1. Overall, @USArmsControl is laying out a position for the extension for New START that Russia could never accept. It's clear, as it has been for months, that the United States is trying to kill New START. (3/n)
2. @USArmsControl implies unambiguously that Russia has nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. No idea whether this is right--but can't remember a U.S. official saying this before. (4/n)
Background: Russia has recently renovated nuclear warhead storage facilities in the enclave. But it's unclear from public information whether Moscow stores warheads in them or wants the ability to move warheads to them at short notice. (5/n)
3. @USArmsControl threatens that, if New START is not extended, the U.S. will modify delivery systems converted under the treaty so they can, once again, be used to deliver nuclear warheads. (6/n)
This threat has always been hovering beneath the surface, but I can't remember its being made explicitly until now. (7/n)
4. In discussing a limits on all warheads (including nonstrategic ones), @USArmsControl appears to rule out inspections of warhead storage sites (though translation is messy).
Yet, he also criticizes New START verification regime for being inadequate!
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
(8/8)
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@ForeignPolicy @IgnatiusPost @washingtonpost Ignatius's oped is written as if it's a news story. The "news" in this case is that--SURPRISE!--an Israeli source backed up claims by the Israeli government! (3/n)
🧵How much damage was done to Iran's nuclear program?
An analysis of Friday's reporting of the U.S. government assessment. I'll focus on the @nytimes, which was clearer than the earlier but confused @NBCNews story. (1/n)
U.S. officials continue to argue that it would take Iran years to rebuild the facilities that were hit. That seems right to me.
But a key question is this: How long would it take Iran to build the bomb? (2/n)
Attempts to play down the survival of most or all of Iran's HEU are comical.
It may be true that "only" the HEU at Isfahan is accessible--but that's almost all of it! (3/n)
Here's my proposed U.S. nuclear strategy for managing escalation, arms racing, and proliferation with two nuclear peers, published through @CFR_org.
Health warning: If you like counterforce, take a DEEP breath before reading on. (1/n)
The U.S. faces a security environment that's bad and getting worse. There's an emerging bipartisan consensus that, in response, the U.S. needs more nukes. The justification stems from the current policy of "counterforce" targeting. (2/n)
The logic of counterforce targeting is merciless, however, and will catalyze an expensive, tension-generating, and futile three-ways arms race in which the United States will fail to achieve the nuclear superiority it seeks. (3/n)
The claim that Iran had 60 days to make a deal is disingenuous since the United States was hardly ready, and did not conduct, an intensive, detailed negotiation. (1/n)
For example, there were times when Iran was willing to talk but the United States wasn't (presumably because it needed more time to prepare).