The pro-Houthi griftersphere is fascinating. It’s solely made up of people who had never heard of the Houthis before October 7, 2023. They were then operationalized, or self-operationalized to suddenly back a group they knew nothing about in a country they never heard about and couldn’t locate on a map; solely because the group claimed to be fighting Israel in the name of Gaza. They adopted the cause of the Houthis, who they often confusingly claim is the government of Yemen (the Houthis are not the government); and now they are all aping eachother like leap frog to one-up how much they back “Yemen” and its “Prime Minister” after Israel targeted the Iran-backed Houthi government.

There isn’t a lone voice among these folk who cared about the Yemen civil war before 2023. It’s just people that adopted this cause and then accept any Houthi slop they are fed.

You could make up a group and claim it is fighting Israel “for Gaza” and these grifters would back it. “The Abjababians are fighting Israel to stop the Gaza war” and the next day you’d have 100 “influencers” very passionate about the Abjababians and their leader General Landocjabr…any random thing you could completely make up…put some AI slop on it and they’d consume it I don’t know if griftersphere is a word, but I’m happy to coin it and will use it more often. It is the most appropriate word for the phenomenon of these folk.

I found this CNN article about Gaza city interesting because of the elephant in the room. It tells the tale of a city that was once thriving and is now a chaos of war and tragedy.

But what seems to be missing in the larger discussion is why Hamas purposely risked all this to commit the genocidal Oct. 7 attack; Hamas would have known that murdering 1,000 people and taking 250 hostage would result in a long war of destruction. They purposely set out to destroy Gaza city. "you could still get a matcha latte on the way to a yoga studio, or relax in a park."

So shouldn't someone hold Hamas to account for having destroyed all this?

I'm fascinated and saddened every time I see a news story about Hamas in Gaza, such as the recent statements about EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas speaking with her Israelis counterpart and discussing Hamas in Gaza. It always shocks me that after 655 days of war that Hamas continues to control part of Gaza and negotiate to return to control most of it. The existence of Hamas in Gaza shouldn't even be a discussion today. It shouldn't be there. But it is. It is unclear if Hamas will be removed from Gaza. If it is to be removed there doesn't appear to be a clear roadmap for doing so. This lack of a process is part of the wider series of missteps and challenges that plagued the war for 21 months. It's fascinating that despite murdering more than 1,000 people on October 7 and kidnapping 250; that decisions were made in the early months of the war that would result in keeping Hamas in power. Instead of being laser focused on removing Hamas, so Israelis wouldn't be kidnapped again, so they wouldn't be massacred again; the war was treated as another round in Gaza, another 2006, 2009, 2014. In fact, the plans for the offensive in Gaza were almost identical to past raids. The concept: Go into part of Gaza city or Khan Younis, uproot some tunnels; and then leave. Go into the Philadelphi corridor, clear it out and then negotiate over leaving it.

There is a lot of talk today about sheikhs in Hebron who want to for an "emirate" of Hebron. This is being greeted by some as a positive initiative. Let's take a look at the claims and also what the results could be. First, the context. Israel is engaged in a 637 day war in Gaza against Hamas. Hamas still controls around 40 percent of Gaza. In Gaza, Israel has backed an initiative to have armed militias involved in some activities in the rest of Gaza. There is one named commander, Abu Shabab (not his real name obviously) and there are rumored to be others.

Some see this as a wise decision to have multiple armed gangs and militias run a post-war Gaza. Israel's current government opposes having the PA run Gaza, so the theory is that armed militias fighting eachother and Hamas is a good future.

Israel's Ynet says IDF possibly "preparing for a new phase in its campaign against Hamas on Sunday, as heavy airstrikes pounded northern Gaza and military officials weighed a deeper ground maneuver, potentially including a renewed incursion into Gaza City."

Is this the third "new phase" since March 2025? There was one that began on March 1 after the ceasefire fell apart; it truly began on March 18...then another one began after May 5 with Gideon's Chariots. Now, it's June 29...and yet another. What the report says is a "deeper" maneuver...the IDF has spent the last months basically re-taking buffer areas around Gaza, leaving Hamas in charge of the central camps and Gaza city. 632 days of war and the IDF basically never went into parts of Gaza city or the central camps.

