@thinkdefence's revised article on MRVP is a timely reminder that the British Army does not have a light (under 15 tonnes) armoured vehicle capable of transporting infantry battalions safely wherever they are needed.
This discussion is not about high-end combat vehicles like Boxer and Warrior for heavy armour roles. It is a basic requirement for a general purpose armoured minibus - a protected vehicle that transports up to 10 soldiers from A to B.
Such vehicles do not enter the direct fire zone, but have decent underfloor protection and can resist artillery fragments and at least 7.62 mm bullets. They're easy to operate and support. They are a recognition that unprotected Land-Rovers and trucks are no longer acceptable.
There are quite a few options available now. Most cost around £1 million each. Regardless of any Integrated Review outcome this type of platform is needed across a multitude of roles and deployment scenarios.
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The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.
The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support.
As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.
For some roles, it makes sense to purchase an off-the-shelf solution from abroad (e.g., Oshkosh JLTV) where the price is lower than domestically produced vehicles can match. But for others, British industry is perfectly capable of producing a state-of-the-art 4x4 or 6x6 PMV.
When it comes to properly regenerating NATO forces, a prevailing view is that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will be long over before any new capabilities ordered today are delivered, so any uplift in defence spending is pointless. THIS VIEW IS TOTALLY WRONG. Here's why...
While the conflict has resulted in the comprehensive degradation of Russia’s land force capabilities, Russia is not yet a spent force. Vladimir Putin has not accepted defeat, nor has he relinquished his territorial ambitions.
Even if the conflict is resolved in the short-term, either through the voluntary withdrawal or forced eviction of Russian forces from Ukraine, Putin is likely to use any peace agreement as an opportunity regenerate his army.
I've been analysing the British Army's overall structure in anticipation of the Defence Command Paper Refresh. It'll be interesting to see how it will be reorganised to accommodate the headcount reduction from 77,000 to 72,500.
Since many units are already operating below their permitted headcount, or are reliant on the Army Reserve to deploy, we could see much leaner units across the Army. Will 450 person infantry battalions be fit for purpose?
I am sure those responsible for reconfiguring he Army will be trying all kinds of models to make the new structure work. But I fear a bold correction may be necessary to ensure the combat units we do intend to field have sufficient potency and resilience in terms of headcount.
THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DEFENCE COMMAND PAPER REFRESH 2023. 🧵
British Army's 2021 Future Soldier strategy was seen more as a structure driven by costs than than a structure defined by strategy, even though it the Integrated Review got more things right than wrong.
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This is the British Army of today. Three primary elements: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, the Field Army and Home Command. Total headcount reduced to 72,500, the lowest it has been for 200 years. Three divisions, but only one of these is deployable.
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The Field Army's three divisions yield eight combat brigades, but only four of these have Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) enablers. So basically only half of the Army is actually usable. Which is a bummer.
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