Today will be the 70th #Königswinter Conference, the annual British-German exchange that brings together great people from the respective governments, parliaments, industries and academia.
It is also a good time to reflect on British-German relations four years into #Brexit.
The good: Foreign and Security Policy has been mostly shielded from Brexit, even during the most difficult negotiations.
The E3 cooperation is going strong, and Germany and the UK continue to cooperate closely in other international fora such as the G7 or the UN.
The bad: From a German perspective, the EU was the most important framework to engage with the UK.
Trade has already suffered, even before the UK has left the transition period.
On many issues the UK is now not in the arena most relevant for German economic policy.
The ugly: What has really suffered is the public perception of the UK in Germany.
#Brexit has largely been characterised as mad, chaos is the most used word to describe UK politics.
The latest moves to violate legal commitments reinforces that image of a friend gone mad.
My Outlook: Much of this overblown. I expect UK-German cooperation to get closer once the toxic Brexit negotiations hopefully end with a deal.
But Königswinter will also be an opportunity to remind UK that anacrimonious no deal Brexit wd also severely impact bilateral relations.
To have these open exchanges, it is all the more sad that this year's conference can only take place with a digital connection between London and Berlin. Ahead of the crunch moment of Brexit negotiations, this would have been the perfect moment for frank informal conversation.
Finally, if you are interested in #Königswinter, read this great history by @HeleneBismarck looking back at the past 70 years of this informal British-German exchange:
#Königswinter kicked off with a discussion on foreign policy cooperation - as written earlier an area less affected by #Brexit, but challenged nevertheless. Looking forward to the discussion with Michael Gove next.
2/ On first sight, a very similar perspective emerged from most countries, with a triangle of concerns:
Democracy, Defence and trade.
3/ Democracy: There are fears that a second Trump term could embolden authoritarian & right-wing populist forces in Europe & globally, undermining democratic rules & norms.
His support for illiberal leaders like Orban is particularly worrying for European democracy.
As far-right parties are gaining ground across Europe ahead of the #EP2024 elections, @Beckehrung and I have analysed the geostrategic positioning of different far-right parties across five key dimensions.
For the analysis, we looked at voting in the EP in regards to EU relations with Russia, China, the US/NATO as well as EU foreign and security policy and enlargement.
We analysed 74 votes during the current legislature, and included all parties to the right of the EPP.
Relations with Russia have long been a divisive point between different far-right parties, but they also differ significantly on EU-China relations, transatlantic relations and (to a lesser extent) enlargement.
2) The focus of the report is to get the EU fit for enlargement and strengthen democracy/rule of law.
The UK is mentioned in a half sentence, for an outer tier of Associate Membership with single market integration, if it wants to. Which neither the UK gov nor Labour wants.
3) The publication of the report was long planned for today's General Affairs Council, ahead of further EU discussions on enlargement planned for the fall. The overlap to Starmer's Paris visit was pure coincidence, driver is the EU's enlargement debate.
As someone who argued for more European sovereignty - in a Euro-atlantic framework - I am truly baffled the German government communication and decision-making on Leopard 2. The damage it is doing to German credibility and European sovereignty is hard to overstate. /1
First, The German government is arguing it does not want to act alone ('No Alleingänge'). But so many of its European allies - from the Central/Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltics), North (Finland), South (Spain), Northwest (UK) now want to act and are calling for Berlin to do so. /2
However, the German government is now arguing it needs a US decision to send tanks before it can send Leos or give other European countries permission to do so.
Instead of European sovereignty, this is effectively outsourcing risky decision-making to the US. /3
@JeremyCliffe First, it's not just centre-right parties moving further to the right (like the US republicans), but also far-right parties becoming more moderate, especially on EU policy. See Meloni, Salvini, Le Pen et al all moving away from calling for their version of either Euro or EU-exit.
@JeremyCliffe Instead, as @APHClarkson, these far-right parties have become 'Europeanised' - they know voters don't want to leave the EU, so instead they want to remake the EU in their image, with hard migration, a 'Europe of nations' w/o rule of law protections.
Today's massive tax cuts in the new UK budget also mark a turning point in the economics of #Brexit which will decide how the success or failure of Brexit will be judged in the future.
First, at the heart of Brexit was always an economic inconsistency. Some Leavers supported it to protect the UK from globalisation, attacking the EU for being a vehicle of liberal policies.
Many of those ended up as first time Tory voters for Boris Johnson, i.e. the ‘red wall’.
They wanted Brexit for a culturally conservative, but economic left-wing policies.