A few thoughts on the recent Reuters report mentioning that "Iran and North Korea have resumed cooperation on a long-range missile project, including the transfer of critical parts." 1/9 news.trust.org/item/202009201…
What project are they referring to? Well, we don't know for sure but there are a few potential options. 2/9
The first one is Iran's apparent role in the development of North Korea's RD-250 engine clone which powers the DPRK's Hwasong 15 ICBM. Unfortunately, apart from a single treasury designation, almost nothing is known about Iran's role in the project. 3/9 treasury.gov/press-center/p…
The second one could be potential cooperation in the development of larger solid-fuel systems. The DPRK has alluded to a solid-fuel ICBM and Iran has a pretty ambitious and sophisticated solid-fuel SLV program going on. 4/9
So cooperation would make sense. However, the shorter range solid-fuel systems we have seen in both countries show very different design philosophies. So it's unclear how much cooperation has actually been going on in this field. 5/9
Another possibility is that 'long range' in this context simply means existing longer range systems the two countries operate. Both Iran's Shahab 3/Ghadr and the Khorramshahr are based on North Korean systems. 6/9
Iran has equipped both of them with precision guidance and, unlike North Korea, seems to have made the Musudan/Khorramshahr work to some extent. So again, some cooperation would make sense. 7/9
One important thing to keep in mind is that missile cooperation between both countries is not a one-way street. While Iran's early missile program was almost entirely dependent on the DPRK, Iranians later claimed they surpassed North Korea in the field of liquid fuel. 8/9
Whether that is 100% true is another question, but it is important to note that cooperation with the DPRK could take many different forms (Iranian assistance, true co-development, sourcing of components, testing etc). The times when Iran simply bought entire systems are over. 9/9
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
People are once again talking about this Sudanese military facility with some claiming it’s a large IRGC-built underground facility. Well, due to recent developments in Sudan’s civil war, we now have a much clearer picture of what this place actually is. Thread 1/13
I first found this facility located in the Jabal Garri area North of Khartoum back in 2018 when mapping the Sudanese defense industry. The site stood out both for its size and the lack of any official information on it. 2/13
At the time, satellite imagery couldn’t confirm the site's exact purpose. However, safety features, like specialized lightning arrestors and earthen berms, strongly indicated involvement in the production and handling of explosive materials. 3/13
First is the complex that I call al-Safira 1 (35.986° 37.4052). This is/was a production complex for solid propellant rocket motors powering Syria's versions of the Fateh 110 and Zelzal. It's also likely some of Syria's and Hezbollah's longer range artillery rockets were produced there (M302).
As the security situation around al-Safir deteriorated during the civil war, the regime tried to build a new solid propellant production line near Masyaf only to see it bombed by Israel repeatedly. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
This recent Reuters report about Russia mass-producing a new strike drone called Garpiya is highly interesting but maybe a bit convoluted. What it seems to boil down to is that Russia has established a second Shahed production line in Izhevsk. Thread 1/14 reuters.com/world/europe/r…
Let's begin with the factory itself. Reuters states that the new UAVs are produced by Almaz-Antey subsidiary Kupol in a former cement factory the company acquired. It also mentions that a video showing UAV production matches the facility. 2/14
The linked video is the video of a Shahed 136 production line that emerged a few months ago and was widely believed to show the known Shahed factory in Alabuga. 3/14
A few quick thoughts on the alleged Houthi drone that crashed into Tel Aviv. 1/9
The Houthis have claimed that they used a new UAV called Yafa for this particular strike. According to the Houthis, the Yafa has the ability overcome enemy defenses and cannot be detected by radar. 2/9
In general, Houthi claims are a mixed bag. Sometimes they are accurate, sometimes they are exaggerated, sometimes they are just straight-up fabrications. In general, their factual claims have to be taken with a much bigger grain of salt than Iran's or Lebanese Hezbollah's. 3/9
The Houthis just unveiled their new 'Palestine' ballistic missile which they claimed to have used against Eilat for the first time on June 3. A few notes on the type and the likely origin of the missile. 1/10
The Palestine is a precision-guided solid propellant missile. This alone is quite noteworthy. So far, the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis against Israel appear to all have been less advanced liquid propellant missiles without terminal guidance. 2/10
The Houthis have previously shown mockups of advanced Iranian precision-guided solid propellant missiles like the Fateh 110 (300km), Tankil (500km) and Kheybarshekan 1 (1450km) on parades. However, it was not proven whether they actually had the real missiles. 3/10
Quick thread on the alleged Shahed production site identified by the US in the Special Economic Zone of Alabuga in Tatarstan 55.821215° 52.051971°
Back in February, @TheGoodISIS already identified the Russian UAV company Abatros LLC as a potential Shahed manufacturer and there are a few more indications this could indeed be the case. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
The location given on Albatros’ official website seems suspiciously close to the site identified by the US (construction not yet visible on the older Yandex picture) alb.aero/development/