THREAD ON AIRBORNE FORCES AND VEHICLES
Russia's failed attempt to seize Hostomel airfield in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine provides confirmation (if any was needed after the lessons of Crete and Arnhem) that airborne assaults against well defended targets can be disastrous. The contemporary use of drones only adds to the risks. This means that future airborne operations will primarily be conducted at battalion and company level for coup de main missions against bridges, airfields, and objectives that need to be physically seized and held by forces on the ground. Think WW2 Pegasus Bridge. Many previous airborne tasks, especially raiding tasks, can now be accomplished using PrSM, loitering missions, or armed drones, so demolition roles will be the exception rather than the norm.

The cancellation of the US Army's M10 Booker has little to do with the quality of the vehicle itself, and more about the lack of supporting infrastructure of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, which cannot effectively support 40-tonne tracked vehicles. 1/4 In the same way that the British Army's Ajax programme includes six different versions, so that armoured cavalry regiments are self-supporting, the Booker chassis lends itself to a whole range of variants based on the M10 Booker Repair & Recovery variant. 2/4

It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6) An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)

The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret. As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.

Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire. Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.

The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support. As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.

When it comes to properly regenerating NATO forces, a prevailing view is that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will be long over before any new capabilities ordered today are delivered, so any uplift in defence spending is pointless. THIS VIEW IS TOTALLY WRONG. Here's why... While the conflict has resulted in the comprehensive degradation of Russia’s land force capabilities, Russia is not yet a spent force. Vladimir Putin has not accepted defeat, nor has he relinquished his territorial ambitions.

I've been analysing the British Army's overall structure in anticipation of the Defence Command Paper Refresh. It'll be interesting to see how it will be reorganised to accommodate the headcount reduction from 77,000 to 72,500. Since many units are already operating below their permitted headcount, or are reliant on the Army Reserve to deploy, we could see much leaner units across the Army. Will 450 person infantry battalions be fit for purpose?

THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DEFENCE COMMAND PAPER REFRESH 2023. 🧵
British Army's 2021 Future Soldier strategy was seen more as a structure driven by costs than than a structure defined by strategy, even though it the Integrated Review got more things right than wrong.
(1 of 20) This is the British Army of today. Three primary elements: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, the Field Army and Home Command. Total headcount reduced to 72,500, the lowest it has been for 200 years. Three divisions, but only one of these is deployable.
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The US Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program has been controversial. Few people expected SIG to win with what many perceived to be an evolutionary approach. The smart money was on Textron and its innovative cased-telescoped ammunition and weapon technology.
1/12 What made NGSW controversial is that US Army wanted a bullet that could defeat Level IV body armour at 600 metres. This resulted in an ammunition that matches .300 Winchester Magnum, a long-range sniping cartridge. (7.62 mm versus .300 WINMAG)
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The UK’s purchase of Archer may seem illogical to some, but is actually a clever solution with multiple benefits. 1️⃣ AS90 is no longer fit for purpose. The Army desperately needs a 52 calibre howitzer and it cannot wait for MFP to deliver in 3-5 years time. For the UK to lead the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, it must have credible tube artillery now.

A few thoughts about #IR23 and its implications for the forthcoming Defence Command Paper. 🧵