Iran's targeting of Qatar appears counter intuitive because Doha has generally been the most friendly country toward Tehran in the Gulf. Unlike the tensions that have existed between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the past with Iran; and to a lesser extent the UAE; Doha is close to Iran. Al-Udeid US base in Qatar is also just one of MANY US bases in the Gulf; there is also the naval facility in Bahrain, and al-Dhafra in the UAE and sites in Kuwait. However, on the other hand Iran may assume it has enough political capital built up with Doha, and also cooperation with them in the energy sector; that Iran can do this and climb down after. If Iran focused on Saudi Arabia it could harm the fragile Beijing brokered new relations with Riyadh; it if targeted the UAE this could cause a crisis; also Bahrain could lead to a crisis.

What happened to the Iranian hardliners? Remember back in the era before the JCPOA and also after we were always told that it was important to "empower" the "moderates" in Iran's regime and that if we didn't do everything the regime wanted then the "hardliners" would be empowered? What happened to this fiction? The narrative of hardliners and moderates was obviously a transparent nonsense designed to cater to the West's need to feel that it can "do X and then Iran will be happy and do Y"...it was sold to the West in a nice package and hundreds of opeds in Western media and commentators employed this paradigm to explain Iran

The data behind the attack according to Israeli media, around 200 warplanes using 330 munitions against 100 targets Compare to a recent strike on the Houthis which was 20-30 warplanes and 50 munitions

In February 2019 Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, who was then the second-in-command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that if a war with Israel took place, then it "will result in Israel’s defeat within three days."

https://twitter.com/HibaNasr/status/1933341192978379184

Salami made a lot of predictions.

In the wake of Israel's initial strikes on Iran. What ways might Iran choose to respond. Iran is in a complex situation because it had been working toward a deal with the US, but it also has been dealing with the recent IAEA censure. Iran has to weigh whether it responds in a kind of "tit-for-tat" as it did in 2024, where it launched ballistic missiles and drones; or if it escalates, or try to find another method. Here are some ways it might respond. Diplomatically

Iran saw the overwhelming UN vote for a ceasefire in Gaza on June 12. It may think that it can play the victim now and leverage the Israeli attacks for its benefit.

Iran has invested heavily in diplomacy in recent years. It has worked on closer ties with Russia and China. It has strong ties with Pakistan and decent ties with India. It has joined economic blocs such as BRICS and the SCO. As such Iran is well positioned to use diplomacy against Israel. Iran has better ties with the Gulf than in the past and also close ties with both Turkey and Qatar, who are US allies. Iran’s foreign minister has travelled frequently in the region and was in Oslo on June 11.

Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz immediately declares a special state of emergency in the home front throughout the entire State of Israel:

“Following the State of Israel's preemptive strike against Iran, a missile and drone attack against the State of Israel and its civilian population is expected in the immediate future. Therefore, and in accordance with his authority under the Civil Defense Law, Defense Minister Israel Katz has now signed a special order, according to which a special state of emergency will be imposed in the home front throughout the entire State of Israel.” His office said “You must obey the instructions of the Home Front Command and the authorities and remain in the protected areas.”

Why did CNN deel the need to put "peaceful" in quotes. The idea is to make it seem that there is a question as to whether it was peaceful. Note that the article doesn't say anything about the man's statements. It does say "The source stressed potential mental health concerns have not yet been ruled out, which could factor into any charging decision."

They don't do reporting on the actual event, they try to make it seem as if it being "peaceful" is a controversial issue; but then do no reporting about what the suspect said.

The emerging story in Gaza is that the new aid distribution is beginning. I will share some more posts and thoughts as this develops below 🧵

https://twitter.com/amichaistein1/status/1927340187085861123

Images of people walking to get aid apparently

https://twitter.com/jewishwarrior13/status/1927338718102221142

I've been thinking about the remnants of the Hamas leadership, who almost all seem to live abroad. Two Hamas officials went to Iran this week and talked tough about continuing the war. This is a war they don't experience. They want Gaza destroyed while they live abroad. Most of these men are in their 60s or older. Key Hamas leaders today include: Mohammed Zahar born in 1945, Mousa Abu Marzouk was born in 1951, Khaled Meshaal was born in 1956, Khalil al-Hayya was born in 1960, Fathi Hamad in 1961, Basem Naim was born in 1963, Ghazi Hamid in 1964, Osama Hamdan was born in 1965, Husam Badran in 1966 and Zahar Jabarin in 1968.

