Today marks the first meeting of the @WHO-established Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness & Response. The inquiry has its own snazzy website (theindependentpanel.org) and twitter account (@TheIndPanel). Panel is to agree on fact-finding methods & ways of working today.
The list of panel members is here (theindependentpanel.org/panel-members). Contrary to some earlier press reports, there is gender balance here (this is good). But absence of international law experience still jumps out to me given the many legal questions implicated by the #COVID19 pandemic.
@TheIndPanel has an ambitious schedule: interim reports due in November & January, a final report due in May. Is this enough time? The enormity of the task, depending on how mandate is construed, raises concerns. What kind of cooperation will they get from key actors (China, US)?
How will @TheIndPanel interpret its broad mandate ('effectiveness' of @WHO mechanisms & IHR, plus WHO actions & timelines re #COVID19)? This could go in many different directions. A list of key sub-questions to be answered, within the mandate headings, would be helpful. END
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There’s a lot of buzz about announced plans by Australia, Canada, Germany & Netherlands to jointly sue #Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice (@CIJ_ICJ) for alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman (#CEDAW).
As far as I know, this would mark only the second time that a state has sought to base ICJ jurisdiction on CEDAW art 29. But the @guardian piece about the announcement appears to be a bit mixed up about how this will work. theguardian.com/world/2024/sep…
CEDAW art 29 requires the state bringing a case about a CEDAW dispute to first attempt to settle the dispute by negotiation. If negotiations fail, that state must request ad hoc arbitration (not by the ICJ). This triggers the six-month period referred to in the article.
This @BBCNews piece addresses recent confusion about the term ‘plausibility’ in ICJ decisions: . It mostly gets this right; the ICJ refers formally to plausibility of 'rights’ rather than ‘claims’. But there is some lingering confusion here. 1/8bbc.com/news/articles/…
The article discusses a debate within the UK about whether the ICJ's January order—in which the ICJ found the rights at issue to be plausible AND a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights—meant it was incorrect to refer to a ‘plausible risk of genocide’. 2/8
The article describes this as a debate about whether the ICJ ‘was convinced there was a risk of that happening’. But is THAT really what the debate was about? The January order made it very clear that the ICJ saw a real risk of Genocide Convention violations *going forward*. 3/8
South Africa returns to the #ICJ once again seeking urgent provisional measures against #Israel. The request asks the ICJ to order Israel to immediately withdraw and cease the offensive in Rafah and relinquish control of the Rafah & Kerem Shalom crossings to allow in aid. 1/14
Very strong language: SA describes the #Rafah assault as ‘killing the Palestinian people of Gaza, while Israel is simultaneously starving them, and deliberately denying them humanitarian aid and the basic necessities of life’ (¶19). 2/14
The focus of the request is on how new facts (namely the Rafah assault & shutting down humanitarian aid entry points) amounts to a new urgent risk of irreparable prejudice harm to the rights at issue in the case. 3/14
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20