Tom Shugart Profile picture
Sep 16, 2020 17 tweets 5 min read Read on X
A few thoughts on tonnage:

There's been wide discussion recently on the size of the Chinese Navy, largely driven by a recent DoD report's statement that the PLA Navy is now the "largest navy in the world" on the basis of its number of ships. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…
If you haven't been paying attention, the PLA Navy is engaged in a naval buildup the likes of which hasn't been seen in quite some time. In fact, the last time any nation build this many warships, and this fast, was during the legendary US "600-ship Navy" buildup of the 1980s.
China's recent buildup is, indeed, comparable in terms of the numbers of ships. As an example, during the years 1982-1986, the USN procured 86 warships, resulting in the the USN's fleet count peaking at the end of that decade. news.usni.org/2020/05/06/rep…
Since we don't have a way (that I know of) to track PLAN warship procurement, we can instead track launches, which are visible via satellite imagery and thus available in open sources.

So, how many warships did China launch over the last 5 calendar years?

By my count: 86
Now, many commentators have pointed out - not incorrectly - that the PLAN's ships are on average much smaller than those of the USN; that the USN remains much larger in terms of its tonnage - the sheer heft of the force as measured, essentially, by its weight.
Assuming that combat power has a somewhat comparable density among modern warships, tonnage would, indeed, perhaps be a better measure than the sheer number of hulls.

So let's take a look at the tonnage of recently built warships, instead.
For the count, I again focused on warships actually launched from 2015-2019. By "warships", I included ships useful in high intensity combat or major power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, & ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers).
I did not include patrol craft, mine warfare vessels, or ships focused on low-intensity operations (e.g., Expeditionary Staging Bases).

"Tonnage" was measured as full load displacement, in tonnes (i.e., metric tons, most data coming from Janes), times number of hulls launched.
The result: by my count, over the years 2015-2019, the Chinese navy launched almost 600,000 tons of warships, the U.S. Navy, just under 400,000 tons.

Bear in mind, as well, that the US total includes about 80,000 tons of the somewhat controversial LCS and DDG-1000 classes.
It's worth considering too that the USN has worldwide responsibilities - with roughly 60% of forces allocated to the Pacific - unlike (for now) the PLA Navy. By that measure, new US warships available for the Pacific might be closer to 200,000 tons.
But, ah, some would say: the US has allies and partners (e.g., "the Quad") across the Indo-Pacific, and China has few. Our combined maritime power will continue to dwarf the PLAN!

The Quad's shipbuilding tonnage (w/ the US Pacific Fleet's allocation)? A little over 400,000 tons.
As ally/partner nation policymakers consider the rise of the PLAN, & whether to support basing missiles on their territory, they might want to consider this: the combined tonnage launched by the main non-US Indo-Pacific navies? Less than 300,000 tons.
Given that the PLAN is a unitary force and that coalitions introduce natural inefficiencies (esp. with deep-seated mistrust among some of these nations), what seems clear to me is that were the US to be driven from the region, or to reduce its commitments due to lack of support..
...the likely result would be domination of maritime Asia by the PLAN (particularly when combined with the anti-ship firepower of the PLA Rocket Force).

With the great dependence on trade by sea that almost all of these regional countries share...
...and the already-demonstrated willingness of the PRC to engage in coercive diplomacy, all concerned should understand these facts when making assessments about their willingness to make investments and support close and coordinated action among the US and other regional allies.
In summary:

Fin.
Here's a re-do of the tonnage figure from above, seemed to come out with the background a bit off:

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More from @tshugart3

Dec 20
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.

Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 4 tweets
Dec 19
A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t…
As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time: Image
Looking for a nice anti-ship ballistic missile? The PLA now has five flavors: the OG DF-21D, DF-26, DF-17, YJ-21, and now the DF-27. Image
Read 6 tweets
Dec 19
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ Image
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization). Image
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.

Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
Read 16 tweets
Dec 19
Moving on, here's part 2 of this thread on the 2024 China Military Power report.

First up, the PLA Rocket Force, which is where IMO biggest news resides.
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.

Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK. Image
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?). Image
Read 17 tweets
Dec 19
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).

I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.

(part 1) Image
In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).

The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
For comparisons between the 2024 and 2023 reports, this year's report will be on the left, last year's on the right.

First up: total numbers. The PLA remains the largest active-duty military in the world, though some numbers dropped a bit due to a change in counting methods. Image
Image
Read 20 tweets
Sep 27
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.
Read 7 tweets

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