The FB investigation took down several different sets of inauthentic assets, including Russian military and individuals associated with the IRA.
They have a track record of election interference. Cleaning their assets out before the U.S. election seems… prudent.
The @Graphika_NYC team looked at the Russian military assets. About 300 of them, activity ranging from 2013 to 2020.
It wasn’t one coherent set: more like different clusters at different times and looking in different directions, north, south, east and west.
On Facebook, there were various fake assets. Some posed as journalists. Others were batch-created, with stolen profile pics, serving as amplifiers.
Fake accounts, making friends with each other.
But this was a cross-platform effort. Some of the networks - there were several - ran the same persona across multiple platforms. Trying to make them look more credible?
This was an interesting one. Pamela Spenser, until recently on Facebook, Medium and Twitter.
The persona wrote a lot about Syria, from a very pro-Russian stance.
Personally, she reminds me of Alice Donovan.
More broadly, Syria was a big theme in this takedown set.
English, Arabic and Russian posts. Basic message: Russia and Assad good, America and the West bad.
Oh, and chemical attacks as false flags.
Subtle.
Another hot spot was, well, cold.
The Arctic.
Guess what? Russia good, NATO not so good.
And as for organisations like @Greenpeace, @WWF and @Bellona_no, well... I don't think this operation liked them much.
Interestingly, a whole cluster of assets across multiple platforms took aim at Japan, especially over the Kuril islands.
Some of those claimed to be run from Khabarovsk, in the Russian Far East.
That may be true. An earlier takedown of Russian military assets included links to a website called nbenegroup[.]com, which posed as a student geopolitical analysis group.
This was its domain registration. Awkward.
One of my favourite personas in the whole set was this one. (On Twitter and Wordpress as well as Instagram).
Stop the Winter Olympics because, um, Russia got banned for doping.
Think of it as Operation Sour Grapes.
I'd love to know if anyone replied to this.
Moving West, there was lots of content attacking Ukraine.
Because of course.
There was even a really early cluster of accounts that posed as ... wait for it... hacktivists.
Late 2013-early 2014. They went silent by mid-2014.
Hacking and defacing Ukrainian and allied websites around February-March 2014, just as Russia was annexing Crimea.
Further West, this cluster seemed to dislike, well, pretty much everybody, really.
NATO, the Baltics, the USA, Georgia...
Mostly this was in English or Russian, but sometimes they really stretched.
Also, they targeted Angela Merkel. As Russian operations so often do.
Sometimes, the strategic interests of different clusters intersected. Here's a Syria-focused asset riffing on the Skripal poisoning.
Only one small cluster focused on US politics. That was based around a blog called "Black and intelligent."
Before anyone loses perspective, it last posted in January, and had less than 500 followers across all platforms.
Important for the attempt, not the reach.
The blog worked by copying content from bona fide news outlets. Every article was plagiarised.
That looks like an audience-building exercise that was dropped before it built an audience.
So overall, where are we?
Different clusters of fake accounts, most likely run by different teams in different places.
Some were active right up to the takedown, some stopped posting years ago.
Common thread: Russian strategic narratives, especially around the military.
They didn't have much impact. The most popular page had about 3,500 followers, the most popular page had about 6,500 members.
Posts like this had a certain charm, though.
So beautiful view, indeed.
(That was from a persona that claimed to have gone to @OfficialUoM.
Really?)
Like I said, finding and taking down threat actors *before* the election is a smart move.
But that doesn't mean the threat actors have gone away.
Like I've also said: keep calm, but keep watch.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…