1/n Yesterday Xi Jinping announced that China would peak its emissions and work towards net zero emissions by 2060.
What does this mean for India?
A short thread on why India is fundamentally different from China, and how it could respond in its climate diplomacy.
2/n India is, simply put, a much poorer country than China. Its GDP at PPP is 57% below that of China. But I think this actually understates how far India is behind China.
Another way of looking: India's final energy consumption per capita is 70% below that of China.
3/n Even at PPP, China's final energy intensity of GDP is 30% higher than India's.
Why is this? Essentially, it boils down to economic structure 👇. China's industry share in GDP is much higher than India, and China's industry sector is more energy intensive.
4/n China's high industry, high investment economic model is tremendously resource-intensive. This is not just high-end, high-valued electronics manufacturing; it's good old cement and steel underpinning China's very high investment rate, which is not really falling either.👇
5/n This brings us to the essential difference between China and India:
- China has largely built the physical foundations of a more or less developed economy (and then some!). Getting to zero is a question of cleaning up, not building green.
India's fundamentally different.
6/n For India, the question is can you urbanize and industrialize without 'carbonizing'. China has already 'carbonized', it now faces a similar challenge to developed countries - 'decarbonization'.
India faces the challenge of 'non-carbonization'.
7/n So how can India respond to this new move from China?
Answering this means assuming, as I guess China has done, that Biden wins in November. Supposing he does, then I think pressure will ratchet up on climate, including on India.
So three suggestions for India.
8/n One) Do a serious, transparent and comprehensive long-term strategy. This can show what is and isn't possible, why India is different, and what is needed to do more. This is not a defensive document, it's India's best case for options, needs and red-lines.
9/n Two) Consider sectoral peaking, but not aggregate. India still has a lot of growth from hard-to-abate sectors like freight, aviation, cement, etc. Technologies are emerging, but they are uncertain. Aggregate peaking is too a risky commitment as of now.
10/n But could India offer peaks in certain sectors, where the mitigation pathway is clearer? Certainly in power and passenger transport this appears possible (even BP has India's oil demand peaking before 2050 in its BAU case). Timelines would need to be worked out.
11/n They may not be the same in all sectors where peaking, so one could consider 'sequential sectoral peaking'.
Three) Evolve a new climate diplomacy. With its new announcement China is drifting ever faster out of the category of 'developing countries'.
12/n Traditionally, India has looked for rhetorical and procedural concessions: 'climate justice' in the Paris Agreement preamble, preservation of the Annex based system of differentiation, limitation of climate negotiations to the UNFCCC and no other fora.
13/n That boat has sailed, for better or worse, and the more China offers, the more untenable it will be. India's new strategy must differentiate it from China (shouldn't be hard after Galwan), which means accepting some differentiation within 'developing countries'.
14/n India needs to define and articulate much more pragmatic and practical demands on developed countries, including around financing, technology demonstration in the sectors where India cannot yet be confident of mitigation options, and so on.
15/n In sum, China's announcement speeds up the inevitable: India will become the 'largest developing country emitter', sooner or later.
This brings strategic pressure; India needs a solid case for what it can and can't do.
Domestic policy and diplomacy should react.
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Clean energy technologies grew strongly in 2023. Solar PV, driven by China, grew 420 GW and wind around 120 GW.
That's another ~550 TWh of clean electricity coming online this year (a lot of this capacity came online at the end of 2023, and will only be felt fully in 2024)
Extreme weather, notably very bad droughts, and continued Covid reopening in the aviation sector and China's transport sector drove around 70% of the increase in emissions at the global level.
1/n Today the @IEA released a special report on the role of coal in net zero transitions. With this thread I want to highlight some of the key findings of the report.
Thread iea.org/news/achieving…
2/n Firstly, energy transitions are not and cannot be just about coal. In the central scenario in our report, advanced economies act strongly this decade already on emissions from oil and gas, as well as coal.
3/n But for three reasons, we need to focus on coal: 1.It’s the largest source of CO2, and far from declining 2.It’s increasingly under pressure in electricity
3.Coal is important for local jobs and development
So what are the key messages?
2/10
Firstly, this book gets an A-plus for the pun (visual and titular) that you get right from the cover.
@Rukmini is a data journalist from Chennai, one of the field's Indian pioneers and a leading voice in interpreting India's covid experience.
3/10
Her book brings together four key characteristics of a good data journalist.
First, she has a sensitivity to the importance of the process of data production. A fascinating description of how all is not what it seems in data on sexual assualt is a case in point.
1/n Today we published a model-based assessment of the grid integration costs of VRE.
Note: we only look at profile and balancing costs, not network costs.
Here I summarize the results in 6 easy tweets.
2/n In all scenarios we study, a short-term 'optimal' level of VRE is substantially higher than current levels, in the order of 40% of total generation.
This is robust to assumptions on demand, storage cost, cost of capital, retirement of end of life assets, etc.
3/n The substitution of expensive energy with cheap VRE allows total system costs to decline as we approach 'optimal VRE', even as total system-wide fixed costs go up.
Basic point: cheap energy + expensive capacity is a winning combination for substantially higher VRE.
1/n We ended 2020 with the news that India's power demand cross 180 GW for the first time. Unusually, this occurred in December, when power demand usually peaks is in summer?
What is going on here? Is it sign of the economic recovery?
Short thread.
2/n Firstly, as I have been repeating, we need to look carefully at both base effect and time period when looking at demand growth.
Monthly demand smooths out daily fluctuations, and comparing 2020 against both 2019 and 2018 shows the importance of the base effect. 👇
3/n Compared against 2018, 2020 monthly demand has registered only a few months of growth since the lockdown effectively ended in June.
Because of the collapse in demand in the second half of 2019, the picture looks more optimistic if we compare against 2019 (low base effect)
At 140 pages, I can't summarize the whole thing in a single thread, but I can do a series of threads.
Today's: H2 in the Indian power sector.
2/n We do a bottom up assessment to 2050 of power demand across all sectors, including direct and indirect electrification (for electrolytic H2 production).
In the low carbon scenario, power demand reaches as much as 6200 TWh by 2050, with almost 1000 TWh of that for H2. 👇
3/n This would consume a very substantial chunk of India's maximum estimated technical potential for onshore wind and solar PV. 👇
The required rate of supply growth and land footprint may be challenging!
This reinforces the message: direct electrification wherever possible.