not* have their names so added.
nytimes.com/2018/02/26/wor…

(1/x) Xi Jinping's visit to China's National Military Museum to commemorate the 70th anniversary of China's military entering Korean war is a *big* deal. Totally agree w/ @niubi on this. Here are some thoughts. (2/x) Recognize the signals here. Xi took entire membership of Politburo Standing Committee, plus Wang Qishan.

That's identical to his 2012 visit to National History Museum, used to kick off Xi's "road to revival" 复兴之路 theme so prevalent since.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-11/…

(1/x) The General Office of the CCP released a new central opinion on ramping up united front (统战工作) work aimed at the private sector - i.e., clearly marking private business as a major political target for Party ideological work.

Two thoughts:
gov.cn/zhengce/2020-0… (2/x) First, the thrust of this is utterly clear: the private sector needs to toe the Party line, period.
教育引导民营经济人士用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑、指导实践，在政治立场、政治方向、政治原则、政治道路上同党中央保持高度一致，始终做政治上的明白人

(1/x) Extended paen to Xi Jinping on @PDChina pg. 3 today. Very flowery language (see below). Note people’s leader (人民领袖) language.

Best guess: maneuvering surrounding Party conferences + question of whether to elevate Xi yet closer to Mao's status.
politics.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0813/c… (2/x) 习近平总书记是从人民中走出来的、对人民怀有真挚感情和强烈责任感的人民领袖，无论是在基层、地方工作，还是在中央工作，都始终把人民挂在心头、念在心里。

(1/x) Really worth starting to think through the Hong Kong - Xinjiang comparison for understanding why what might be coming down the pike in Hong Kong could be much more severe than people expect.

A thread ... (2/x) It’s easy to think that Hong Kong & Xinjiang are just two totally different issues. One, a cosmopolitan global city with a primarily Han population. The other, a heavily rural Central Asian region with a large Muslim population (Uighurs being the most well known minority).

@lingli_vienna (1/x) The primary way I can imagine Xi’s power getting expanded is a scenario in which the institution of “the Party” itself begins to get cannibalized in name of Xi himself.

[Note: really dark. Major implications for political instability. But I think we’re in that zone now.] @lingli_vienna (2/x) I can imagine two ways in which this might happen.

First, resort to bottom-up mobilization. That’s the Cultural Revolution analogy. You’d need to see the top leader calling the disgruntled in society into the streets to attack his enemies – perceived or real.

(1/x) Some thoughts on why Xi Jinping's new article in the flagship CCP Party ideological journal Qiushi is a *big* deal.

h/t to @niubi, who flagged this in his Sinocism newsletter.

qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-… (2/x) First, because Party propaganda says it is.

It’s the lead article on all China’s major state media channels right now – CCTV evening news, Xinhua, People’s Daily, etc. Everywhere.

(1/x) There’s deep controversy in the U.S. and Europe over wearing face masks – their merit and accompanying social norms.

Here’s a thread on a specific example from Taiwan on why they’re a very good idea – particularly as some countries and states start re-opening. (2/x) Overall, Taiwan's response to the virus has outstanding.

It moved EARLY, w/expert-led epidemic control center set up in Jan. – *before* Wuhan even locked down. Contact tracing & effective quarantine policies of both infected & close contacts worked out in Feb. And so on..

(1/x) Now that advice in the West has finally shifted on wearing masks, can people please focus on the *other* anti-virus strategy that has made a big difference in Asia: central quarantine of the infected - particularly the lightly ill? (2/x) In Wuhan, the city-wide lockdown helped *slow down* increase in #s of infections. (see @XihongLin paper). Exactly what may be happening in NYC now.

But sending sick people home to families in small apartments ensures *rising* household infections.

medrxiv.org/content/10.110…

(1/x) Large swaths of USA now adopting extensive lockdown orders paralleling those in Wuhan.

But Wuhan's response had another crucial element: central quarantine.

Read this for a crazy, only-in-New York idea for how to break the epidemic. Perhaps useful for others too. (2/x) Note: my only expertise is as a China specialist who was in Shanghai in January, is currently in Taipei, and has watched this play out in country after country since.

If there’s any merit to this idea, actual public health specialists, please tear out whatever is useful.

(1/x) Many friends & family in U.S. now seem to be entering the freakout stage of the epidemic I remember from late January/early February in China, when case # starting spiking, and people suddenly saw their day-to-day lives change dramatically.

FWIW, here's what I tell them: (2/x) Yes, case # will dramatically rise over coming weeks. That does *not* indicate current responses are failing.

It is because:
a) Many undetected cases
b) Testing getting better
c) Because as of 3 days ago, people still doing stupid stuff like packing into bars & beaches.