Thread: I blocked two people last evening because I saw them discussing whether Palestinians should pursue "armed struggle"...I felt bad, but they aren't Palestinian, and I find it macabre for people to discuss others engaging in war that can harm civilians so cavalierly
One of the entitled notions of discussing the "conflict" in the West has tended to empower people to feel that they can discuss the lives of people in the Middle East using what seem like sterile terms such as "armed struggle" without admitting what they are discussing.
The people discussing the "armed struggle" don't pay any of the consequences, so for instance they won't live under curfew or rocket fire or sirens or tanks in the street. That feels to me like colonialism. Colonizing someone else's "conflict" to encourage suffering
If Palestinians want to discuss what approaches they should have towards Israel or the region, great. But when people relaxing in NY or London want to discuss how there should be "one state" or "armed struggle" without listening to people in Ramallah or Jerusalem, it's colonial
The only people who can decide if they want one state are the people living in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. They are the ones who must take responsibility and face consequences for such a decision. No one else gets to decide that for them.
Almost everyone in the West who talks about one state (and I've heard this since University in 1998) never listens to anyone from Gaza or Ramallah, Jerusalem of Tel Aviv, Yatta or Kiryat Gat. They never listen, they just tell others about a state. That's colonial.
People of course can take an interest in the Israel-Palestinian conflict and learn about it, and discuss it. But doing so without ever including voices from the region and discussing what people should do is arrogant and misplaced. Certainly mentioning "armed struggle" is gross
If you want to be honest about "armed struggle" call it "war" because it is war. And then admit that what you're talking about is rocket fire on civilians, bus bombings, checkpoints, tanks in the streets, drone strikes, and suffering for everyone involved.
I believe I have some knowledge of the conflict because I have lived in Jerusalem for 16 years and taught at a Palestinian university for five years and covered three Gaza wars and other incidents. But still I have a lot to learn and know. If I have a lot to learn, imagine others
You never see any recognition by those sitting abroad that "we should listen to Palestinians and Israelis," you just hear total arrogance of "Palestinians will have to do X"...just like John Kerry always predicting an "explosion" of violence, without listening to anyone.
For too long the Israel-Palestinian conflict was a plaything, which catered to neo-colonial tendencies. It was this inviting "instant expertise" in the "conflict" that enabled generations of people to say "what is best" for people in Jerusalem and Ramallah, without listening
That's why you have panels where three non-Palestinians will discuss a "one state"...and no one raises their hand and says "umm, how come there are no Israelis or Palestinians on your panel." Colonial.
I guess I'm a bit sensitive because I spent almost 10 years covering war and refugees and I think one needs to have a bit of respect for locals before talking about them being plunged into another conflict that most of them don't want. And I rarely hear that respect.
I remember that one formative experience for me was the 2014 Laylat al-Qadr ( لیلة القدر) clashes at Qalandiah, so when people relax and talk about "armed struggle", they need to listen to those who saw it first hand sethfrantzman.com/2014/07/26/lay…
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There is a lot of talk today about sheikhs in Hebron who want to for an "emirate" of Hebron. This is being greeted by some as a positive initiative. Let's take a look at the claims and also what the results could be.
First, the context. Israel is engaged in a 637 day war in Gaza against Hamas. Hamas still controls around 40 percent of Gaza. In Gaza, Israel has backed an initiative to have armed militias involved in some activities in the rest of Gaza. There is one named commander, Abu Shabab (not his real name obviously) and there are rumored to be others.
Some see this as a wise decision to have multiple armed gangs and militias run a post-war Gaza. Israel's current government opposes having the PA run Gaza, so the theory is that armed militias fighting eachother and Hamas is a good future.
In the West Bank the PA has been relatively successful at ruling Palestinian cities and towns for thirty years. However, Israel's current government includes parties that oppose the PA. The PA leader Mahmoud Abbas is aging and there is talk of what comes next.
Israel's Ynet says IDF possibly "preparing for a new phase in its campaign against Hamas on Sunday, as heavy airstrikes pounded northern Gaza and military officials weighed a deeper ground maneuver, potentially including a renewed incursion into Gaza City."
Is this the third "new phase" since March 2025? There was one that began on March 1 after the ceasefire fell apart; it truly began on March 18...then another one began after May 5 with Gideon's Chariots. Now, it's June 29...and yet another.
What the report says is a "deeper" maneuver...the IDF has spent the last months basically re-taking buffer areas around Gaza, leaving Hamas in charge of the central camps and Gaza city. 632 days of war and the IDF basically never went into parts of Gaza city or the central camps.
I remember having a conversation with someone a year ago and I'd said that the IDF still needs to defeat Hamas and remove it. They said "but hasn't Israel taken all of Gaza and defeated Hamas"...I had to remind them that, no...the Israeli offensive always leaves Hamas in charge of around half of Gaza. And it's the same a year later.
Iran's targeting of Qatar appears counter intuitive because Doha has generally been the most friendly country toward Tehran in the Gulf. Unlike the tensions that have existed between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the past with Iran; and to a lesser extent the UAE; Doha is close to Iran. Al-Udeid US base in Qatar is also just one of MANY US bases in the Gulf; there is also the naval facility in Bahrain, and al-Dhafra in the UAE and sites in Kuwait.
However, on the other hand Iran may assume it has enough political capital built up with Doha, and also cooperation with them in the energy sector; that Iran can do this and climb down after. If Iran focused on Saudi Arabia it could harm the fragile Beijing brokered new relations with Riyadh; it if targeted the UAE this could cause a crisis; also Bahrain could lead to a crisis.
Doha is therefore the least obvious choice. Iran could have targeted Al-Asad base in Iraq, or US bases in Syria, or in the KRG or US naval ships, or many other locations. However, Tehran may have assumed Doha is a kind of safe bet. It could tell Doha before hand what it would do, then there will be a formal complaint but maybe this leads to a deal brokered by Doha and Ankara?
What happened to the Iranian hardliners? Remember back in the era before the JCPOA and also after we were always told that it was important to "empower" the "moderates" in Iran's regime and that if we didn't do everything the regime wanted then the "hardliners" would be empowered? What happened to this fiction?
The narrative of hardliners and moderates was obviously a transparent nonsense designed to cater to the West's need to feel that it can "do X and then Iran will be happy and do Y"...it was sold to the West in a nice package and hundreds of opeds in Western media and commentators employed this paradigm to explain Iran
Notice how Iran's regime never felt it needed to "empower moderates in the US"...or that its behavior, such as attacking Saudi Arabia or Israel or other countries would "empower hardliners." Iran never had to sell itself this fiction because this was a talking point cooked up in the West, probably at a focus-group decades ago, as a way to sell the West, and especially the US, a mythical Iran policy.
In February 2019 Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, who was then the second-in-command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that if a war with Israel took place, then it "will result in Israel’s defeat within three days."