Seth Frantzman Profile picture
Middle East security analyst, Phd, author of #TheOctober7War bylines @Jerusalem_Post @BreakingDefense adjunct fellow @FDD Exec Dir @MidEast_Center @GulfIsrael;
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Jun 13 4 tweets 1 min read
The data behind the attack according to Israeli media, around 200 warplanes using 330 munitions against 100 targets Compare to a recent strike on the Houthis which was 20-30 warplanes and 50 munitions
Jun 13 4 tweets 2 min read
In February 2019 Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, who was then the second-in-command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that if a war with Israel took place, then it "will result in Israel’s defeat within three days." Salami made a lot of predictions. Image
Jun 13 7 tweets 3 min read
In the wake of Israel's initial strikes on Iran. What ways might Iran choose to respond. Iran is in a complex situation because it had been working toward a deal with the US, but it also has been dealing with the recent IAEA censure. Iran has to weigh whether it responds in a kind of "tit-for-tat" as it did in 2024, where it launched ballistic missiles and drones; or if it escalates, or try to find another method. Here are some ways it might respond. Diplomatically

Iran saw the overwhelming UN vote for a ceasefire in Gaza on June 12. It may think that it can play the victim now and leverage the Israeli attacks for its benefit.

Iran has invested heavily in diplomacy in recent years. It has worked on closer ties with Russia and China. It has strong ties with Pakistan and decent ties with India. It has joined economic blocs such as BRICS and the SCO. As such Iran is well positioned to use diplomacy against Israel. Iran has better ties with the Gulf than in the past and also close ties with both Turkey and Qatar, who are US allies. Iran’s foreign minister has travelled frequently in the region and was in Oslo on June 11.
Jun 13 7 tweets 4 min read
Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz immediately declares a special state of emergency in the home front throughout the entire State of Israel:

“Following the State of Israel's preemptive strike against Iran, a missile and drone attack against the State of Israel and its civilian population is expected in the immediate future. Therefore, and in accordance with his authority under the Civil Defense Law, Defense Minister Israel Katz has now signed a special order, according to which a special state of emergency will be imposed in the home front throughout the entire State of Israel.” His office said “You must obey the instructions of the Home Front Command and the authorities and remain in the protected areas.”
Jun 1 22 tweets 7 min read
Why did CNN deel the need to put "peaceful" in quotes. The idea is to make it seem that there is a question as to whether it was peaceful. Image Note that the article doesn't say anything about the man's statements. It does say "The source stressed potential mental health concerns have not yet been ruled out, which could factor into any charging decision."

They don't do reporting on the actual event, they try to make it seem as if it being "peaceful" is a controversial issue; but then do no reporting about what the suspect said.Image
May 27 27 tweets 9 min read
The emerging story in Gaza is that the new aid distribution is beginning. I will share some more posts and thoughts as this develops below 🧵 Images of people walking to get aid apparently
May 20 6 tweets 2 min read
I've been thinking about the remnants of the Hamas leadership, who almost all seem to live abroad. Two Hamas officials went to Iran this week and talked tough about continuing the war. This is a war they don't experience. They want Gaza destroyed while they live abroad. Most of these men are in their 60s or older. Key Hamas leaders today include: Mohammed Zahar born in 1945, Mousa Abu Marzouk was born in 1951, Khaled Meshaal was born in 1956, Khalil al-Hayya was born in 1960, Fathi Hamad in 1961, Basem Naim was born in 1963, Ghazi Hamid in 1964, Osama Hamdan was born in 1965, Husam Badran in 1966 and Zahar Jabarin in 1968.
May 19 11 tweets 3 min read
One of the elements to pay attention to in Israel’s new Gideon’s Chariots offensive in Gaza is the fact that many of its key players are new to their positions. A different chain of command than on Oct. 7 and in 2024. Here are the key figures: 🧵 The Defense Minister Israel Katz took over from Yoav Gallant in November 2024. Gallant was fired by the Prime Minister after a year of tension. Katz comes from the world of politics as opposed to Gallant who came from the world of the IDF Image
Mar 14 6 tweets 3 min read
The IDF released a report on the failure of October 7 to defend Kibbutz Nir Oz. The report is worse than expected. It shows the IDF didn't defend this community at all, and only arrived at 13:10, more than six and a half hours after the attack began. Hamas and other terrorists had already come and left, they had complete control of the place and could do basically whatever they wanted. There was a small local security team from the community, but it was overwhelmed.

