Datar reads out the excerpts from the Supreme Court's 2019 judgment where the 2017 Rules were strick down and the SC had directed for the new set of Rules to be framed that would be in line with the SC's guidelines laid down in its precedents.
Datar: One thing unique about India is our SC has permitted judicial powers to be exercised by the Tribunals.
My argument in relation to National taxation tribunal was that core judicial power cannot be taken away from the Courts system.
Justice Nariman struck down NTT.
Datar: my humble submission is today for better or worse, we have accepted the fact that judicial functions can be exercised by Tribunals. But my prayer is that Centre must then ensure that these Tribunals then are as independent as possible
Datar: Some guidelines must be laid down to ensure that there is independence of these Tribunals that have now the power to exercise judicial functions.
Datar: SC has repeatedly said that Tribunals should not become havens for retired Judges... The idea that SC has repeatedly said that take young members should be considered.
Datar in his parting submissions requests Court to open up the opportunity for advocates which will also enable lady members of the Bar to be appointed in Tribunals and will help in improving representation aspect.
Senior Counsel Aryama Sundaram begins his submissions.
His submissions will touch upon
- Opportunity for lawyers to be appointed in Tribunals
- Restrospective vs prospective applicability of the Tribunal Rules
Sundaram: For the past 35 years lawyers have been eligible... If you want to make a departure from that, there must be some good reason. What is most telling is that even the 2017 Rules which were struck down did not disentitle lawyers.
Sundaram: The exclusion of lawyers has no nexus or connection with what is the purpose of the Tribunals.
To eliminate lawyers in a blanket manner is totally discriminatory especially when these Tribunals exercise the functions of what civil courts would have
Sundaram: The DRAT, NCLAT etc have taken away the jurisdiction from the HC and vested them in the Tribunals.
Your Lordships would look at these being equal to the normal Court system.
Sundaram: Through these enactments, control over judicial bodies has been given to the executive and this would impinge on the doctrine of judicial independence.
Sundaram: Do not just see this from the lens of Article 14. This violates the basic structure of our Constitution.
Justice Bhat: You have an analogy here, but it is an extreme one.
Sundaram: Your Lordships would look at it through the lens and when testing a legislation then look at it through a magnifying glass with regard to the independence of judiciary.
Justice Rao: We have a number of judgements here including Rojer Mathew where this aspect ha ls been considered.
(Sundaram is now taking the Court through a status report filed by Centre on vacancies in CAT)
Sundaram: Therefore, I submit that If your Lordships are to uphold the Rules, they cannot have retrospective effect and cannot make candidates ineligible who were earlier qualified.
Sundaram reads excerpts from the Madras Bar Association judgement of 2014 on tbe issue of qualification of candidates and for lawyers to be eligible
Sundaram: When the Constitution itself does not make a distinction between a lawyer or a judge being appointed to the superior judiciary then an enactment cannot bring in such a distinction for a lower level of courts/bodies.
Sundaram summarises:
- SC should view the enactment with the lens that it would use for examining any legislation that makes judicial inroads
- Rules are on the face of them prospective.
- Exclusion of Lawyers is arbitrary.
(Sundaram concludes his arguments)
Senior Counsel Siddharth Luthra now making submissions on behalf of a a candidate who had applied for being appointed in the CESAT under 2017 Rules which came to be struck down in 2019.
Justice Rao: We were discussing this earlier... There was interim order that any appointments that were made after Rojer Mathew judgment were to be regulated by the parent Act.
Luthra: They are treating my appointment as fresh appointment and this is what I'm agitating against also.
Justice Rao: Your entitlement b to pe sion may not be related.
Luthra: In terms of pension they are treating me as a fresh appointee and that is the problem
Luthra stresses that the Rules cannot be applied retrospectively.
(Luthra cites SC's precedents to support his case that the Rules in place at the time of the issuance of advertisement for vacancy should be applicable)
Justice Rao: What is your response on the requirement of 25 years experience for appointment to ITAT?
