For those of you who have wondered what ICAO spoofing is, or why it is getting so much attention lately, here is a short description of what is going on.
1st, the callsign: a plane tracker will know from experience which are frequently used. Many air traffic radio enthusiasts over time have compiled 100s of callsigns assigned to particular aircraft. In this instance, MOJO is often seen in the Persian Gulf by refuel tankers.
2/
Callsigns can be a clue that a transmitter is receiving a false interrogation of its Mode-S receiver. Mode-S is a 6 digit code, using A-F letters and 0-9 numbers. Countries are assigned 3 digit prefix codes for their planes. In this case, AE0 is a code used for US mil planes.
3/
In certain circumstances, the plane along it's route will change from its preassigned callsign, but generally not its Mode-S code which is tied to a specific registration or tail number telling what it really is.
In this instance, N873GQ hasn't been assigned yet. It's bogus.
4/
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Fantastic film. Perhaps the best of the modern era in terms of nuclear war fiction. Invoking the plot lines of a number of many prior films without actually drawing them to their full conclusions.
That said, I felt there were several major problems.
First, the whodunnit.
The scenario is made possible by a certain amount of ambiguity as to whether the DPRK, PLA or Russia launched the initial missile, made possible by a failure of detection by an early warning satellite in a region in which all 3 nations share interests.
SAR imagery confirms destroyed airframes at the locations in part 3.
Adjusting suspected one Tu-22M location (52.901642, 103.575327) to 52.900303, 103.574194.
Adding third suspected Tu-22M: 52.895627, 103.582776