There's been wide discussion recently on the size of the Chinese Navy, largely driven by a recent DoD report's statement that the PLA Navy is now the "largest navy in the world" on the basis of its number of ships. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…
If you haven't been paying attention, the PLA Navy is engaged in a naval buildup the likes of which hasn't been seen in quite some time. In fact, the last time any nation build this many warships, and this fast, was during the legendary US "600-ship Navy" buildup of the 1980s.
China's recent buildup is, indeed, comparable in terms of the numbers of ships. As an example, during the years 1982-1986, the USN procured 86 warships, resulting in the the USN's fleet count peaking at the end of that decade. news.usni.org/2020/05/06/rep…
Since we don't have a way (that I know of) to track PLAN warship procurement, we can instead track launches, which are visible via satellite imagery and thus available in open sources.
So, how many warships did China launch over the last 5 calendar years?
By my count: 86
Now, many commentators have pointed out - not incorrectly - that the PLAN's ships are on average much smaller than those of the USN; that the USN remains much larger in terms of its tonnage - the sheer heft of the force as measured, essentially, by its weight.
Assuming that combat power has a somewhat comparable density among modern warships, tonnage would, indeed, perhaps be a better measure than the sheer number of hulls.
So let's take a look at the tonnage of recently built warships, instead.
For the count, I again focused on warships actually launched from 2015-2019. By "warships", I included ships useful in high intensity combat or major power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, & ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers).
I did not include patrol craft, mine warfare vessels, or ships focused on low-intensity operations (e.g., Expeditionary Staging Bases).
"Tonnage" was measured as full load displacement, in tonnes (i.e., metric tons, most data coming from Janes), times number of hulls launched.
The result: by my count, over the years 2015-2019, the Chinese navy launched almost 600,000 tons of warships, the U.S. Navy, just under 400,000 tons.
Bear in mind, as well, that the US total includes about 80,000 tons of the somewhat controversial LCS and DDG-1000 classes.
It's worth considering too that the USN has worldwide responsibilities - with roughly 60% of forces allocated to the Pacific - unlike (for now) the PLA Navy. By that measure, new US warships available for the Pacific might be closer to 200,000 tons.
But, ah, some would say: the US has allies and partners (e.g., "the Quad") across the Indo-Pacific, and China has few. Our combined maritime power will continue to dwarf the PLAN!
The Quad's shipbuilding tonnage (w/ the US Pacific Fleet's allocation)? A little over 400,000 tons.
As ally/partner nation policymakers consider the rise of the PLAN, & whether to support basing missiles on their territory, they might want to consider this: the combined tonnage launched by the main non-US Indo-Pacific navies? Less than 300,000 tons.
Given that the PLAN is a unitary force and that coalitions introduce natural inefficiencies (esp. with deep-seated mistrust among some of these nations), what seems clear to me is that were the US to be driven from the region, or to reduce its commitments due to lack of support..
...the likely result would be domination of maritime Asia by the PLAN (particularly when combined with the anti-ship firepower of the PLA Rocket Force).
With the great dependence on trade by sea that almost all of these regional countries share...
...and the already-demonstrated willingness of the PRC to engage in coercive diplomacy, all concerned should understand these facts when making assessments about their willingness to make investments and support close and coordinated action among the US and other regional allies.
In summary:
Fin.
Here's a re-do of the tonnage figure from above, seemed to come out with the background a bit off:
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Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.
These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.
First, let’s look at hull count. By my estimate, the PLAN launched 157 warships over the years 2014-2023. As always, these numbers are from open source data for ship launches which China doesn't always publicize, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. 🤷♂️
UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.
So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯
There have been rumors in the media that this new yard would start construction of a new class of amphibious assault ship - the Type 076. And it looks like that might well be the case. scmp.com/news/china/mil…
This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my…
That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them.
Let's look at the evidence he puts forward in support of Myth 1. First, there's the primary link describing the them...
Oops, broken link!
Now, this happens. Authors can't control web site changes. (Most links for my older articles are broken.) But this article is 1 day old. 🤷♂️
Let’s get straight into the top-line numbers. The report shows major increases in every category of China’s long range missiles.
Fielded ICBM launchers jump from 300 to 500, and the number of missiles goes up from 300 to 350 (I guess they haven’t filled all those silos yet).
While the number of launchers stays the same, the estimate of the number of intermediate-range missiles (i.e., the “Guam Killers”) goes from a somewhat vague “250+” to a solid 500.
This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).
While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).
We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.
UPDATE: three of the Bo Hai ferries: Bo Hai Cui Zhu, Heng Da, and Bao Zhu; are now at what appears to be an industrial wharf in Xiamen, across the Strait from Taiwan. My guess is they're doing on-load/off-load ops for a PLA operation/exercise of some sort.
Bo Hai Fei Zhu appears to be at anchor off a beach just southwest of Xiamen. This is consistent with previous exercises that practiced amphibious landing operations at similar beaches nearby.
Bo Hai Jin Zhu is now broadcasting a destination that I think is supposed to be Yantai, back north on the Yellow Sea, so it may be heading home.