IR21 was prescient and correct in identifying Russia and China as the two major threats. Russia was always the more immediate challenge due to its proximity, and IR23 reflects this.
1/ IR21 recognised that resource constraints meant that our approach to the Indo-Pacific needed to be a "tilt" not an outright "pivot." The AUKUS construct is the perfect embodiment of this aspiration, especially as the threat posed by China is expanding not contracting.
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These five armies all have one thing in common: they're using the same camouflage pattern uniforms. This makes it hard to distinguish between them. Not a good look. Is Crye Precision / MTP really so good that nothing else will do? Or are our armed forces just fashion victims? Why is this a problem?
You need to be able to tell your own forces apart from those of the enemy. If the enemy is wearing the same uniform as you and is indistinguishable, there’s a risk of friendly fire fire incidents, blue-on-blue, as they’re called.
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Ukraine says it needs 300 tanks to replace losses and conduct “combined arms manoeuvre.” This is the modern equivalent of Blitzkrieg and describes a tactical approach through which tanks and infantry supported by artillery and air power retake lost ground.
1/ NATO and its partners could potentially provide five different tanks types:
1️⃣ M1A1 / M1A2 Abrams
2️⃣ Leopard 2 A4 / A5 / A6
3️⃣ Challenger 2
4️⃣ Leclerc
5️⃣ K2 Black Panther
All are equally capable and quantifiably better than anything the Russians have fielded in Ukraine.
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To clear-up the misunderstanding about Germany issuing "licences" for the export of tanks. This is not a German thing. Every NATO country that exports military weapons requires customers to have an END USER CERTIFICATE that confirms they are ultimate user of the capability. Why? To stop weapons ending-up in the wrong hands. For example, the electronics in upgraded T-72s come from a French company that didn't require an end user certificate, or licence. Their products should never have been exported to Russia. So, yes, end user certificates matter.

Much of the criticism levelled at Germany is justified. Merkel’s coziness with Putin meant that she failed to see the threat he posed or the risks of Nordstream 2. And Scholz has been slow to accept the reality of the situation Germany now finds itself in. But…
1/ Germany answered the wake-up call months ago and is fully on board with need to support Ukraine by providing military aid. In fact, only the USA and Britain have donated more. But it hasn’t been any easy journey or transformation. And it’s important to understand why.
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@RUSI_org believes a Ukraine spring offensive risks depleting key UAF reserves. But without an attempt to retake lost territory, a stalemate is more likely. This could lead to a peace deal where Russia permanently gains the territory it has already taken.

https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1613852353953730560?s=61&t=gE2-rqW8gAlvMn8pDaQ-Fw

On the other hand, if Ukraine can successfully re-take lost ground, even pushing back Russian forces to their pre-2014 positions, this will increase the pressure on Putin at home. Humiliation is the surest way to get him ousted.

The Netflix remake of “All Quiet on the Western Front” is every bit as powerful as the original film. Whenever a significant new war film comes out, I like to see how it stacks-up against the all time greats. So here’s a thread on 12 war movies you must watch. First, the criteria for inclusion:
- The story, script and acting must hang together as a piece of theatre
- It must have an element of hope, or message, even when depicting the horrors of war
- It must entertain
- It must build on the body of work already in existence.

The ethics of robotic weaponry is becoming a major concern as science fiction becomes science fact. So what are the military and ethical issues that will impact their usage? A thread.
1/ AI is already embedded into a variety of everyday systems and vehicles. The autopilot of modern airliners is a good example. Most landings are completely automated with the onboard computer taking all of the decisions. Cars are going the same way.
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A nice comment from yesterday’s Defence Committee session with @BWallaceMP was when Mark Francois quoted Dr. Julian Lewis, the previous head of the Committee, who said: “We need to spend three to be free.” Referring to the need to spend 3% of GDP on defence. Just to expand on the point Mr. Wallace made. UK Boxers come have a GVW of 38.5 tonnes with an RS4 12.7 mm weapon station. If you added a manned turret it will weigh around 5-6 tonnes. So that weight has to be reduced elsewhere. Usually it’s Armour that comes off.
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In the absence of fresh information, I’ve been trying to analyse what’s going on in Ukraine. The top line consensus is that both sides have stalled, with Ukraine making marginal gains and Russia pouring-in untrained and unwilling conscripts merely to hold the line.
1 of 6 Incremental casualties continue to mount-up on both sides. As winter approaches, cold weather and wet ground will restrict movement and combat. A lack of warm clothing and sustainment is likely to lead to unnecessary further Russian casualties and a collapse in morale.
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