1/n @KanitkarT@tjayaraman
Thank you for clarifying that the source of your claim that developed country patenting in climate mitigation technologies has collapsed from 2009-10 to 2017.
This allowed me to go back and look through the data.
A (long) thread on innovation.
2/n Firstly, as per your article, I don't think that you can use 2017 as the cut off for the analysis, because as noted in the OECD metadata "figures for the later years may be decreasing because of legal delays for publishing patent information."
3/n Taking 'priority date' as the best reference date for the patenting (described in the metadata as "closest to the invention date ... To measure inventive activity, patent should be counted according to the priority date"), then data completeness is described as follows :
4/n 1. EPO: "complete up to 2016" 2. USPTO: "almost complete up to 2016" 3. PCT: "complete up to 2017" 4. Triadic and IP5: "almost complete up to 2016".
You can't use 2017 as the cut off, doing so implies that OECD patenting in almost all technology domains has collapsed 👇.
5/n But, your broad point is correct even if we take an earlier cut-off. There's been a decline in annual patenting in CC mitigation technologies since 2008-10.
Your claim that this applies to all developed countries and all subsectors is not correct if we don't take 2017
6/n But more importantly, the conclusions you draw are problematic in a number of ways. 1) Patenting across the technology lifecycle. We know that patenting is most intensive at early phase of technology development, when fundamental ideas are being protected.
7/n Thus, once a technology reaches maturity then typically patenting to slows down (see below). Moreover, once a technology reaches this stage, cost declines are typically driven by process improvements in manufacturing and economies of scale, not by fundamental research.
8/n So, from the slowdown in patenting, particularly in wind and solar, its possible to draw an opposite conclusion from the one you do: these technologies are now mature, commodified, and competitive, with cost declines now driven by manufacturing improvements not research.
9/n 2) Patents as stock not flow.
Thus a decline in the annual publication of patents means our technological capacity to mitigate is still growing. See below, left is flow, right is stock: note how cumulative RE patents look logistic, exactly as expected from a mature tech.
10/n 3) Patents as a sole indicator of innovation.
Patents cover only a small part of the innovation process, ignoring other drivers like learning by doing/economies of scale. Declining patenting rate doesn't equal declining performance improvement; the opposite has been true👇
11/n 4) Misattributed causality.
You state: "But since the Copenhagen Accord signalled the end of legally binding commitments to emissions reduction by the developed countries, technology development in climate change mitigation technologies has registered a significant fall".
12/n First, massive logical inconsistency: you state (correctly) that developed countries ex-Russia et al only reduced their emissions by ~4%. If these legally binding commitments were so unsuccessful in driving emissions down, why were they so successful in driving patents up?
13/n Second, causal simplicity. Patenting activity is driven by a number of things: policy strength, stage in the business cycle, technology maturity, exogenous factors like energy prices. Ascribing the fall in patents to a single and - frankly - spurious cause is problematic.
14/n So, here humble conclusions: 1. You misread and oversimplify the evidence on technological innovation. You appear to be so keen to argue what India SHOULD not do (laudable), that you don't assess pragmatically what CAN be done (not so laudable)
15/n 2. The decline in CCMT patenting which you rightly point to is a result of numerous causes, some good, some bad. RE has reached technological maturity; 2008-9 saw the end of a massive business cycle upswing and energy price surge; policy is not strong enough outside RE.
16/n 3. We should be concerned about the decline in patenting, but not equally in all sectors. We should be concerned about the lack of acceleration in early innovation in sectors where mitigation techs are most immature: aviation, industry, heavy duty transport, etc.
17/n 4. Responding explicitly to how India should respond to Guterres' call to progressively phase out coal:
a. Not in industry, technology is not ready.
b. Not yet in power, but India can look to peak and plateau thermal coal use by 2030 & have a very low coal system by 2050
18/n
Finally, I want to apologize for the tone of my first tweet in response to your article.
These are my honest, considered opinions. I disagree fundamentally with a number of your points; I have concerns about certain of your data.
But I hope we can debate with respect.
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Clean energy technologies grew strongly in 2023. Solar PV, driven by China, grew 420 GW and wind around 120 GW.
That's another ~550 TWh of clean electricity coming online this year (a lot of this capacity came online at the end of 2023, and will only be felt fully in 2024)
Extreme weather, notably very bad droughts, and continued Covid reopening in the aviation sector and China's transport sector drove around 70% of the increase in emissions at the global level.
1/n Today the @IEA released a special report on the role of coal in net zero transitions. With this thread I want to highlight some of the key findings of the report.
Thread iea.org/news/achieving…
2/n Firstly, energy transitions are not and cannot be just about coal. In the central scenario in our report, advanced economies act strongly this decade already on emissions from oil and gas, as well as coal.
3/n But for three reasons, we need to focus on coal: 1.It’s the largest source of CO2, and far from declining 2.It’s increasingly under pressure in electricity
3.Coal is important for local jobs and development
So what are the key messages?
2/10
Firstly, this book gets an A-plus for the pun (visual and titular) that you get right from the cover.
@Rukmini is a data journalist from Chennai, one of the field's Indian pioneers and a leading voice in interpreting India's covid experience.
3/10
Her book brings together four key characteristics of a good data journalist.
First, she has a sensitivity to the importance of the process of data production. A fascinating description of how all is not what it seems in data on sexual assualt is a case in point.
1/n Today we published a model-based assessment of the grid integration costs of VRE.
Note: we only look at profile and balancing costs, not network costs.
Here I summarize the results in 6 easy tweets.
2/n In all scenarios we study, a short-term 'optimal' level of VRE is substantially higher than current levels, in the order of 40% of total generation.
This is robust to assumptions on demand, storage cost, cost of capital, retirement of end of life assets, etc.
3/n The substitution of expensive energy with cheap VRE allows total system costs to decline as we approach 'optimal VRE', even as total system-wide fixed costs go up.
Basic point: cheap energy + expensive capacity is a winning combination for substantially higher VRE.
1/n We ended 2020 with the news that India's power demand cross 180 GW for the first time. Unusually, this occurred in December, when power demand usually peaks is in summer?
What is going on here? Is it sign of the economic recovery?
Short thread.
2/n Firstly, as I have been repeating, we need to look carefully at both base effect and time period when looking at demand growth.
Monthly demand smooths out daily fluctuations, and comparing 2020 against both 2019 and 2018 shows the importance of the base effect. 👇
3/n Compared against 2018, 2020 monthly demand has registered only a few months of growth since the lockdown effectively ended in June.
Because of the collapse in demand in the second half of 2019, the picture looks more optimistic if we compare against 2019 (low base effect)
At 140 pages, I can't summarize the whole thing in a single thread, but I can do a series of threads.
Today's: H2 in the Indian power sector.
2/n We do a bottom up assessment to 2050 of power demand across all sectors, including direct and indirect electrification (for electrolytic H2 production).
In the low carbon scenario, power demand reaches as much as 6200 TWh by 2050, with almost 1000 TWh of that for H2. 👇
3/n This would consume a very substantial chunk of India's maximum estimated technical potential for onshore wind and solar PV. 👇
The required rate of supply growth and land footprint may be challenging!
This reinforces the message: direct electrification wherever possible.