The small community was massacred; 47 people murdered, 76 kidnapped.

Jpost; "October 7 probe: IDF only arrived in Nir Oz after Hamas terrorists left because it was 'far away'"
jpost.com/israel-news/ar… The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion was defending the sector, but it was understrength. The IDF completely failed to plan for or even apparently think about how to defend this community. It's strange because one assumes the IDF wouldn't have behaved this way in the north or the West Bank. Something about Hamas in Gaza cast a spell over Israel and its defenses such that this border was almost treated like a peace border.
Mar 13 9 tweets 3 min read
Articles like this illustrate the corrosive nature of how media use the term “disinformation” as a stand in for actually covering things on the ground or reporting what happened Image Here you have an entire article that admits 800 people were killed, the article claims that some old videos were repackaged and some people falsely reported that others were killed…but where is the evidence that the “disinformation” led to “intensified” violence? Do they mean the information that was provided to SNA-backed militias who went on a rampage in Latakia? No. They don’t even mention themImage
Feb 26 6 tweets 2 min read
This became their main talking point the day before the Bibas children were buried. This is what these people came down to.

No words.

Note, they don’t say they will do the minute of silence, they just want to add the whataboutism. There is a reason they trotted him out the day before the burial to do this.

Never forgetImage A quick thought on this. Where was this talking point on October 8 when there were 38 dead children as a result of the Hamas massacre? What was Daniel Levy's talking point on that day?
Feb 25 10 tweets 3 min read
For many years there was a subset of critics of Israel who would say things like "I want Israel to reflect my liberal/progressive values." And they expected to take part in a discussion where reasonable people would say "well I can understand that, let's debate Israel's policies, I understand why you feel uncomfortable with some of them." They posed as being inside the tent of Israel discussions, merely objecting to Israel's "policies." And they were taken at face value by moderates and centrists. Some of these types of people would even come to Israel, they'd spend most of their time with Palestinians, or at unrecognized beduin villages, or supporting African refugees. They posed as just wanting Israelis to support their progressive causes.
Feb 21 18 tweets 5 min read
What is further surprising about kidnappinig and murder of the Bibas children, and now the decision by Hamas to lie about returning the body of Shiri Bibas, the mother, is the way Israel has always been surprised at every turn of events, always reacting. Israeli officials have vowed to avenge the latest Hamas action; but the fact is that since Oct. 7 Israel has always been reacting. Israel was taken by surprise by the Hamas attack. Shiri, Yarden, Kfir and Ariel Bibas were kidnapped from Nir Oz.
Feb 20 10 tweets 3 min read
One thing that has interested me a little since the hostage deal began, is the lack of interest in the freed hostages or the victims such as the Bibas children, among self-defined progressive Jewish circles in the US. I mean groups such as rabbis involved in human rights or academics or social justice activist types and commentators. It's a small, niche group of outspoken people, but symbolic. What I see is a collective silence from them, a decision apparently to never post images of the Bibas children, never post images of women hostages or Hamas parading emaciated male hostages. Basically anything related to hostages who are Jewish and Israeli is considered something they won't discuss or empathize with or post about.
Feb 19 9 tweets 2 min read
I think it's important to understand that Hamas purposely targeted civilian communities that had been involved in peace because Hamas' goal is one state. Hamas is weakened by peace and two states. Hamas was created and grew in the late 1980s and early 1990s largely in opposition to Oslo and peace. Whenever there was a chance for peace Hamas has come along to destroy it, to create war. When Israel left Gaza there was a chance for Gaza to be governed in a peaceful way and pave the way for two states. Hamas took over to use it as a base to prevent peace.
Feb 18 24 tweets 5 min read