Khanna: When you're replacing the jurisdiction of a Court and vesting it in a Tribunal, you cannot prescribe a qualification that is different from Constitutional provisions.
Khanna concludes.
Senior Counsel Mukul Rohatgi begins his submissions on behalf of three judicial members of CESTAT.
Rohatgi: Under the Rules of 1987, members of ITAT and CESTAT go up to 62 years.
Rohatgi: There is an error coming because for all other Tribunals there is five years tenure but for ITAT and CESTAT it is five years or 62 years of age. As far as we (his clients) are concerned, it has to be 62.
Rohatgi: If a lawyer or a District Judge joins the Tribunal at 50 and after five years he is told that your tenure is over, he will lose out on everything. This will lead to absurdity.
Rohatgi: Even the interim relief which directed for all apointments to go back to parent Acts also reiterates my case.
(Rohatgi now cites the example of appointment of Justice Manjula Chellur as the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity)
Rohatgi: I think they have something against the lawyers. What is the point of saying that a lawyer with 10 years experience can be appointed a Judge of the High Court but cannot be appointed to these Tribunals.
Ultimately this is how the Bar grows, but lawyers are excluded.
Rohatgi: Today Your Lordships have extended the tenure of Justice Manmohan Singh... He's one of the most renowned in the arena of IP.
He has disposed of so many cases.
But he was not sure if his tenure is getting over.
Rohtagi: Justice Cheema (NCLAT) the other day said that "I will give you a date if I have time"
This is how Tribunals are functioning.
Rohtagi: If Tribunalisation has to happen and jurisdiction is taken from Courts and vested in Tribunals then it should be done gracefully.
What's the point of Madras Bar Association judgements 1, 2 and 3 saying judicial member is a must and after five years they are told to go.
Rohatgi concludes.
Senior Advocate AS Chandhiok making a case of members of the NCLAT who are due to retire in the next thirty days.
Justice Rao indicates that the judgement on this case can be expected in two weeks so matter can be dealt with thereafter.
Senior Advocate CS Vaidyanathan made brief submissions on behalf of an applicant on the aspect of tenure of members being four years.
Senior Advocate Gautam Misra argues in a transfer petition.
Misra is referring to the SC judgment in the RK Jain case of 1994 which appreciates the "invaluable and vital role" of the Bar in being capable of discharging judicial services.
Misra: RK Jain judgment was considered and relied on in the Rojer Mathew judgment.
Point is that executive would be bound by RK Jain judgment.
Misra: If all these are considered, then there js no way Advocates can be excluded.
By bringing in the Rules through an executive action they have tried to take away the effect of legislative provisions which make lawyers eligible.
Misra concludes.
Senior Advocate S Guru Krishnakumar for intervenors argues that if the Court upholds the Rules, then okay but should the Rules be struck down then the matter considering IPAB should be considered separately.
Chitambaresh argues that the interim order which ordered for apointments to go back to parent Act was modified later to say that the appointments after 2017 Rules were struck down to be governed by the advertisment issued.
Senior Counsel C Nageswar Rao argues on behalf of applicants in relation to CESTAT.
His sole point is that the new Rules should be made applicable to his client also.
Book launch: “The Constitution is my home” by Senior Advocate Indira Jaising.
CJI Surya Kant and Justice BV Nagarathna to shortly address the event.
Sr. Adv. Indira Jaising: CJI told me that has has been called out by the Prime Minister in relation to the BRICS judicial forum meeting.
Jaising’s discussion with senior journalist Sreenivasan Jain:
Jaising: the constitution is very personal home. In this country, the first question everyone asks is “Where are you from?” I found the answer. I said to myself I belong to the constitution of India.
Jaising: all governments regardless with which party they belong to have tried to shake the foundation of the constitution. The first time we saw it is when the emergency was declared. Currently also I believe that the constitution is under threat.
