Tom Shugart Profile picture
Sep 16, 2020 17 tweets 5 min read Read on X
A few thoughts on tonnage:

There's been wide discussion recently on the size of the Chinese Navy, largely driven by a recent DoD report's statement that the PLA Navy is now the "largest navy in the world" on the basis of its number of ships. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…
If you haven't been paying attention, the PLA Navy is engaged in a naval buildup the likes of which hasn't been seen in quite some time. In fact, the last time any nation build this many warships, and this fast, was during the legendary US "600-ship Navy" buildup of the 1980s.
China's recent buildup is, indeed, comparable in terms of the numbers of ships. As an example, during the years 1982-1986, the USN procured 86 warships, resulting in the the USN's fleet count peaking at the end of that decade. news.usni.org/2020/05/06/rep…
Since we don't have a way (that I know of) to track PLAN warship procurement, we can instead track launches, which are visible via satellite imagery and thus available in open sources.

So, how many warships did China launch over the last 5 calendar years?

By my count: 86
Now, many commentators have pointed out - not incorrectly - that the PLAN's ships are on average much smaller than those of the USN; that the USN remains much larger in terms of its tonnage - the sheer heft of the force as measured, essentially, by its weight.
Assuming that combat power has a somewhat comparable density among modern warships, tonnage would, indeed, perhaps be a better measure than the sheer number of hulls.

So let's take a look at the tonnage of recently built warships, instead.
For the count, I again focused on warships actually launched from 2015-2019. By "warships", I included ships useful in high intensity combat or major power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, & ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers).
I did not include patrol craft, mine warfare vessels, or ships focused on low-intensity operations (e.g., Expeditionary Staging Bases).

"Tonnage" was measured as full load displacement, in tonnes (i.e., metric tons, most data coming from Janes), times number of hulls launched.
The result: by my count, over the years 2015-2019, the Chinese navy launched almost 600,000 tons of warships, the U.S. Navy, just under 400,000 tons.

Bear in mind, as well, that the US total includes about 80,000 tons of the somewhat controversial LCS and DDG-1000 classes.
It's worth considering too that the USN has worldwide responsibilities - with roughly 60% of forces allocated to the Pacific - unlike (for now) the PLA Navy. By that measure, new US warships available for the Pacific might be closer to 200,000 tons.
But, ah, some would say: the US has allies and partners (e.g., "the Quad") across the Indo-Pacific, and China has few. Our combined maritime power will continue to dwarf the PLAN!

The Quad's shipbuilding tonnage (w/ the US Pacific Fleet's allocation)? A little over 400,000 tons.
As ally/partner nation policymakers consider the rise of the PLAN, & whether to support basing missiles on their territory, they might want to consider this: the combined tonnage launched by the main non-US Indo-Pacific navies? Less than 300,000 tons.
Given that the PLAN is a unitary force and that coalitions introduce natural inefficiencies (esp. with deep-seated mistrust among some of these nations), what seems clear to me is that were the US to be driven from the region, or to reduce its commitments due to lack of support..
...the likely result would be domination of maritime Asia by the PLAN (particularly when combined with the anti-ship firepower of the PLA Rocket Force).

With the great dependence on trade by sea that almost all of these regional countries share...
...and the already-demonstrated willingness of the PRC to engage in coercive diplomacy, all concerned should understand these facts when making assessments about their willingness to make investments and support close and coordinated action among the US and other regional allies.
In summary:

Fin.
Here's a re-do of the tonnage figure from above, seemed to come out with the background a bit off:

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More from @tshugart3

Apr 18
A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1. Image
This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.
On the topic of SLCM-N, he gives a full-throated endorsement. Of note, this is not the STRATCOM commander, but the theater commander that might actually need to use something like this (or have it to deter the other side's use of something similar). Image
Read 13 tweets
Mar 20
Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/
@ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways. Image
@ChinaMaritime Next, we found patents for these or similar barges in filings from several years ago. In other words, this project has been in the works for a while now - not a reaction to the 2022 Pelosi visit, or the DPP's election win, etc. (not that I ever thought it was). Image
Image
Read 9 tweets
Mar 13
UPDATE: three of the PRC's new landing ships (I called them T-LPTs) have left the GSI Longxue shipyard. 🚨🚨🚨
In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).

As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction. Image
Image
Image
After seeing the departure of these vessels, I went back & observed AIS data to see if the vessels were using AIS.
What I saw was indications of tugs getting these ships underway, but no AIS from the ships themselves, unlike other commercial vessels.
marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
Read 10 tweets
Feb 13
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: Image
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ ChinaImage
Read 40 tweets
Feb 12
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with ChinaImage
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
Read 37 tweets
Feb 1
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Read 7 tweets

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