There is a false comfort in the assertion that Hamas cannot be defeated or that Israel has achieved most of its goals in Gaza. The fallacy rests on assertions that Hamas cannot be eradicated and that similar groups in other places have not been removed. This analysis is It's ahistorical but gives comfort because it means one doesn't ever have to defeat an enemy fully, one can always just "degrade" capabilities and use precision strikes to go after "command and control" and then after X number of things have been destroyed (key leaders, fighters, bunkers, weapon platforms, capabilities etc)...then you have completed your mission.
Feb 12 10 tweets 3 min read
One of the interesting things about Hamas and the Oct. 7 war is that in the past Hamas was often seen by some/many in the progressive, left, liberal and human rights community as part of the problem, part of the rise of extremists or "far-right" that weakened the Oslo peace process. You'd hear arguments such as "Hamas and the Israeli Right are against peace" which posited that the Israeli center and left and the PA or Fatah were partners for peace. Over time this narrative changed and there was a quiet attempt to infiltrate pro-Hamas messaging throughout the global far-left. This was openly stated by one western intellectual who said Hamas and Hezbollah were part of the global left. The goal was to portray the most fanatic and murderous groups, the armed groups, the ones attacking civilians, blowing up buses and raining rockets down on civilians as "left" and thus "good."
Jan 19 9 tweets 3 min read
🧵 The Middle East is in a transition phase. This requires Israel to re-think its security policy. For decades Iran was seen as the major threat along with its proxies. Hamas was dismissed as basically not a threat. Oct 7 should be a lesson that this minor the case and the status quo since 2005 need a re-think Iran is weakened today by losing Syria. However the new Syrian government is closely linked to Qatar and Turkey, both of which back Hamas. In the next decade the Abbas government of the PA will leave office and it’s possible Netanyahu will also leave office within the next 20 years. New leaders will face new challenges. Netanyahu was the architect of the policy regarding Hamas in which it grew more powerful. He won’t change that status quo probably
Jan 17 15 tweets 3 min read
🧵 At some point there is going to need to be a looks back at the 15 months of the Gaza war and a kind of debriefing or analysis of it, what went right, what went wrong for Israel and the IDF . This will need to take a look at different aspects and also look at its phases etc, here are a few thoughts and discussion points First of all a lot went right for the IDF in Gaza in terms of tactical learning curve, medical care for soldiers, use of new tech with the Ghost unit, close fire support, “closing circles”…but a lot of the IDF momentum doctrine seems to have not borne fruit exactly
Jan 15 10 tweets 3 min read
There is some debate today about whether Hamas has recruited some 10,000 new fighters or not throughout the course of the war. This is based on some US assessments that have been published. We need to understand something about Hamas "numbers" of fighters to begin with to discuss this. Prior to Oct. 6 Hamas was portrayed as deterred, so even if it had 20-30,000 fighters, these were portrayed as not a major threat, just men with AKs basically.
Jan 1 7 tweets 3 min read
I think this is likely an assessment that reflects the thinking that informs Israel's current policies on Gaza.

However it leads to several tough questions.
1. Once it's acknowledged that returning hostages is basically impossible, one has to wonder why it wasn't an absolute priority throughout the years, leading up to Oct. 7, to prevent hostage taking at all costs. On Oct. 6 there was complete complacency along the border; very few combat soldiers, numerous unarmed soldiers, primarily women, in observations rooms right on the border in posts that were difficult to defend; civilian communities with only a handful of rifles that were secured in an armory in each community, hard to reach quickly.

Hamas openly trained to attack and take hostages, and yet the assessment was that it was deterred, there wasn't even a skeptical voice saying "what if they are not, then this will be catastrophe." Second, once the assessment is that it's basically impossible to return hostages from Gaza, one has to ask if there is an updated policy on hostage taking that prioritizes preventing it? A year and two months after Oct. 7 what would be done differently? Are there any procedures in place?