One of the elements to pay attention to in Israel’s new Gideon’s Chariots offensive in Gaza is the fact that many of its key players are new to their positions. A different chain of command than on Oct. 7 and in 2024. Here are the key figures: 🧵 The Defense Minister Israel Katz took over from Yoav Gallant in November 2024. Gallant was fired by the Prime Minister after a year of tension. Katz comes from the world of politics as opposed to Gallant who came from the world of the IDF

The IDF released a report on the failure of October 7 to defend Kibbutz Nir Oz. The report is worse than expected. It shows the IDF didn't defend this community at all, and only arrived at 13:10, more than six and a half hours after the attack began. Hamas and other terrorists had already come and left, they had complete control of the place and could do basically whatever they wanted. There was a small local security team from the community, but it was overwhelmed.

The small community was massacred; 47 people murdered, 76 kidnapped.

Jpost; "October 7 probe: IDF only arrived in Nir Oz after Hamas terrorists left because it was 'far away'"
jpost.com/israel-news/ar… The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion was defending the sector, but it was understrength. The IDF completely failed to plan for or even apparently think about how to defend this community. It's strange because one assumes the IDF wouldn't have behaved this way in the north or the West Bank. Something about Hamas in Gaza cast a spell over Israel and its defenses such that this border was almost treated like a peace border.

Articles like this illustrate the corrosive nature of how media use the term “disinformation” as a stand in for actually covering things on the ground or reporting what happened Here you have an entire article that admits 800 people were killed, the article claims that some old videos were repackaged and some people falsely reported that others were killed…but where is the evidence that the “disinformation” led to “intensified” violence? Do they mean the information that was provided to SNA-backed militias who went on a rampage in Latakia? No. They don’t even mention them

This became their main talking point the day before the Bibas children were buried. This is what these people came down to.

No words.

Note, they don’t say they will do the minute of silence, they just want to add the whataboutism. There is a reason they trotted him out the day before the burial to do this.

Never forget A quick thought on this. Where was this talking point on October 8 when there were 38 dead children as a result of the Hamas massacre? What was Daniel Levy's talking point on that day?

For many years there was a subset of critics of Israel who would say things like "I want Israel to reflect my liberal/progressive values." And they expected to take part in a discussion where reasonable people would say "well I can understand that, let's debate Israel's policies, I understand why you feel uncomfortable with some of them." They posed as being inside the tent of Israel discussions, merely objecting to Israel's "policies." And they were taken at face value by moderates and centrists. Some of these types of people would even come to Israel, they'd spend most of their time with Palestinians, or at unrecognized beduin villages, or supporting African refugees. They posed as just wanting Israelis to support their progressive causes.

What is further surprising about kidnappinig and murder of the Bibas children, and now the decision by Hamas to lie about returning the body of Shiri Bibas, the mother, is the way Israel has always been surprised at every turn of events, always reacting. Israeli officials have vowed to avenge the latest Hamas action; but the fact is that since Oct. 7 Israel has always been reacting. Israel was taken by surprise by the Hamas attack. Shiri, Yarden, Kfir and Ariel Bibas were kidnapped from Nir Oz.

One thing that has interested me a little since the hostage deal began, is the lack of interest in the freed hostages or the victims such as the Bibas children, among self-defined progressive Jewish circles in the US. I mean groups such as rabbis involved in human rights or academics or social justice activist types and commentators. It's a small, niche group of outspoken people, but symbolic. What I see is a collective silence from them, a decision apparently to never post images of the Bibas children, never post images of women hostages or Hamas parading emaciated male hostages. Basically anything related to hostages who are Jewish and Israeli is considered something they won't discuss or empathize with or post about.