Court: the court has had detailed interaction with the parties. Today it considered what would be the immediate next step in the exercise undertaken in the present proceedings so as to take some real, effective steps on the ground.
Stray dogs case: Supreme Court to shortly pronounce verdict in its suo motu case to manage stray dog population across the country.
Bench: Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, and NV Anjaria
The Court had reserved its verdict on January 29 after hearing the final leg of submissions made by various States, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI).
Court: we have divided the judgement into theee parts. We have given detailed consideration to applications seeking recall of Nov 7 judgement. We have dismissed all the applications.
Court: In para 85 we have concluded- this courts finds no reason to interfere with the Nov SOP by AWBI. The challenge does not merit acceptance in the light of conclusions herein above. All IAs challenging the SoPs stands dismissed.
BCI Chairman, Senior Advocate Manan Kumar Mishra requests CJI led bench to constitute another
High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee similar to the one headed by former Supreme Court Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia to oversee bar council election disputes
#SupremeCourt
Sr Adv Kumud Lata Das: Let BCI not be a member of this committee.
Mishra: this is very very bad
Das: Don't raise your voice against me. You only want to make the women members subservient to you. Please don't shout at me. You are virtually a permanent chairman..from 2010 to 2026 you are the only one who can become the BCI Chairman
Mishra: these are absurd allegations.
CJI: We are constituting two more election tribunals.
Supreme Court today to pronounce judgment in a narco-terror case from J&K, where the accused has spent nearly five years in custody despite no contraband being recovered directly from him
#SupremeCourt
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan: this case raises an important question concerning the interface between Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. More particularly, the issue concerns the propriety of smaller benches progressively hollowing out the constitutional force of a larger bench decision without ever expressly disagreeing with it.
Then, after narrating the facts and the submissions, and also referring to two judgments in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and gumfisha Fatima v. State, we have said in para 26:
There are two judgments of this Court which we need to deal with before proceeding ahead. These two judgments, Gurwinder Singh and gulfisha Fatima, have taken a somewhat divergent view from the clear, distinctive trajectory taken by this Court for grant of bail even under special enactments like TADA, UAPA, and NDPS.
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan: A decision made by a bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by a bench of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such binding precedent must either be followed in full, or in case of doubt, be referred to a larger bench. A smaller bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger bench.
The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sheikh Javed Iqbal is therefore clear. Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAPA.
For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in gurminder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant.
We also note that the bench in Gurwinder formulated the so-called twin-prong test governing grant of bail under the UAPA. It held that inquiry under Section 43D(5) must proceed in two sequential stages. First, whether the accusation is prima facie true, and second, only if the first question is answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary bail considerations such as flight risk, etc. would justify the relief. If the first stage of the twin-prong test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes absolutely impermissible.
With respect, this test flows neither from the text of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA Act, nor from Najeeb. In fact, on the contrary, it is in the case of Najeeb where it is categorically stated that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA Act provides no more than another possible ground, namely, that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true, for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like possibility of tampering with evidence, etc.
SG Tushar Mehta: CBI appeal is listed before the Delhi High Court
Sr Adv N Hariharan: I am in the position to show that the prosecutrix is not a minor. The AIIMS board says she was not a minor. All reports are in his favour still he is in jail.
SG: The main conviction is under 376(1) IPC for remainder of his life
CJI: Prayer was only to suspend the sentence. There are issues which require consideration.
SG: it has to be seen whether MLA is a public servant for the POCSO
Justice Bagchi: we do not endorse the hyper technical conclusion of the high court. This is a penal legislation which protects children from sexual exploitation.. section 21 of IPC and prevention of corruption of act..
SG: MLA is in a dominant position.
CJI: HC has suspended the sentence. We have stayed by it. Now there is suspense whether order is illegal, erroneous etc. Now in this area..HC will be reluctant to hear the main appeal.
CJI: we can set aside the order. HC can decide the appeal or if it's taking time .HC can decide the application for suspension of sentence.